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The Horme in Purposivistic Psychology and Karma in the Gita—A Comparative Study

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In his paper on 'Indian Philosophy in relation to Contemporary Italian Thought'[1] Professor Surendaranath Das Gupta says, 'My contention is that most of the elements of contemporary European thought are found anticipated in Indian Philosophy. I do not maintain for a moment that Indian systems of thought are identical with modern ones or *vice versa,* but I wish to maintain that the important elements are all there in more or less varying modifications. Much of what passes as modern philosophical discovery is like old wine in new bottles.' These words are pregnant with meaning. The object of this paper is to extend Professor Das Gupta's significant remarks to the realm of Western Theoretical Psychology. It is contended here that the most important element in the theoretical basis for, what is perhaps, the most influential school of modern psychological thought has been anticipated in Indian Philosophy.

Professor McDougall's hormic psychology bids fair to conquer and assimilate all its rival schools. The outstanding contribution of the Hormic school is the discovery that the horme is the very essence of the structure of the mind. This discovery, we hold, was made long ago (in the fifth century B.C. if we accept Professor Radhakrishnan's conclusion regarding the date of the Gita) by the Master of the Gita.

1. Atti Del Quinto Congresso Internazionale Di Filosofia, p. 1156.

The Hormic school is one of the oldest of the contemporary schools of psychology. It was in 1908 that it took shape as the result of a protest against the lop-sided intellectualism of the then reigning schools of psychology. As against the rationalising tendency of psychology, Professor McDougall, the founder of the school, stressed the life of emotion, and the importance of the play of motives in human action. Human conduct depends upon impulses, and these impulses are non-rational, just because they are ultimate.

'It is the mental forces, the sources of energy, which set the ends and sustain the course of all human activity—of which forces the intellectual processes are but the servants, instruments or means.'[2] Professor McDougall does not neglect the intellect. His theory of the mind is not a partial theory. Unlike the other schools, the Hormic school takes the whole mind into account, and gives intellect its proper place in its scheme. The hormic theory asserts that the behaviour of every organism is purposive, though the purpose might be vague in many cases. That which urges the organism on to action is the Horme, the vital impulse called variously as the *elan vital* by Bergson, the *libido* by Jung and the *will-to-live* by Schopenhauer. Professor McDougall's work, 'An Outline of Psychology,' is one long argument in support of the hormic thesis.

'The instincts are prime movers of all human activity; by the conative or impulsive force of some instinct, every train of thought, however cold and passionless it may seem, and every bodily activity is initiated and sustained.'[3] Professor McDoughall himself asserts that the hormic theory of action is not new, but very old. But his emphasis, or over-emphasis as his opponents term it, is but the natural corollary of the general theory of the structure of the mind which he has propounded. His brilliant analysis of instinctive propensities, and his equally brilliant attempt to trace the complex sentiments of adult life to their instinctive sources, should not blind us to the origin from which all these subsidiary doctrines take their rise.

It is possible to pick holes in Professor McDougall's hormic theory, if one confined oneself to its partial manifestations in the discussions about instincts, intelligence, belief and reasoning, attention, etc.

The doctrine of instincts propounded by Professor McDougall has been most vigorously attacked by those engaged in laying a psycholo-

2. McDougall, W. Introduction to Social Psychology, p. 3.
3. *Ibid.* p. 44.

gical foundation for sociology. Mr. Bernard's treatise on 'Instinct' is typical of the one-sided criticism urged against the hormic theory. Professor McDougall's analysis of instincts, and particularly his classification of instincts, his account of the relationship between emotions and instincts, have all been argued against with great show of reason. But in the heat of the controversy the critics have lost sight of the fundamentals of hormic psychology. But 'now, happily, all is changed; the animal psychologists have begun to realise that any description of animal behaviour which ignores its goal-seeking nature is futile;...... they are busy with the study of 'drives,' 'sets,' and 'incentives'. . . Much the same state of affairs prevails in current American writings on human psychology..... Motivation after being almost ignored, has become a problem of central interest. We are in a transition period; and all this recognition of the purposive nature of human activity is partial and grudging.'[4]

Human activity, then, is hormic activity involving 'the liberation of energy potential or latent in the tissues.' Hormic psychology asserts that active striving towards a goal is a fundamental category of psychology.[5]

Three basic principles of supreme importance emerge from a careful examination of the foundations of hormic psychology. (1) The mind is fundamentally a unity. (2) The Horme or the primeval urge is of the very essence of the mind, as it lives and moves in this phenomenal world. (3) This Horme differentiates itself into the impulses of the instincts (or propensities), which have been clearly analysed by Professor McDougall.

This hormic theory was clearly present before the mind of the Great Teacher of the Bhagavad Gita when he propounded his doctrine of 'Desireless Action.' The author of the Gita had profound insight into human nature; he had a very thorough knowledge of the psychology of the human mind.[6] We have no hesitation in affirming that the exposition of the doctrine of action (especially in Adhyayas 2, 3 and 6) is based on the second hormic principle enunciated above.

4. Psychologies of 1930, p. 3.

5. Had Prof. McDougall confined the term 'desire' to the desire for the goal or 'fruit of action,' and used the expression 'horme' to indicate the primal urge to action a great deal of confusion could have been avoided.

6. The mind referred to here is the mind in the midst of the phenomenal environment.

Mr. A. S. Wadia, in the opening chapter of his book, 'The Message of Sri Krishna,' says, 'By habit and thought, temperament and character, the East has long been associated with Passivity and Inaction as the West with Effort and Activity...... And yet, strange to say, the guiding star of the East wrote Effort large and luminous on his own incomparable life and proclaimed Action repeatedly and triumphantly in his own peerless Song Celestial.' The call to action rings persistently through every line of the Gita.

The author of the Gita is intensely interested in man, and the Song Celestial, therefore, definitely concerns itself with the problem of conduct. The solution which the Gita offers to the ethical problems is based upon the psychological analysis of the *Gunas* of the mind. The Gita definitely discountenances inaction (III, 27 and 32). In chapter III verses 4 and 20, and in chapter IV verse 41, Sri Krishna preaches renunciation, and yet, immediately after, he insists upon practical performance of duty. Such an attitude tantalises Arjuna, who asks, 'If the method of discernment or knowledge without action be held by Thee more excellent than work, why dost thou urge me to work ?' This question elicits a long answer (III, 3 to 35) which weighs the respective merits and demerits of the teaching of the Veda, Samkhya and Yoga regarding work. 'Activity is natural to man and no view of life which overlooks that feature or minimises its importance can be right.' Men must work and work is inevitable, nay more, it is right ! In the remarkable utterance in III, 20-22 Sri Krishna points out that even the liberated (jivanmuktas) should work so long as they are in the world. A little farther on (III, 27) it is asserted that this work is done entirely by the *gunas* of nature. And Sri Krishna urges Arjuna to work. This precept is no empty precept. That the urge to work (the horme) is natural to the mind is fully recognised. This primal urge is present even in the minds of those who have secured liberation. It is a clear proof of the fact that the horme is of the very essence of the structure of the mind.

We gain further support for our view when we analyse the exposition of renunciation. Sri Krishna preaches not renunciation *of* action, but renunciation *in* action. He does not recommend the rooting out of all desires, but only the rooting out of the desire for the fruit of action, and the desire for selfish gain. In chapter V we are told that true renunciation and true performance of work are not opposed. 'Who is the true renouncer ? Not he who attempts to remain completely inactive, but he whose work is done in a spirit of detachment.' The Samkhya method of inaction is condemned in unmistakable terms in this chapter. The opening verses of chapter VI emphasise once again

the oneness of renunciation and performance of work. Sri Aurobindo Ghose writes, 'No, he (Sri Krishna) says, 'such renunciation far from being indispensable, is not even possible. 'For none stands even for a moment not doing work; every one is made to do action helplessly by the modes of Prakriti.' The strong perception of the great cosmic action and the eternal activity and power of the cosmic energy which was so much emphasised afterwards by the teaching of the Tantric Shaktas who even made Prakriti or Shakti superior to Purusha is a very remarkable feature of the Gita. Although here in an undertone, it is still strong enough, coupled with, what we might call the theistic and devotional elements of its thought to bring in that activism which so strongly modifies in its scheme of Yoga the quietistic tendencies of the old metaphysical Vedanta. Man embodied in the natural world cannot cease from action, not for a moment, not for a second; his very existence here is an action.'[7]

No more authentic pronouncement is needed to establish our contention than these weighty words of the great sage. The author of the Gita was perfectly conscious of the hormic theory of human action.

The following verses bear out our contention:[8]

III, 1-8

If, O Janardana! devotion is deemed by you to be superior to action, then why, O Kesava! do you prompt me to this fearful action? You seem, indeed, to confuse my mind by equivocal words. Therefore, declare one thing determinately, by which I may attain the highest good.

The Deity said,

O sinless one! I have already declared that in this world there is a two-fold path—that of the Samkhyas by devotion in the shape of (true) knowledge; and that of the Yogins in the shape of action. A man does not attain freedom from action merely by not engaging in action; nor does he attain perfection by mere renunciation. For nobody ever remains for an instant without performing some action; since the qualities of nature constrain everybody to some action.

7. Ghose: Essays on the Gita, I series, p. 154.
8. Telang: Bhagavad Gita, S. B. E., Vol. 8.

III, 33

Even a man of knowledge acts consonantly to his own nature. All beings follow nature.

IV, 16-20.

The truth regarding action is abstruse. He is wise among men, he is possessed of devotion, and performs all action, who sees inaction in action and action in inaction. The wise call him learned, whose acts are all free from desires and fancies, and whose actions are burnt down by the fire of knowledge. Forsaking all attachment to the fruit of action always contented, dependent on none, he does nothing at all, though he engages in action.

V, 1-3.

O Krishna! you praise renunciation of actions and also the pursuit (of them). Tell me determinately which one of these two is superior.

The Deity said,

Renunciation and pursuit of action are both instruments of happiness. But of the two, pursuit of action is superior to renunciation of action. He should be understood to be always an ascetic who has no aversion and no desires.

VI, 1-3.

He who, regardless of the fruit of action, performs the actions which ought to be performed, is the devotee and renouncer, not he who discards the (sacred) fires; not he who performs no acts. Know, O son Pandu! that what is called renunciation is devotion, for nobody becomes a devotee who has not renounced (all) fancies. To the sage who wishes to rise to devotion, action is said to be a means.

These verses, and others with similar import, in the later chapters stress the need for action, and prescribe action as the means for deliverance. This action should be desireless action (that is action performed without desire for the fruit). But such action is not purposeless action.[9] It has a vivid and intense purpose. 'On me place your mind, sacrifice to me, reverence me, and you will certainly come to me,' says Krishna.

9. The difference between the urge to action (horme) and the desire for the enjoyment of the fruit of action is brought out, in a striking manner, in the Gita.

When the Great Teacher made the demand for desireless action of his devotees he was not making a demand impossible or even difficult of fulfilment. He knew full well that he was prescribing a course of conduct which did not cut athwart the pain of mental structure. In short, he knew the hormic structure of the human mind.[10]

10. Further support for our position is gained from Lokamanya Tilak's 'Gita Rahasya.' The following lines have been taken from Mr. Bhide''s paper on 'The Gist of the Gita Rahasya,' Kalyana Kalpataru, Gita Number, 1935:

Now let us turn to the mandatory portion of verse 48 (II). But before that it is necessary to ascertain the significance of verse 47, because in this verse it is stated 'Thou hast a right to action alone.' The term right (Adhikari) is clearly intended to show that according to 'Buddhiyoga' 'Karma' (action) is not something unauthorised but that which *necessarily and naturally devolves upon man.*

"The word 'kama' in Samskrit means passion. A passion for devotion to the Supreme Deity is also known as 'kama' and actions done with this motive are also called 'Sakama' or interested actions. But it is wrong to believe that all passions or desires lead to sinful results. Passions or desires which are not contrary to the Divine laws are virtuous and not sinful. Not only this, such passions lie at the root of 'Paramartha' of spiritual progress. Therefore all actions done with a pious motive are disinterested actions. This definition is fully acceptable to the srutis and smritis alike."

A Brief History of English Scholarship

By

M. S. Sundaram

(*Continued from page 25, Vol. VI No. 1.*)

II. BEGINNINGS OF ANGLO-SAXON SCHOLARSHIP

English scholarship, in the strict sense of the term, may be said to begin with the study of Anglo-Saxon literature. Even before the conquest of England by the Norman kings, Anglo-Saxon, as a literary language, was slowly dying and passing into some other form. For some two hundred years Anglo-Saxon had ceased to produce any great poetry or literary prose. The language itself showed signs of a complete break; its inflections were becoming loose and its dialects were thrown into a confused mixture. With the coming of the Normans, French became the established court language. Literature, in a language which had been banished from the court and had been losing its distinctive features, was obviously impossible. Anglo-Saxon had succeeded in producing works of intrinsic merit both in prose and verse and had established its claim to being the ancestor of one of the greatest literatures of Europe, and one of the oldest, with the exception of Icelandic. For nearly two hundred years after the Norman conquest we have no Anglo-Saxon literature except the last sections of the Worcester and Peterborough chronicles, the last of which extends to the year 1155. The bulk of literary work between the fifth and twelfth centuries known as Anglo-Saxon was mostly preserved in the monasteries where the effects of the Norman Conquest were not felt very much. Some of the very valuable manuscripts were preserved intact in the monastery of Tevistock.

To a scholar of the fifteenth century in England, any of the Anglo-Saxon manuscripts preserved in the monasteries would have appeared almost as a foreign language. By the fifteenth century English had undergone such vast changes both in form and vocabulary, and scholars were concerned more with Latin learning and the classics than with Anglo-Saxon. The earliest references to Anglo-Saxon literature in the period of the Renaissance are found in the works of that most incomparable of compilers and editors—Richard Hakluyt. In his *Principal Navigations* which has been called " the prose epic of the modern English nation," Hakluyt refers to the voyages of Othere mentioned in Alfred's

Orosius. This might be interpreted as proof that the Elizabethan scholars and researchers were acquainted with Anglo-Saxon literature. The study of Anglo-Saxon was not at any time allowed to decay completely, but it was not until the beginning of the English Reformation that a real attempt was made by English scholars to do research in Anglo-Saxon literature and to print the ancient texts of Anglo-Saxon buried in the monastic shelves.

Almost the first name connected with the revival of the study of Anglo-Saxon is that of Matthew Parker, (1504-1575) Archbishop of Canterbury in the reign of Queen Elizabeth. He held various appointments both in the State and in the Church and was for a time Vice-Chancellor of the University of Cambridge. He identified himself with the party which sought to establish a *via media* between Romanism and Puritanism, known later as the Anglican party. In his untiring researches carried out among church tracts, he came to know of the sermon of Aelfric, and it seemed to him to have a bearing on the debated question of the sacrament as maintained by the Anglican church. Since the time of Aelfric there had grown up customs and rituals for which no warrant could be found. Parker immediately ordered this work of Aelfric to be published. The motive was purely ecclesiastical but the work turned out to be of immense value to Anglo-Saxon learning. Matthew Parker was a great lover of books and he knew the value of old manuscripts. The dissolution of the monasteries had done irreparable harm to the manuscript collections preserved in them, and a great many Anglo-Saxon treasures happened to be scattered all over the country, and some, secreted abroad by foreigners. Parker spared no pains in collecting these scattered treasures and instructed Bale, the antiquary, to use all his efforts to secure such manuscripts as were still to be found. He had several other agents both at home and abroad whom he employed in this business of collecting books. He bequeathed all his valuable collection to the Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, of which he was a student. These manuscripts are called by Fuller "the sun of English antiquity." One of Parker's great objects was to revive and stimulate the study of the Saxon language, and he employed John Day, the printer, to cut the first Saxon types. He was the earliest among English scholars to perceive the necessity for an Anglo-Saxon dictionary and had actually planned this work which he had no leisure to pursue.

Matthew Parker had the rare gift of selecting able men to assist him in his research. Parker's secretary was a certain John Josselyn (1529-1603) who was a great Anglo-Saxon scholar. He was a student of Queen's College, Cambridge, and in his twentieth year was elected

fellow of Queen's. When Parker became Archbishop, he chose this scholar as his Latin secretary, and he rendered Parker invaluable assistance in his literary undertakings. Parker has sometimes been accused of taking the credit of Josselyn's work by giving his name to Josselyn's writings.

Josselyn's name is closely associated with Anglo-Saxon learning. Under Parker's guidance he made collections from Anglo-Saxon documents, and many of his notes and collections are found among the Cottonian and Harleian sections in the British Museum. He was the earliest to prepare an Anglo-Saxon and Latin dictionary and also an Anglo-Saxon grammar. Josselyn published Parker's *Testimonie of Antiquity shewing the ancient Fayth in the Church of England, touching the Sacrament of the Body and Bloude of the Lord* which was an edition of *Aelfric's Homily* discovered about 1567. William Lisle re-edited this volume in 1623.

Lawrence Nowell (?—1576) Dean of Lichfield, has been acclaimed as the founder of Anglo-Saxon studies. Camden gives him very high praise and calls him the restorer of Anglo-Saxon learning. He was a member of both the Universities (Oxford and Cambridge) and a diligent antiquary. He learned Anglo-Saxon "being among the first to revive the study of that language in England." (Cambden's *Brittania*). He left in manuscript an Anglo-Saxon dictionary entitled *Vocabularium Saxonicum* which passed into the hands of several scholars of Anglo-Saxon, and is now in the Bodleian Library. He edited no work under his own name.

Nowell's pupil, William Lambarde, (1536-1601) imbibed his master's enthusiasm for Anglo-Saxon studies, and at the suggestion of Nowell he undertook a collection and paraphrase of the Anglo-Saxon Laws (1568).

One of the early foreign scholars who showed a special interest in the study of Anglo-Saxon was Richard Verstegen (1565-1620) a Dutchman, who took the English name of Rowlands and joined Christ Church, Oxford. Being a zealous Catholic he left the University without a degree declining the religious tests. On his return to Amsterdam he set up a printing press and cut special types to print Anglo-Saxon words. The principal work is entitled *Restitution of Decayed Intelligence concerning the Most Learned and Renowned English nation,* 1605. He dedicated the book fittingly to the learned King of England, James I. In this book he gives a summary of all the invasions of Britain, the formation of its languages, surnames, and exhibits his knowledge and appreciation of Anglo-Saxon. His collection of Anglo-Saxon words printed in this book is our earliest printed vocabulary in Old English. This foreigner is again the

first to point out the distinctions between the three principal Anglo-Saxon dialects—the southern, the midland and the northern. Thus the study of dialects is not so very modern as some of us are inclined to think. Verstegen also refers to Chaucer as the first illuminator of the English tongue, but he complains of Chaucer's mixing English and French words indiscriminately.

By the year 1600 the Anglo-Saxon language was accessible and well-known to the continent. In 1597 there appeared a book called *De Literas et Lingua Getarum* (the writing and language of the Goths) in which we find ten pages (between 70-80) devoted to "specimens of the old Saxon language which the English made use of 1,000 years ago." The author, by name Wulcanius Brugensis, gives quotations from Asser's Life of Alfred with modern translations.

With the beginning of the seventeenth century a new era in Anglo-Saxon scholarship begins. For nearly fifty years Cambridge becomes the real centre of Anglo-Saxon studies. It was mainly due to the energy and enthusiasm of one man that a great revival of interest in Anglo-Saxon began. Our knowledge of Anglo-Saxon is largely due to the researches carried out by Sir Henry Spelman, (1564-1641) Church historian and antiquary. He was pronounced to be a dull boy at school and the "curst schoolmaster" under whom he was educated used to say, "as very a dunce as Henry Spelman" (Aubrey's *Lives*). Spelman graduated from Cambidge in 1581 and settled near London determined to devote all his spare time to research. His scholarly abilities combined with his knowledge of affairs commended him to King James I, by whom he was appointed Commissioner to determine unsettled titles to lands and manors in Ireland. Nothing was a more pleasing task to this antiquary.

Spelman was greatly interested in English law and desired to trace them back to their sources and original records. He experienced great difficulties in finding out the proper meanings of Anglo-Saxon terms used in early legal records, and he determined to compile a glossary of law terms. In 1626 the first volume of the glossary extending to the letter "L" was published. The concluding volume for which he gathered materials was not published till after his death in 1664. His researches in collecting material for the Anglo-Saxon glossary induced him to found an Anglo-Saxon lecturership at Cambridge. He wrote to Abraham Wheelocke touching this subject, "We must not launch out into the deep before we know the points of our compass." Finally, he experimented boldly by establishing a lecturership and endowing it with a stipend. Wheelocke was appointed the first lecturer and he proved to be also the last in this post. The stipend attached to this office was on the death of

Wheelocke, paid to William Somner towards enabling him to complete a Saxon Dictionary.

Spelman was master of the art of editing, and in some respects he could be said to have anticipated the modern ways of editing books. He collected various manuscripts and recognised the importance of variant readings. (We had to wait nearly a hundred years to get the variant readings of Shakespeare's plays).

It was at the instance of Spelman that another Cambridge scholar devoted his time and energy to the study of Anglo-Saxon. This was Abraham Wheelocke (1593-1653) a great student of oriental languages at a time when comparatively no interest was evinced in oriental learning. He was the University Librarian at Cambridge and also Professor of Arabic and Persian. But his name is best remembered in connection with the work he did as Anglo-Saxon reader. In 1643 he published the Anglo-Saxon *Translation of Bede* ascribed to Alfred and also an edition and translation of the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*. For the latter, he used two manuscripts, one of which belonging to the Cottonian collection was destroyed by fire. His edition is the only authority now on which modern editors depend for the authentic text. Wheelocke admits having derived his knowledge of Anglo-Saxon mainly from the letters and writings of Sir Henry Spelman. Spelman suggested to him, among other tasks, the compilation of a comprehensive dictionary of Anglo-Saxon which Wheelocke commenced but left unfinished. This project was completed by William Somner (1598-1669) the first Oxford scholar of Anglo-Saxon in 1659.

In Anglo-Saxon scholarship Cambridge had the lead by nearly half a century, but after the death of Wheelocke interest in Anglo-Saxon almost died out in Cambridge and began a new life in Oxford.

The greatest name associated with Anglo-Saxon scholarship in the seventeenth century is that of a foreigner, Du Jon Francois, a Dutchman, who took the English name of Francis Junius (1589-1677). In 1621 he came to England where he became librarian in the household of the Earl of Arundel. For thirty years he lived with this family, and during this period paid several visits to the Bodleian Library at Oxford. He devoted himself to the study of Anglo-Saxon in connection with his comparative study of Teutonic and Northern languages. He was the discoverer of *Caedmon* and it was at Amsterdam that the text of *Caedmon* was first printed (1655). There are references to Caedmon in Bede's works, but the text of Caedmon was unknown for a long time. Milton shows a knowledge of Caedmon, but he could not have seen the edition brought

out by Junius, for Milton was blind by 1652 and Caedmon was printed only in 1655. Archbishop Usher (1581-1656) had a copy of Caedmon in his collections which he had presented to Junius.

After several visits to Holland, Junius finally returned to England and retired to his favourite town of Oxford where he at first lodged opposite Lincoln College of which the Rector, Dr. Marshall, was his intimate friend and collaborator. Together with Marshall (1621-1685) he edited the Anglo-Saxon gospels and the Gothic gospels of Ulfilas with a Gothic glossary, Junius editing the Gothic and Marshall, the Anglo-Saxon.

Before his death on November 19, 1677, Junius made a magnanimous gift to Oxford by bequeathing in his will all his manuscript collections to the Bodleian and also the Saxon types which he had specially designed for printing Caedmon. The manuscripts which he bequeathed contained both " Caedmon " and the " Ormulum." Junius's own book on philology *Etymologicum Anglicanum* was of immense value to later students of the language, and Dr. Johnson referred to it for his etymologies when he compiled the English Dictionary.

The friendship of Junius and Marshall and the bequests of the former to the Bodleian gave a great impetus to Anglo-Saxon learning in Oxford. For the next hundred years the home of Anglo-Saxon studies was Oxford. Gothic and Icelandic studies were also revived in Oxford. The University Press co-operated with the scholars in furthering this enthusiasm for Anglo-Saxon. The Sheldonian theatre which is to-day used for holding the Convocation of the University was originally used as the University Printing Press. (The Clarendon Press came into existence only in the eighteenth century) Many of the early books printed at Oxford mention the Sheldonian on the title-page, and in some, there is even a wood-cut of the Sheldonian as it is to-day. In some of the books we find " Tipis Junianus " printed on the title page, meaning that the books were issued with the use of the types presented by Junius to the University.

Anglo-Saxon in course of time became the fashionable study for clever young men at Oxford, and Queen's College produced some of the exceptional scholars who continued the enthusiasm for the revival of the oldest literature of England. In the year 1803 there was created a Professorship of Anglo-Saxon in the University of Oxford and the first to hold the chair was Professor James Ingram. In 1807 he published his Inaugural lecture (as Rawlinson Professor of Anglo-Saxon) on the utility of Anglo-Saxon literature to which is added the geography of Europe by King Alfred.

From the time of Junius up to the inauguration of the chair of Anglo-Saxon at Oxford, a great many scholars devoted their attention to the revival and study of all the available materials in the language. The name of George Hickes (1642-1715) is only next in importance to that of Junius among the seventeenth century scholars of Anglo-Saxon. He was a non-juror and member of St. John's College, Oxford, and after graduation, he became Fellow of Lincoln's and was tutor there for seven years. At Worcester he began the study of the northern languages, and after a year's indefatigable work compiled his Anglo-Saxon and Maero-Gothic grammar printed in Oxford in 1689. Between 1703-05 appeared his best-known work printed in the University Press, Oxford, *the Lingarum veterum septentionalium thesarus grammatico-criticus et archœologicus* which was acclaimed by all contemporaries as a stupendous monument of learning and industry. It contained a comprehensive survey of the Anglo-Saxon, Gothic and Icelandic grammars. The entire work was dedicated to Prince George of Denmark and was priced at three guineas.

Among the scholars of Anglo-Saxon at Queen's College at this time, may be mentioned William Nicholson, Edward Gibson and Edward Thwaites, who, each made a distinct contribution to the advancement of old English studies. William Nicholson (1655-1727) graduated from Queen's in 1675 and travelled abroad learning German and the northern languages. Hearne says that Nicholson "had ye reputation (and not undeservedly) of a drinking fellow and boon companion; but his industry must always have been great, for at Oxford, in addition to the labours already specified, he transcribed for Bishop Fell, the large lexicon of Junius, and compiled a "Glossarium Brigantinum."

Of the many young scholars inspired by the work of George Hickes, Edmund Gibson (1669-1748) was the most noteworthy considering the services rendered to the advancement of Anglo-Saxon studies. He was attracted to the study of old English which was then the rage at Oxford. He was Fellow of Queen's and in 1692 he brought out an edition of the "Saxon Chronicle" with a Latin translation and notes. He based his text of the chronicle on the manuscript which was a gift of Archbishop Laud to the University Library, but he also compared it with a few others. Plummer in his edition of the *Two Saxon-Chronicles* bestows great praise on Gibson's edition; but Gibson treated the Anglo-Saxon chronicle as though it was the work of one author. Gibson never formed any clear view of the relative value of the authorities which he employed, and taking sometimes one and sometimes another version, he managed to produce a composite text. But he was an honest editor and mentioned the sources from where he obtained his text.

Edward Thwaites (1667-1711) was a batler at Queen's College and came early in his college days under the spell of George Hickes. Among the Anglo-Saxon scholars at Queen's, Thwaites took the lead. He edited Alfred's Anglo-Saxon version of the 'Universal History' of Orosius. He was elected Lecturer in Anglo-Saxon and he next laboured in bringing out a revised edition of Somner's Anglo-Saxon dictionary, and in this he was helped by another scholar, by name, Thomas Benson. Thwaites also wrote an up-to-date grammar of Anglo-Saxon for the benefit of his pupils, to one of whom, by name, Christopher Rawlinson, it was dedicated by the author.

The reign of William III was an important period in the history of English scholarship and English antinquarian research. It was a period which witnessed the renaissance of Anglo-Saxon, and the full effects of this period were known only in later years. The spirit of research was animated by a sense of the continuity of the English language. The aim of the scholars was to recover old material, to know and understand it and then publish it. The same cannot be said of the research of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when phonology was viewed with greater importance than subject matter. The year 1705 may be taken as a great landmark in the history of Anglo-Saxon scholarship. That year witnessed the publication of Hicke's *Thesaurus.* All that Hickes knew of the northern languages was collected in the three volumes of this book, and there were many beautiful reproductions of old manuscripts in them. These volumes may be called a summing up of the studies in the older languages made so far.

Of the many who assisted Hickes in his monumental task, no one is more noteworthy than Humphrey Wanley. He was engaged for George Hickes in searching through various parts of England for Anglo-Saxon manuscripts. Wanley was a simple modest man whose value was not recognised until our century. He was assistant to a linendraper and remained with him till he was twenty-three, "but spent every vacant hour in studying old books and documents and in copying the various styles of handwriting." His studies are said to have begun with a transcript of Somner's Anglo-Saxon dictionary. He came to Oxford in 1695 and became an assistant in the Bodleian Library on a salary of £12 per annum. As he had no university degree he could not be appointed Librarian. He became secretary to the S.P.C.K. (Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge) and his talents as a scholar were discovered by Robert Harley who appointed him his private Librarian. Harley was a famous collector of books and Wanley advised him in the matter of choosing books. He was also a keen bargainer and often bought for his patron many valuable books. The library was inherited by Harley's son, and later it was scattered owing

to the poverty of Harley's descendants. But fortunately the manuscripts were kept together and were added to the Cottonian collection to form the nucleus of the British Museum. Wanley has the right to rank as one of the great scholars and cataloguers of all times.

The history of Anglo-Saxon scholarship may be concluded with a brief survey of the work of a very remarkable woman, Elizabeth Elstob, grand-daughter of George Hickes on her mother's side. Scholarship among women was rather rare at this time, and particularly Anglo-Saxon scholarship. Elizabeth Elstob (1683-1756) was a precocious child and at the age of eight she learnt accidence and grammar. Her brother, William Elstob, was a student at Queen's College, Oxford, and Elizabeth went to Oxford to attend upon her brother in his illness. William Elstob (1673-1715) was an Anglo-Saxon scholar, and under his guidance Elizabeth applied herself to further study and mastered eight European languages including Latin and Anglo-Saxon. In 1709 Elizabeth Elstob published the *English-Saxon Homily on the Nativity of St. Gregory* with an English translation and a preface. The book was dedicated to Queen Anne. The book contains a long chatty preface in which she explains the purpose of the work and how she came to write it. The story of St. Gregory exclaiming on seeing the Angles sold at the Slave market, " Ah ! they have the face of Angels " is found in this preface. She proposed to edit Aelfric's Homilies and advocated her scheme in a letter, " Some testimonials of learned men in favour of the intended version of the Saxon homilies." This publication was not completed, and a fragment of the first few pages is found in the British Museum.

In 1715 Elizabeth Elstob published her *Rudiments of Grammar for the English-Saxon tongue, first given in English ; with an apology for the study of Northern Antiquities.*

In the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Anglo-Saxon literature was revived in the two older universities. When Queen Anne ascended the throne Oxford made a special effort to display its loyalty by celebrating the accession with an address in every language ; one of the poems was in Anglo-Saxon composed by William Elstob. This was an indication that Oxford at this time had accepted Anglo-Saxon as one of the humane languages like Latin and Greek. Almost all the prose and verse in Anglo-Saxon had been unearthed and reprinted by this time. Only the *Beowulf* among the major works remained unknown, and it was not before 1815 that the first edition of this great masterpiece of Anglo-Saxon literature came to be published.

(*To be continued*)

The Tariff and the Handloom—Some Aspects

By

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INTRODUCTORY

[In this article, though an attempt has been made to offer some cut-and-dry suggestions towards a conclusion, the main aim of the author has merely been to provoke some discussion. He feels the imperative need of co-ordination in textile production: otherwise the benefits of the tariff would be confined to one section of the textile industry, and other interests prejudicially affected.]

Recently, the Madras Spinning Mills, that gave evidence before the Murray Board, contended that their interests were more seriously affected by foreign imports of yarn than those of the combined spinning and weaving mills, which are in a position to convert the bulk of their yarn into cloth, or to regulate sales of surplus yarn, according to market conditions. The agitation on behalf of the handloom weaver has been equally continuous, especially after the passing of the Cotton Yarn Duty Act of 1927, though with no fruitful results. The Murray Board, however, took the view that the protection of either the interests of the handloom weaver or the spinning section of the industry, did not fall within their terms of reference, but contented themselves with enhancing the duties on imported piecegoods.

The protection to spinning, the Indian mills contend, has, to a certain extent, been neutralised by the levy of a duty on imported cotton (½ anna per lb. or Rs. 12-8-0 per bale). This duty was justified on the ground that it would protect the grower of cotton in India and that it would incidentally permit the entry of foreign yarn of finer counts, on which the living of handloom weavers depends in some parts of India. But the Indian Central Cotton Committee itself (vide evidence before the Tariff Board on cotton, 1932) has recommended the confining of this duty to cotton between ⅞" tc 1"; for weaving finer counts of yarn, Egyptian or Uganda cotton is required by Indian mills at present. Mr. Kasturbhai Lalubhai pointed out (evidence before the Tariff Board : 1932) that there is really no competition between indigenous and imported cotton, and

that the only effect of the duty has been to handicap particularly the Ahmedabad mills, in the weaving of finer yarn.

The ultimate interest of the spinning industry would seem to require this duty. In recent years, (e.g. in 1921-22, 1926-27, 1931-32), Indian growers of short stapled cotton, who ordinarily do not feel the competition of foreign imports, suffered from the fall in the price of American cotton. There has also been a tendency for the quality of American cotton to deteriorate. If this should continue, in the absence of this import duty, the position of the Indian grower may become more precarious. Further, the growing of high quality cottons, having a staple of 1⅛″ or even 1¼″ and capable of spinning up to 60 counts warp, is likely to become a commercial proposition, in certain areas of Sind. If our ideal is the weaving of fine counts of yarn, from out of Indian cotton itself, the duty on imported cotton ought to continue. (Ordinarily, there is a difference of only Rs. 0-1-6 per lb. between the price of imported cotton and Broach cotton.)

Sir George Rainy, in 1927, frankly admitted that the specific duty on cotton yarn, would enhance the price of cotton yarn consumed by the handlooms, but justified it, on the ground that it was an emergent measure, dictated by the dumping of Chinese yarn. Others, however, in the Legislative Assembly, argued that (1) as 5/6th of the yarns used by the handlooms is of mill origin, its price would be determined by competition amongst Indian mills and not by the price of imported yarn, and that (2) particularly the price of yarns over 40 counts, largely used by the handlooms, would not be affected. (The majority of the Tariff Board in 1926, it need hardly be stated, were against the levy of such a duty on yarn "in view of the effect it would have on the handloom industry, which in 1925-26, supplied about 26% of the total consumption of cloth in India.")

Even at present, according to the Murray Report, "The spinning mills assert that the protection granted is inadequate and that no less than 10% of the purely spinning mills, have gone over to weaving. We are also told that in the case of coarse yarn and coarse piecegoods where economies of the power loom do not count, the handloom, partly protected by the Railway freight, is able to hold its own. (Vide, however, the evidence of the Government of the U. P. before the Tariff Board in 1932, for a contrary view).

In the case of medium counts, even the 1932 Tariff Board had to admit that the handloom is losing ground. Unlike the handloom weaver, the power loom does not pay any freight or commission charges. For

counts of yarn below 30s, the handlooms are almost entirely dependent on mills—their principal competitors—and if the existing duty, which also applies to finer counts of yarn, continues, the situation will be the same with reference to higher counts also. It may be argued that the handloom weaver has taken to Indian mill yarn not because the price of foreign yarn has been raised but largely because he has come to realise that, if he should use foreign yarn, his products would not command a market. At present, if the handloom weaver is killed, the market for mill-made yarn will disappear. As a result of this duty, many mills, which were merely weaving sheds, have begun to spin their yarn. Mr. Kasturbhai suggested that the duty be continued on all counts of yarn and that the assistance be provided to the handloom weaver in other ways. But it must be remembered that Indian mills at present account for only 3% of the total quantity of fine yarn used in India, and often, the " attempt of the handloom weaver, to take to lines of production in which there is not mill competition has been unsuccessful because of the high price of the finer counts of yarn (beyond 30s)." I am free to admit that other facts have also been at work ; the prejudice against goods woven from foreign yarn, the decline in the purchasing power of the rural classes in recent years, and the competition of cheap priced artificial silk goods will also explain the deterioration in the position of the handloom weaver. A way out of this difficulty is the substitution of subsidies in place of the import duty on fine yarn, following the recommendations of the majority of the Tariff Board in 1926. The specific duty on yarn ought to be levied on counts 40 and below and should be supplemented by bounties on the weaving of finer counts of yarns. When the specific duty is continued, the problem of how best to help the handloom persists. A cess of 3 pies per lb. on the production of Indian mill-made yarn has sometimes been suggested, the proceeds of which being distributed to the handloom weaver, to improve particularly his technical efficiency. If a cess be levied equivalent to the specific duty on imported yarn, the mill-owners might reasonably ask for a higher scale of duties on imported piecegoods, as such a cess would increase their cost of production. Unless the Government of India is willing to raise still further the tariff on woven goods, a cess is out of the question : there would arise also the inevitable question of Imperial Preference. Measures may be devised which would, in effect, limit the spheres of production of the power and handlooms.

Mr. Kasturbhai indicated in 1932 (evidence before the Tariff Board) that he was willing to surrender the right of weaving cloths below 18 counts, entirely in favour of the handloom : possibly Bombay may not be willing to surrender, such a large part of her coarse cotton cloth pro-

duction, but may be willing not to weave cloths of less than 12 counts (even then, there would be a few lines, such as tent-cloth, open to power looms). Now, if the mills consent to weave only cloths made out of medium counts, the handloom weaver, would have, as his province cloths woven out of counts below 12 and (2) cloths woven out of fine yarn, say about 60 counts. The establishment of a Federal Government, ought to enable us to enforce such agreements, in the Indian States. In view of provincial differences, in marketing conditions, such co-ordination of production may in the first instance, be on a provincial basis. Co-ordination in the production of textile goods is imperative: otherwise the position of the handloom weaver, would deteriorate. The interests of the spinning section of the Indian Mill Industry and of the handloom weaver, are not necessarily opposed, and ought to be reconciled like Road and Rail Interests. To revert: The duty on finer counts of yarn should be removed and Indian production of finer counts of yarn, stimulated directly by the grant of subsidies. (Taking Madras, only 2 per cent. of the Madras Mill's production is in counts of above 90's—Murray Report). If the price of very fine yarns, is not reduced, their use by the handloom would altogether cease. It is at this point, we have to notice, the competition of artificial silk yarn and piecegoods. They compete with dyed and fancy piecegoods made by the handloom and the power loom. (The Revenue duty on these yarns, was raised to 18¾ per cent in 1931 and was changed to 25 per cent or a minimum specific duty of 3 as. per pound in May 1934). In spite of duties, the imports increase. The interests of the Indian Mill, handloom and sericulture industries, with singular unanimity, demand that they must still further be raised. If the price of indigenous silk yarn should go still further, probably Indian mills will go in for them, alongside the handloom weaver. But, if its price is to be lowered, it must be produced on a larger scale and this would be possible, only if indigenous sericulture is given effective protection. In the long run when the Swadeshi spirit is developed, the handloom weaver, would find it to his advantage, to use indigenous cotton and silk yarn.

CONCLUSION

What would seem to be called for immediately is (1) the removal of the duty on finer counts of yarn, and the grant of subsidies, for a certain percentage of fine yarn production in Indian mills; (2) the devising of some kind of quota system, under which the respective spheres of the power and the handloom, would come to be defined and (3) the raising of the duty on artificial silk yarn and piecegoods, still further.

Optical Scattering by Colloidal Suspensions and Emulsions

By

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1. INTRODUCTION

It was Lord Rayleigh[1] who developed the theory of light scattering in the case when light falls on minute particles of dimensions several times smaller than the wavelength of light. Rayleigh's theory has been considerably extended by Sir C. V. Raman[2] and the theoretical deductions have been amply confirmed in Calcutta and elsewhere. Studies on light scattering by molecules have thrown much light on the shape and structure of many organic and inorganic molecules.

When the scattering particles have diameters comparable with the wavelength of light, the scattering becomes unsymmetrical about the plane perpendicular to the incident ray. Mie[3] studied the distribution of scattered energy of light around a radiating particle of a turbid medium for different dimensions. According to him the definite asymmetry of dispersion of particles having nearly the same diameter as the wavelength of light, increases as the particles become larger. Shoulejkin[4] worked the theory of Mie in a comprehensive manner and considered typical cases of spherical particles having the ideal properties of a dielectric. B. B. Ray[5] studied the gradual changes of the light transmitted through colloidal solutions as the size of the particles increased. Krishnan[6] discussed the scattering of light for the case of air bubbles suspended in a liquid medium. The same writer detected the presence of molecular clusters in fluids of size comparable with the wavelength of light by the method of the anomalous depolarisation of scattered light. Such molecular clustering was obtained in mixtures of carbon disulphide and methyl alcohol in the ratio 3 : 1 at the critical solution temperature and also to a smaller extent at temperatures in this neighbourhood. Scattering methods have now given us a powerful

1. Scientific papers, 1, 104 ; 1, 518 ; 4, 397.
2. See innumerable papers from the Ind. Assn. Cult. Sc., Calcutta, 1922-29.
3. Ann. d. Phys., 1908, 25, 377.
4. Phil. Mag., 1924, 48, 307.
5. Proc. Ind. Assn. Cult. Sc., 1923, 8, 221.
6. Proc. Ind. Acad. Sc., 1934, 1, 147.

tool for the study of the size and shape of colloidal particles. In the following pages an outline is given of the attempts made to study the particle size and stability of colloidal suspensions and emulsions.

2. EXPERIMENT

The box used for studying the polarisation of the scattered light in different directions is shown in fig. 1. A and B are made of sheet metal and have openings at C, D, E and F for the incident and transmitted beams of light. At O is placed a round-bottomed flask of diameter 6 cm. The solution or emulsion studied is taken inside the flask. To enable us to study the light scattered in different directions suitable windows are cut on the sides of A and B. The sides of the box are blackened with Japan enamel. The flask is also blackened on the outside leaving a small slit running symmetrically round the flask in a horizontal plane. The width of the slit was 2 mm.

The source of light is a mercury arc lamp which is placed inside a closed wooden box. The light emerging from a small slit in the box is rendered parallel by a convex lens placed at the proper distance. The parallel beam is focussed at the centre of the flask with the help of a lens of long focal length (about 10 inches).

To render the light monochromatic, a Zeiss monochromatic filter (B) transmitting 80% of the 5461 radiation was placed in the path of the incident beam.

The scattered light was observed through a horizontal window 5 mm. × 1 mm. The depolarisation factor was measured with a double-image prism and nicol in the usual manner. The double-image prism was adjusted so that the images appeared one over the other. The angle between the two positions of the nicol for which there was equality of intensity between the two images was determined. If this angle is denoted by 2θ, the depolarisation factor or the ratio of the intensity of the weaker to that of the stronger component is given by $\tan^2\theta$.

To render the incident beam polarised in any desired plane, a second nicol was placed in the path of the incident beam. In many of the following measurements, the depolarisation factor has been determined with the incident light (a) unpolarised, (b) vertically polarised and (c) horizontally polarised.

Because of the feeble intensity of the scattered beam, the experiments were conducted in a perfectly dark room. All extraneous light in the direction of observation was cut off by suitable screens with slits cut through them.



A
B
C
D
E
F
O
Scale 0 1 2 3 4 5 cms.

Fig. 1.



+50
0
50
ϱ_u ⟶
0
30
60
90
120
150
180
φ ⟶

Fig. 2.

In this investigation colloids of sulphur and arsenious trisulphide and emulsions of benzene, toluene, aniline and nitrobenzene with water have been studied. The sulphur colloids were prepared by acidifying a dilute solution of sodium thiosulphate with a few drops of dilute sulphuric acid. On shaking the flask, sulphur colloid is obtained having a characteristic colour which changes with the mode of preparation and time. Arsenious trisulphide colloid was prepared by boiling some pure arsenious trioxide dissolved in a beaker of double distilled water. Dust-free hydrogen sulphide was next passed into the diluted solution. To eliminate excess of this gas remaining in solution, a stream of hydrogen gas (dust-free) was passed through the liquid. A fine colloidal solution of arsenious trisulphide now appears in the beaker.

The organic liquids used in the preparation of the emulsions were taken from freshly opened bottles and distilled before use. Double distilled water was taken in a flask and a few drops of benzene were added. When the mixture is shaken well for some time we obtain an emulsion of benzene in water. If on the other hand a few drops of water are added to benzene in excess and the mixture shaken well, we obtain an emulsion of water in benzene. An emulsion was also prepared by leading dust-free benzene vapour into double distilled water. The condensed benzene is dispersed through the water medium as a fine emulsion, more stable than those obtained by the previous method. The other emulsions studied were also prepared by one of these methods. Steam was also passed through dust-free aniline and nitrobenzene and fairly stable emulsions were obtained in these cases.

3. RESULTS

Shoulejkin[4] derived several important conclusions from his adaptation of Mie's theory to the special case of the scattering of light by very big colloidal particles. When the particles are very small of the Rayleigh type, the maximum of polarisation corresponds to an angle of 90° and a definite symmetry of scattering can be observed. With particles of diameter about a third of the wavelength of light, a definite asymmetry appears, the forward scattering being larger than the backward scattering. In the case of particles whose diameters are approximately equal to the wavelength of light, the curve of radiation is sharply deformed in the direction of the incident beam. The maximum of polarisation is more displaced from 90° than in the previous case. With the biggest possible particles, we have reflection taking place at the surface of the spheres and also refraction of the light through the particles. These considerations lead Shoulejkin to the result that as the particle size increases, the maximum of polarisation tends to reach the direction

for which the angle is equal to 2 $\tan^{-1} m$ where m is the ratio of the refractive indices of the particles and of the surrounding medium. A smooth continuous change was thus observed from scattering to reflection and refraction.

Similar calculations have been carried out by Krishnan[6] in the case of optical scattering by particles suspended in a medium of higher refractive index. The conclusions are quite similar to those obtained by Shoulejkin. In another direction however, Krishnan[7] has carried the subject to a field of great interest. His reciprocity theorem in colloid optics shows that if

ϱ_u be the depolarisation factor with the incident light unpolarised,

ϱ_v be the depolarisation factor with the incident light polarised with the electric vector in the vertical direction,

and

ϱ_h be the depolarisation factor with the incident light polarised with the electric vector in a horizontal direction,

then

$$\varrho_u = \frac{1 + \dfrac{1}{\varrho_h}}{1 + \dfrac{1}{\varrho_v}}$$

Krishnan has verified this relation from the results of Subbaramaiya[8] and his own measurements on colloidal solutions, emulsions, suspensions and protein solutions. The depolarisation factors studied give us useful information regarding the size and anisotropy of the colloidal particles.

The results obtained with sulphur colloids are tabulated below. Subbaramaiya prepared sulphur suspensions by adding 8 to 10 drops of a very weak solution of sodium thiosulphate to a large quantity of double distilled water. 3 or 4 drops of very dilute sulphuric acid were then added and the mixture was stirred. A fine suspension of sulphur

7. Proc. Ind. Acad. Sc., 1935, 1, 782. See also ibid., 1935, 1, 717.
8. Ibid., 1935, 1, 709.

was formed. In this investigation the same method has been adopted except that definite concentrations of the acid were employed to study the effect on the scattering of light.

TABLE 1—SULPHUR SUSPENSIONS*

Test No.	Concentration of acid used.		Soon after mixing.	After 3 hrs.	After 6 hrs.	After 12 hrs.
1.	N/20	ρ_v	8·0	9·0	10·1	11·2
		ρ_h	12·8	13·6	14·1	14·4
		ρ_u (obs.)	73·0	75·0	77	82
		ρ_u (cal.)	65·3	69·0	74·2	79·8
2.	N/20	ρ_v	10·7	11·2		11·4
		ρ_h	15·0	15·1		15·2
		ρ_u (obs.)	74·0	77·2		78
		ρ_u (cal.)	74·1	76·8		77·6
3.	N/10	ρ_v	10·7	11·3	14·2	14·9
		ρ_h	13·1	14·2	14·8	15·2
		ρ_u (obs.)	88	92	97	98
		ρ_u (cal.)	83·5	81·7	96·5	98·3
4.	N	ρ_v	10·8	12·6		15·2
		ρ_h	13·2	14·3		15·6
		ρ_u (obs.)	86	95		97
		ρ_u (cal.)	83·6	89·5		97·8

* All depolarisation measurements in this paper are given in per cent.

The results for arsenic trisulphide are given in table II below:

TABLE II—ARSENIC TRISULPHIDE

No.	Sample.		Fresh.	After 3 hrs.	After 12 hrs.
1.	Hydrogen sulphide driven off from colloidal solution	ρ_v	15·2	15·4	16·0
		ρ_h	37·0	37·2	39·0
		ρ_u (obs.)	56·0	56·0	53·0
		ρ_u (cal.)	48·9	48·3	49·2
2.	Hydrogen sulphide in solution	ρ_v	14·3	14·4	15·0
		ρ_h	45·0	45·0	45·5
		ρ_u (obs.)	48·0	48·0	49·0
		ρ_u (cal.)	40·3	40·6	41·7

A study was next made of the depolarisation factor in different directions in the plane of scattering. The angles (φ) given are those between the direction of observation and direction of incidence.

TABLE III—ARSENIC TRISULPHIDE

$\varphi =$	30°	45°	50°	75°	90°	105°	120°	135°	150°
ρ_v	10·0	10·0	9·0	11·1	15·3	15·8	12·0	6·0	3·2
ρ_h	41	46	29	16	24	21	18	10	5
ρ_u	−37	−37	−12	32	48	38	22	11	5·5

The depolarisation factor is plotted against the angle of observation in figure 2. The curve is of special interest. It will be noticed that for incident unpolarised light, the maximum of depolarisation occurs in the neighbourhood of 90°. ρ_v is maximum at 100° while ρ_h is largest at 45°.

EMULSIONS

The methods of preparing emulsions have already been outlined. It is a curious fact that the value of ρ_v is very high for the emulsions studied indicating that the minute liquid particles were highly anisotropic. This is remarkable in view of the fact that one would expect the liquid droplets to gather up into perfect spherical shapes. The effect of time upon the depolarisation factors was also investigated showing astonishingly large variations. These results lead one to expect that conditions inside the emulsions are characterised by large variations in size and shape of the minute liquid droplets.

Benzene-water. The emulsions were not stable when prepared by mixing and shaking. But those obtained by passing benzene vapour in double distilled water were more stable. The depolarisation factors observed for three specimens are given below.

TABLE IV—BENZENE WATER

	Specimen I.	Specimen II.	Specimen III.
ρ_h	95	93	95
ρ_v	29	26	25
ρ_u (obs.)	93	94	93
ρ_u (cal.)	49	43	41

A reference to the above table indicates that the formula of Krishnan does not hold good in this case. But a little consideration will show that this need cause no surprise. Krishnan's relation obviously cannot

hold good in this case since it postulates scattering by the matter but does not contemplate reflection—surface or internal. In the case of benzene in water, the refractive index of benzene is greater than that of water and hence it is likely that part of the incident light gets transmitted into the droplets and suffers internal reflection (one or more) at the droplet boundary. This would account for a large amount of unpolarised light in the lateral beam.

Toluene-water. As in the case of benzene, emulsions of toluene in water were more stable. It should however be confessed that the measurements were far from being consistent and emulsions produced by the same methods under apparently identical conditions gave considerably divergent values. Since however a verification of the relation of Krishnan was one of the objects of this work, such fluctuations were disregarded.

To investigate the problem of any influence likely to be exercised by the container on the depolarisation measurements, readings were taken with emulsions in a rectangular cell and in the spherical vessel as outlined earlier. No difference was found to exist. Further, in the case of emulsions, the filter did not influence the depolarisation factors.

TABLE V—TOLUENE IN WATER

	Rectangular cell.		Spherical bulb.	
	With filter.	Without filter.	With filter.	Without filter.
ρ_v	26	26	25	25
ρ_h	44	44	43	43
ρ_u (obs.)	66	65	64	64
ρ_u (cal.)	68	68	66	66

In the following table are given the depolarisation factors at different time intervals.

TABLE VI—TOLUENE IN WATER

	Fresh.	½ hr.	1 hr.	12 hrs.	1 day.	2 days.
ρ_v	64	31	44	76	10	32
ρ_h	88	88	21	21	22	36
ρ_u (obs.)	50	43	79	86	7	11
ρ_u (cal.)	83	49	55	41	49	91

It will be noticed that there is no systematic variation of the depolarisation factors with time. A result of much greater regularity was

obtained when the emulsion was prepared by passing steam through a bottle containing dust-free toluene and stabilising the emulsion by adding a few drops of very dilute soap solution.

TABLE VII—WATER IN TOLUENE

	Fresh.	1 hour.	12 hours.	1 day.	2 days.
ρ_v	28	40	42	45	57
ρ_h	69	83	84	86	93
ρ_u (obs.)	39	42	45	47	50
ρ_u (cal.)	54	63	65	69	76

This table shows that the depolarisation factors change gradually with time and there are no irregular variations. The relations however do not appear to be verified here, obviously because of internal reflection of light in the minute droplets.

Measurements made on another sample prepared in a similar manner are given below. It will be noted that there is a close agreement between these results and those given in the above table.

TABLE VIII—WATER IN TOLUENE

	Fresh.	1 hour.	1 day.	2 days.
ρ_v	31	43	51	70
ρ_h	65	78	84	92
ρ_u (obs.)	39	42	44	52
ρ_u (cal.)	60	68	73	86

The disagreement between the observed and calculated values may, as in the previous cases, be attributed to reflections of the incident beam.

The depolarisation factors were next measured for the above emulsion in different directions in the plane of scattering. The values obtained are given in the following table:

TABLE IX—WATER IN TOLUENE

$\varphi =$	30°	45°	60°	90°	105°	120°	135°
ρ_v	17	16	9	35	51	65	63
ρ_h	52	82	82	75	39	29	52
ρ_u	−26	−12	39	69	78	75	51

The nature of the variation of any one of these factors is similar to what was obtained in the case of arsenic trisulphide except for the fact that the values of ρ_u are greater.

Aniline-water. The results obtained with emulsions prepared by shaking dust-free aniline vigorously with water show that reflections play a large part in the intensity of the observed illumination in a transverse direction.

TABLE X—ANILINE-WATER

	Fresh.	After 12 hours.
ρ_v	81	73
ρ_h	86	54
ρ_u (obs.)	83	84
ρ_u (cal.)	96	83

The depolarisation factors for the polarised incident beams decrease with time indicating that the liquid droplets become less asymmetric.

Nitrobenzene-water. The emulsions were prepared by shaking water to which was added a small quantity of nitrobenzene. The results obtained are similar to those of aniline-water emulsions.

TABLE XI—NITROBENZENE-WATER

	Specimen I.		Specimen II.		
	Fresh.	After 1 hr.	Fresh.	After 1 hr.	After 1 day.
ρ_v	84	84	80	84	84
ρ_h	63	63	60	63	63
ρ_u (obs.)	85	85	90	85	85
ρ_u (cal.)	85	85	84	85	85

The depolarisation factors were then measured in different directions in the plane of scattering. The values obtained are given in table XII.

TABLE XII—NITROBENZENE-WATER

$\varphi =$	45°	60°	90°	120°	135°
ρ_v	70	62	84	78	67
ρ_h	61	52	63	79	86
ρ_u	93	69	85	98	71

An examination of the above table shows that the unpolarised incident light gives rise to a maximum depolarisation at about 120°. For incident light polarised with the electric vector vertical, we observe maximum depolarisation at some angle between 90° and 120°. When

the incident light is polarised with the electric vector horizontal, the maximum of depolarisation occurs at about 120°. Thus in all the three cases the maximum of depolarisation occurs at some angle above 90° and on the theory of Mie as developed by Shoulejkin, this would indicate that the emulsion droplets have dimensions a little larger than the wavelength of the light used. The matter will be discussed at length in the next section.

4. DISCUSSION

Before undertaking a discussion on the measurements, a word may be mentioned about the convergence correction. The convergence correction is usually given as $\Omega^2/2$ where Ω is the semi-angle of convergence at the focal spot of the condensing lens. In the present investigation, this angle was 0·15 and hence the convergence correction works to 1·1%. This value has to be *substracted* from the values given in the foregoing tables. Since our aim however is to study comparatively the depolarisation factors under various conditions, this small correction is not of great significance.

From the theory outlined in the first section, it is well known that as the scattering particles grow in size from molecular dimensions, a striking change takes place in the distribution of intensity of the scattered light in different directions. A variation of the depolarisation factor in any direction of scattering also takes place. The following table is adapted from a paper of Krishnan. The values of the depolarisation factor with the incident light vector horizontal are given here as the ratios of the *weaker* vertical to the *stronger* horizontal components in the scattered light.

TABLE XIII

Case.	Nature of particle.	ρ_u.	ρ_v.	ρ_h.
1.	Small spherical particles. ..	0	0	0
2.	Spherical particles of finite size ..	<1	0	0
3.	Small ellipsoidal particles ..	<1	<1	1
4.	Ellipsoidal particles of finite size ..	<1	<1	<1

It is clear from a reference to the above table that measurements made in this investigation will yield a good picture of the size and shape of the colloidal particles or emulsions. A finite value of ρ_u indicates that the particles are not small. The values of ρ_v on the other hand give more useful information regarding the asymmetry of shape of the particles, the larger the value of ρ_v (always less than 1), the more ellip-

soidal the shape. The values of ϱ_h are equally useful and supplement the information from the other measurements.

These methods have been applied to the case of colloidal solutions, emulsions and protein suspensions by Subbaramaiya and Krishnan. The latter worker also investigated a few binary liquid mixtures, some pure liquids and optical glasses. He claims to have shown the presence of large clusters of particles of dimensions equal to the wavelength of light even in pure liquids like formic and acetic acids. While this special inference needs confirmation from other well-known properties of liquids, there is no doubt that the method is a powerful one and is bound to throw much light on the size and shape of the scattering elements.

Our results for sulphur suspensions are in general accord with those of Subbaramaiya although our values of ϱ_u are much smaller. A reference to the above table will indicate that here we are dealing with ellipsoidal particles of finite size. The particles are small and definitely asymmetric. Further the size and shape alter very little with time, showing however a tendency on the part of particles to become larger and more asymmetric. The changes are not large even after 12 hours. The large variation obtained by Subbaramaiya has not been noticed in this case.

The depolarisation factors observed with suspensions of arsenic trisulphide are of great interest. The results of Subbaramaiya are given in the following table:

TABLE XIV—ARSENIC TRISULPHIDE

		Fresh.	After 5½ hrs.	After 18½ hrs.
ϱ_u	Blue	13·4	23·5	27·1
	Red	4·7	11·5	16
ϱ_v		2·1	4·9	6·9
ϱ_h		90	70	55

Our values for ϱ_u are larger while those of ϱ_h are smaller than those of Subbaramaiya. These may indicate that the suspensions prepared in the present work were larger and less asymmetric than those of this investigator. It should however be remembered that he used white light and gets two different values using blue and red filters. This indicates that the wavelength of the incident light modifies the measurements considerably. We think that since the depolarisation factors have different values in the different parts of the spectrum, no direct

comparison of the relations would be possible if white light is used. Subbaramaiya has himself drawn attention to the difficulty of comparing the two components of the scattered light which are different in colour. It is essential to use monochromatic light for a detailed study and any broad differences between our results and those of Subbaramaiya should be attributed to this cause.

It is found in the present work that both ρ_u and ρ_h tend to increase with time while ρ_h is either constant or shows a small decrease. The observed values of ρ_u are greater than those calculated by assuming Krishnan's relation. The depolarisation values suggest that the particles become slightly larger and perhaps a little more asymmetric. The effect of removing hydrogen sulphide is to increase the value of ρ_h effectively. The particles become smaller without suffering any change in the asymmetry. This may be due to a layer of hydrogen sulphide molecules around the colloidal particles, some of which are perhaps driven off by leading a stream of hydrogen gas through the colloidal solution.

Taking into consideration the variation of the depolarisation factors with the direction of scattering, it will be noticed that the maximum values of these factors are obtained at scattering angles just greater than 90°. At the same time the values of ρ_u at small angles of scattering are negative indicating that at these inclinations, the vertical component is stronger than the horizontal component. A reference to Shoulejkin's paper indicates that for those particles whose diameter is approximately equal to the wavelength of light, such a reversal takes place at some angle between 20° and 40°. In the present investigation, the reversal occurs at about 50°. Since the depolorisation depends not merely on the angle of observation but also on the refractive index of the material of the particles in relation to that of the medium in which they are suspended and on the shape of the particles, a coincidence between the theoretical and experimental values in this account should not be expected. That a reversal of the sign takes place is in full accord with theory. This would indicate that the arsenic trisulphide particles prepared in this work possess dimensions of about $0 \cdot 5\mu$.

The results obtained with emulsions show that generally speaking the depolarisation factors for incident polarised light have got relatively large values. This suggests that the suspended droplets should have dimensions of the order of the wavelength of light. A large ansiotropy is also indicated. One would expect the droplets to be perfectly spherical but the large depolarisation values show that they are highly asymmetric. This is a surprising result and is in agreement with similar observations by Subbaramaiya.

Attention may be drawn to the large discrepancy between the calculated and observed values of the depolarisation factor, when the incident light is unpolarised. Some agreement is obtained in the case of toluene and water (see table V) but in all the other cases the departures are serious. It is noted that whenever the values of ϱ_v and ϱ_h are large, such discrepancies are in evidence. A straight inference from this observation is that the deviations are prominent only when the particles or droplets are large and highly asymmetric. Under such circumstances, the possibility of reflections taking place at the boundary between the droplet and the surrounding liquid would have to be considered. Krishnan's relation holds good when the particles scatter the incident beam and does not include cases where reflections occur in addition to scattering.

5. SUMMARY

The scattering of light (wavelength=5462A) by colloids of sulphur and arsenic trisulphide and emulsions of benzene, toluene, aniline and nitrobenzene with water, has been investigated. The depolarisation factors were observed transversely and in differing angles of scattering for three cases (a) with the incident light unpolarised (b) with the incident light polarised with the electric vector vertical and (c) with the incident light polarised with the electric vector horizontal. For the colloidal suspensions studied, it is found that the particles possess dimensions of about the wavelength of light. Their asymmetry is also striking. More surprising is the strong asymmetry noticed with the emulsions. Krishnan's relation connecting the three depolarisation factors is found to be valid for the colloidal suspensions, particularly when the depolarisation is small. In the case however of emulsions, serious discrepancies have been observed and these are attributed to reflections of the incident light occurring at the boundary between the droplet and the surrounding medium.

Our thanks are due to the authorities of the Annamalai University for the award of a studentship to one of us which has rendered this work possible.

The Age of Tholkappiam

By

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Tholkāppiam is the classic grammar in the Tamil language. This is held to be the oldest extant book in the Tamil literature. Pandits of the old school claim for this book an antiquity of some eight to ten thousand years. There are others who contend that this is perhaps the latest of the early literature and is not earlier than the ninth or eighth century A.D. To find out the truth between these two extreme views is no easy task. In my thesis "Tamil classics and Tamilaham" written over 20 years ago, I tried to discuss some of the salient arguments of these extremists, and as a result of my investigation on the materials then available to me, I suggested that this great Tamil grammar may be assigned to about 500 B.C. Many others have since gone into this question and have written learned disquisitions about this controversy, and recently in a Madras University publication known as the "The Chronology of the early Tamils," a definite stand is taken by its writer, and the Pro-modernist view is advocated in a highly provocative challenging manner. It is time, in my opinion, that the whole question is reviewed in a dispassionate scientific spirit in the interest of truth: and I propose to prepare the ground for such a final decisive verdict in the world of Letters by an attempted approach to the truth in a twofold manner. Let me first try to test the worth and value of and valid warrant for the modernist arguments advanced in the chronology; and thereafter I shall marshal out and summarise the salient historic and literary evidences which would affirmatively indicate the real truth about this matter. As many problems relating to the history of the Tamil literature depend on the place and position of Tholkāppiam in that literature, and are sure to be coloured by one's outlook on this question of the Age of Tholkāppiam, its importance warrants an earnest inquiry into its truth. And I shall presently deal with the first part of this inquiry, viz., an assessment of the value and validity of the specific data given in the Chronology to refute Tholkāppiam's claims for antiquity.

Dewan Bahadur S. E. Runganadan drew my attention to a review of the Chronology of the Early Tamils in the "Hindu." The reviewer's remarks interested me deeply: particularly the hearty approval he ac-

corded to the conclusions of the learned author of the Chronology recording the Age of Tholkāppiam aroused my curiosity. Directly I secured a copy of the Chronology and read it through with all the attention and care which such an University publication as the Chronology and the startling new theories expounded therein would demand. It struck me that the general remark of the Professor in his review that the book reveals some settled bias is really more warranted than the approval of the reviewer regarding the Age of Tholkāppiam.. It is obvious that both the author and the reviewer of the Chronology have some instinctive bias against the great antiquity which traditions and Tamil scholarship agree in according to the classical Tamil Vyakaranam. It is my purpose here briefly to canvass the reasons given in Appendix XV of the Chronology to prove that Tholkāppiam should be assigned rather to 600 A.D. or a later time than to 600 B.C. or an earlier age. Five particular points are emphasised by the learned author of the Chronology in the Appendix in support of his conclusions. Let me deal with them seriatim.

1. As the "Venkatam" hills are mentioned in the preface or 'Payiram' to Tholkāppiam as the northern limit of Tamilakam, and as the name 'Venkatam' itself is not mentioned in any Tamil literary works earlier than that of 'Kalladanar' of the 7th generation of the Chronology, its author argues that Tholkappiam should be of a later age. For the first time, according to this author, Karikalan II extended the Tamil rule as far as the "Venkatam" hills. If the author's premise is an established fact, there may be some force in his argument. But the very basis for this argument is an unproved and unwarranted assumption, and will be found to be founded on an error in fact. In the first place Tholkappiam makes no reference to "Venkatam" at all; and the "Payiram" which mentions Venkatam is not the work of the author of Tholkāppiam. Again it is a cardinal canon for all research workers that no valid argument can be based on mere absence of reference in any books to the points at issue in a discussion. No Sangam poet set himself to write any geographical treatises as such. He need not have mentioned anything on earth unless it had some necessary bearing on or relation to the subjects he was poetising upon. There are innumerable rivers, hills, valleys and villages in the Tamil Nad, that no poet ever referred to; and no one will seriously argue against their existence from the absence of any reference to any of them in the works of the literary writers. Thus the first point for the argument against the antiquity of Tholkappiam is found to be a bubble that stands no pricking.

But this is not all. The very hypothesis for this whole argument is untenable. That the "Venkatam" is not mentioned in any early Sangam

work and cannot receive any such mention, because till Karikalan II extended his kingdom in the 6th century for the first time the "Venkatam" hills lay far far north of the limits of Tamilakam, are statements which are as incorrect as they are unwarranted. The author of the Chronology has yet to establish this opinion he hazards about Karikalan II being the first warrior that extended his conquests to the foot of the "Venkatam" hills. He only throws out these suggestions as arising out of his surmises from the absence of any earlier references to the Chola conquest of Aruvanadu before Karikalan II. But he knows as well as any Tamil scholar that Aruvanadu was always part and parcel of the Tamil Nad; and as a matter of fact from the early times the Vadugas called the Tamils and their language by the name of this northern-most Tamil province, which bordered the Andhradesa. "Aravam" and "Aravars" are the Vadugu appellations for the Tamils and their language, famously familiarised by the author of "Parani" by his felicitous reference to the cries of the fleeing Vaduga warriors when vanquished by the great Chola general Karunakara Thondaiman in his conquest of "Kalinga."

The author of the Chronology admits in his book after an elaborate discussion that Purananuru, Agananuru, Narrinai and Kuruntokai (should) form the main basis and supply us with the primary evidence for the early history of the "Tamils", and that "Padirrupattu and Pattuppattu are by their style and subject matter not far removed from them." Almost all these old classics refer to the "Venkatam" hills, and reinforce the tradition that not only these hills formed the northern bourn of the old Tamilakam, but that they were part of Tamilakam being ruled over by Tamil chieftains. Verses 381, 385, 389 and 391 of Purananuru will make this fact abundantly clear. "ஒலிவெள்ளருவி வேங்கடநாடன்" (381) "கல்லிழி யருவி வேங்கடங்கிழவோன்" (389)
Nothing can give more definite evidence than these references to the Tamilian proprietorship and sovereignty of the Venkatam hills. And "Purananuru" is the oldest extant Tamil classic and Agananuru comes next to that according to the author of the Chronology. Let us therefore see if any and what evidence we may find in the Agananuru collection as regards this unchanging hill boundary of the old Tamilakam. Again verses numbers, 61, 211, 27, 213, 85, and some others as well speak of the "Venkatam" as being in the territory of the Tamil chieftains. "மழபுலம் வணக்கிய மாவண்புல்லி விழவுடை விழுச்சீர் வேங்கடம் பெறினும்" (61). Stanza 14 of "Narrinai" says the same story. In the face of this overwhelming evidence in all the oldest Tamil classics for treating the 'Venkatam' hills as in and of the old Tamil Nad, it is difficult to

appreciate the argument of the author of the Chronology against the antiquity of Tholkāppiam on the score that the preface or 'Payiram of Panamparanar affixed to Tholkappiam refers to the "Venkatam" as the northern boundary of Tamilakam.

2. The second point of attack against the antiquity of Tholkappiam is founded on a presumption that the rulers in the Tamil country of the Sangam Age were all petty tribal chiefs, and none of them was a crowned king. Because Tolkappiam refers to the three crowned kings in the Tamilakam, therefore it should be of a very late period when some chieftains had established kingdoms and came to wear crowns also. It may well be that in the pre-historic remotest past, some warrior chiefs may have founded the thrones that acquired renown as the three great kingdoms in the Tamilakam. But what is the warrant for this author's dictum that in the Age of the now extant Sangam poetry, there was not and could not be any crowned monarch in the whole Tamil Nad. He hazards an opinion that the founder and first ruler of the Chola dynasty was Veliyan Thithan and he was only a Vēnmān or crownless petty chieftain of Veerai, a coastal town in the estuary of the Kaveri river, or that he and his son ruled their people in the Chola territory without wearing a crown. That Thithan conquered and planted himself in Uranthai may or may not be confirmed by further research. But even were it true, this would not conclude that there were no crowned kings in Uranthai. On the other hand Thithan himself may have usurped the crown with the throne of Uranthai kingdom. A chieftain may well conquer and establish his dynasty over a kingdom. Far from confirming the suggestion in the Chronicle, the very poets he quotes in this connection lend support to the fact, that Uranthai was not a mere manorial or baronial town, but was the famous capital of the Chola line of kings even at the time of Thithan.

" வென்றி முரசின் விறற்போர்ச் சோழன்
இன்கடுங் கள்ளின் உறந்தை யாங்கண் "

(Agam. 137).

" வெல்போர்ச் சோழர் அழிசியம் பெருங்காட்டு "

(Narrinai 87).

" மறங்கெழு சோழ ருறந்தையவையத்
தறநின்று நிலையிற்றாதலின் "

(Puram. 39).

There is no specific proof that Venman Veliyan was the lineal ancestor or the prepositus of the Chola house of Karikalan, or even that

the Veerai chieftain permanently established his dynasty over the Uranthai throne. The very rule laid down by the author in his chronology appears to rule out this surmise of his. He says " Three generations is the utmost limit to which a person could be assigned, and that too in very exceptional circumstances only. But beyond it, neither facts of history nor demands of logic would permit us to go." In his chronological tables (1) Veliyam Thithan, the Veerai chieftain, is shown as the prepositus of the Chola dynasty. (2) Thithan Veliyan, his son, is shown as the successor in second generation on the Uranthai throne. (3) Mudithalaikko-Perunarkilli is mentioned as the son and successor of this latter Thithan (No. 2), in the third generation. (4) Velpahradakkai Perunarkilli as succeeding (No. 3) in the fourth generation. (5) Uruvappahrār Ilancētcenni succeeds (No. 4) in the fifth generation. And the poet, Paraṇar, is assigned in this table to be the eulogist of all except the second Thithan of these five Chola kings of Uranthai in unbroken succession. This offends the above peremptory postulate which the author has himself approvingly emphasised in his book. Paraṇar could not possibly have adorned the courts of five successive generations of the Uranthai kings besides being in courts of Nedumceraledan, Chenguttuvan and others, as well as a number of Velir chiefs such as Pehan and Neduman Anji. The only acceptable position would be that these several heroes Paraṇar belauds in his poems should be more or less contemporaries, and are not to be reckoned as successors surviving each other to five generations.

It is perhaps to explain away this patent and fatal objection, it is just insinuated in the Chronology and its schedule that poet Paraṇar only addressed the Chola kings from the third generation as a contemporary of those kings, while his verses about the earlier Chola rulers in Uranthai were only posthumous eulogiums by Paraṇar based on hearsay reports of their exploits. The language and nature of these poems do not afford warrant for any such differentiation. Paraṇar's verses about Tithan the Ist and Mudithalai-ko, *alias* Karikalan I of the Chronology, and particularly Stanza No. 6 in Aham series could suggest contemporaneity of the poet with the hero-kings as consistently as those about the later Cholas do. Of course Puram verses may be addressed to kings directly; whereas the poems of the Aham series by their very nature can only be indirect references to the kings. For, all direct personal references are tabooed in Aham poetry. But tenses, moods and other circumtsantial indications in the Aham verses of Paraṇar about Thithan and his alleged grandson in the schedule to the Chronology, far from militating against the poet's contemporaniety, almost suggest it to such an extent that one may well infer that there were more than one poet by the name of Paraṇar in the Sangam Age. The

real point is that the verses in the name of Paranar cited and relied on for the chronological pedigree do not warrant, and much less prove the author's assumptions. Even if Paranar's references to Tithan of Uranthai and to Mudithalai-ko-Perunkilli were to be brushed aside as mere posthumous eulogies based on hearsay reports, nevertheless, according to the Chronology the astounding fact still stares us in the face, *viz.*, Paraṇar belauds personally Pahradakai Perunarkilli in the fourth and Ilamchetchenni in the fifth generation in the Chronology, as much as he does in Pattirruppattu the King Cheran Chenguttuvan, whom the author of the Chronology takes to be the grandson of Karikalan, who was son to Ilamchetchenni. This would make Paranar a contemporary of five generations of kings, a longevity out of the range of credibility. On these facts, the theory that all the five Chola rulers of Uranthai in the first five generations in the chronological table, were uncrowned petty chiefs, and that only Karikalan in the sixth generation for the first time assumed the royal role, fails.

Moreover in the absence of their distinctive dynastic appellations such as Valavan or Killi for the Cholas, Cheliyan or Maran for Pandyas, and Cheral or Vanavan for the Cheras, the adjunct Ko is added to the names of kingly rulers to indicate that they are crowned monarchs of these three immemorial Tamil kingdoms, as distinct from mere ruling chiefs and feudatories who go by the names of Vels and Venmans. The names of almost all the rulers of Uranthai are spoken of in the Sangam literature, and even in the table of chronological pedigree under review, either with their respective dynastic titles or with the royal appellation of Ko. This fact also would militate against the conjecture that all the Uranthai rulers prior to Karikalan were only Velir chiefs without crowns.

Again, the schedule to the Chronology mentions two Karikalans, the first in the third, and the second in the sixth generation; and in support thereof some verses (Puram 65 and 66) are cited. Obviously these citations reveal that there must be much confusion in the ordering and grouping of kings of the Chola dynasty in the schedule to the Chronology. Puram stanzas 65 and 66 specifically refer to and praise the exploits of Karikalan in the famous battle of "Venni." The poem "Porunar Arrupadai" of Mudathama Kanniyar, cited for Karikalan II in this schedule, narrates just these very exploits in Venni-battle which on the authority of Puram verses 65 and 66 the author of the Chronology attributes to his Karikalan I. It is not suggested that there were two battles in Venni, and in each the victory went to the Chola king having the same name of Karikala. The Puram verses only give the name of the Venni-victor as Karikalan; but they do not say whose son he was.

"Porunar Arrupadai" expressly says that the conqueror of the other two contemporary rival crowned kings at Venni was the son of Uruva Pahrer Ilamchetchenni. The hero of Pattina Palai is neither the son of Ilamchetchenni, nor the victor of Venni battle; he is not even known as Karikalan. His real name is Perumavalavan; and he is the son of Karikalan. (*Vide* Pazhamozhi verse No. 105.) This stanza leaves no doubt as to the respective identities of and relationship between the Venni-victor Karikalcholan, and the hero king immortalised in Pattina Palai. Karikalan means "he who had the burnt-foot." Karikalan earned that name because he had his foot burnt in his child-hood, *vide* the following venbas :—

1. முச்சக் கரமு மளப்பதற்கு நீட்டியகால்
இச்சக் கரமே யளந்ததால்—செய்ச்செய்
அரிகான்மேற் றேன்றொடுக்கும் ஆய்புன்னீர் நாடன்
கரிகாலன் கானெருப் புற்று

(பத்துப்பாட்டு-பொருநராற்றுப்படை முடிவிலுள்ளது)

2. சுடப்பட் டுயிருய்ந்த சோழன் மகனும்
பிடர்த்தலைப்பேரானைப்பெற்றுக்—கடைக்காற்
செயிரறு செங்கோல் செலீஇயினா னில்லை
உயிருடையா ரெய்தா வினை.

(பழமொழி 105)

This Chola king Karikalan's son was kept out of his birthright in his boyhood; and this adventurous Chola scion escaped from his captivity eluding his prisoners, and won back his ancestral Chola crown by his daring military *coup-de-main* with the aid of loyal allies. This story and happy denouncement, exquisitely eulogised in Pattina Palai, are succinctly summarised in this Pazhamozhi venba. In later times, this martial son of Karikalan was confused with his father; and their respective exploits have been indifferently mixed up by indiscriminate writers. That Pattina Palai neither names its hero as Karikalan, nor alludes to any exploits of the famous battles of Venni and Vahai which are exclusive laurels only of Karikalan—the son of Ilamchetchenni, is eloquently significant: Also the incidents of the youthful life of the victor in Venni and Vahai as given in Porunar Arrupadai are irreconcilably at variance with those of the early life of the hero of Pattina Palai. These facts were first noticed by and elaborated in a research thesis of Mahavidwan R. Raghava Iyengar of this University: and when he drew my attention to them, I suggested to him the venba from Pazhamozhi as not only confirming his thesis *viz.*, the Pattina Palai hero was different from Karikalan of Venni and Vahai fame, but as also affording further

proof of the real relationship between these two great Chola kings as father and son.

There is yet another confusion in the Chronology between Tithan, the Chola king of Uranthai, and a Venman or chieftain of Veerai. All the citations in the Chronology in support of the identity of these different personalities except one verse from Narrinai, make no reference whatever to Veerai or Venman in relation to Tithan of Uranthai. Puram stanzas 6, 122, 352 and 395 all speak simply of "Thithan's Uranthai,' without any other adjunct. Even the Aham verse No. 226 refers only to Tithan Veliyan's Uranthai, and gives no warrant to connect this Tithan of Uranthai with any Venmanship of Veerai. All these poems further emphasise that Uranthai was ever the abiding capital of Tithan under his aegis, and would not admit even remotely any possible hint of his conquest or usurpation of Uranthai. Thithan is the personal name of this Chola king of Uranthai. Velian was one of his titles or surnames suggesting his conquest of "Veliam" a chera citadel. Aham verse 359 expressly names this place as belonging to the Chera ruler. "வானவரம்பன் வெளியத்தன்ன" Aham 208 also speaks of this 'Veliam' as being under the Chera Venman general, Aay Yeyinan ' 'வெளியன் வண்மான் ஆய்எயினன்" And if the Chola king Thithan conquered this Chera citadel 'Veliam,' nothing is more natural than for him to add the title 'Velian,' suggesting his martial victory over the place. Thus, Tithan or Tithan Velian were both one and the same Chola-king that ruled over Uranthai, the time-old Chola metropolis in the classic age. The Narrinai line relied on in the Chronology to identify this Chola king with a petty Velir chief of Veerai seems to read into it a totally different story altogether. The relevant lines of this verse run as follows :—

> " ....
> வீரைவேண்மான் வெளியன் தித்தன்
> முரசுமுதற்கொளீஇய மாலை விளக்கின்,
> வெண்கோடியம்ப நுண்பனியரும்பக்
> கையறவந்த பொழுதொடு............................"(நற்றிணை 58)

The first line is read to mean that it is all one reference to Veerai Venman being or having become the Velian Tithan of Uranthai. That the language of this verse cannot bear this suggestion is patent on its very face. If all the words 'Veerai Venman Veliam Tithan' in this line go to name a single person, then the following lines are left bald and bereft of all meaning. These lines speak of some military exploit as worthy of praise. The plain and intelligible meaning of the second line here, is and could only be this. "Like unto the vespertine rows of lamps

lighted in commemoration of the capture of the Drum, etc., etc., etc., etc." Such a statement would be unmeaning, unless it were completed in sense by mentioning the victor and the vanquished in this connection, i.e., the winner and the loser of the drum, etc. mentioned in this second line here. If the entire first line were taken as referring only to one person, he may be the winner or the loser of the drum and other things. The poet would give no information whatever, by leaving his lines so vaguely indefinite as to make no sense out of his lines. The first line therefore must be read to furnish all the particulars necessary to render it in accord with the second line an intelligent and intelligible allusion to some laudable event of military exploit. The words in the first line just appear to answer to this end. Veerai Venman was the chief that perhaps vanquished another Velir chief of Veliam by name 'Tithan.' Veerai and Veliam are two seats of Velir chiefs, situated in the Chola and Chera regions respectively (*Vide* Aham 206 and 208.) A Velir chief of Veerai perhaps won a victory over another Velir chief of Veliam, and seized his War-Drum, etc. in the battle. These lines of the Narrinai verse here refer only to this incident. The War-Drum, etc. etc. referred to in the second line were those of Thithan of Veliyam seized by the Venman of Veerai. Thus read, the Narrinai verse makes cogent sense; and also shows that this Tithan who lost his Drum to the Venman chief of Veerai, a Chola feudatory, was a Chera lieutenant in charge of Veliam, and had nothing whatever to do with the Chola king Tithan of Uranthai; who also once conquered Veliam perhaps, and therefore assumed the honorific surname 'Velian' to signify that victory of his. This seems to be not only more probable in the light of the many verses cited above, but also the only way to reconcile them all into harmony and accord, as well as to give sense and cogent meaning to the Narrinai stanza No. 58 cited in the Chronology.

Finally, one would like to be shown some clear authority or definite reference in any Sangam classic before being asked to accept the suggestion that the "Veerai Venman Veliyan Thithan' is to be identified with the Thithan referred to in the line "தித்தனுறந்தை" by Paranar in Agam 22. The mere fact that an Uranthai ruler's name was Thithan will be no warrant to conclude that he must be the Venman Thithan of Veerai praised by 'Mudukurranar' in Agam. There is not only no evidence for identifying these namesakes; but there is also not the faintest hint in the whole Sangam literature even to suggest that the Veerai chief ever invaded or conquered Uranthai. That very fact that Veerai chieftain is specifically spoken of as Veerai Venman, while this distinctive appellation is dropped in the case of the Uranthai Thithan should preclude any suggestion of identity between them. They

are not even spoken of by the same poet. Paranar the earliest poet sings of Uranthai Thithan, while Mudukurranar speaks of Veerai Venman. These two poets have to be reckoned as contemporaries only because the heroes they belaud are assumed to be one and the same person. This is reversing all rules of research. If the identity of their heroes is otherwise established, it may then suggest contemporaneity for the two poets who eulogise that common hero. But when neither the identity of the heroes, nor the contemporaneity of the eulogising poets is proved, it is unthinkable to build any argument for one from the other of the two unproved and probably unprovable statements.

Thus the whole argument of the Chronologist on this head against the antiquity of Tholkappiam is found to have no feet to stand on. Venman Thithan is not proved to be the first Chola victor of Uranthai; and even if Veerai Venman were really the conqueror of Uranthai, that in itself cannot prove that there was no crown for the Uranthai rulers in those times.

There is just one more point that calls for consideration in this connection. That Uranthai was a mere Baronial seat of some electorate or petty principality, and not the capital of a kingdom before Karikalan is again an obiter, if not an ipse dixit of the author of the Chronology, and rests on no higher authority than his own surmise. On the contrary all the references in the earliest Sangam poems point to Uranthai as the Chola metropolis (*Vide* Puram Stanzas 39, 58, 69, 352, 395), and the Cholanad as one of those three famous kingdoms of Yore. (*Vide* Puram stanzas 13, 35, 38, 40, 61, 67, 174, 212, 382).

This writer facetiously concludes that the reference in Tholkappiam to the three Tamil kings (வண்புகழ் மூவர்) itself disproves its antiquity, because he presumes that the "general phrase" 'three kings' cannot refer particularly to the Tamil kings at a time "when there were seven or eleven kings and a host of them besides on a proper counting." It is difficult to divine what this author really means by this sentence. He cannot mean seriously to argue that passages in poems like "எழுவரும் வீழ" "சோழர் குடிக்குரியோர்ஒன்பதின்மர்" refer to as many independent kings. Even in later times after the three monarchies were firmly established in Tamilakam according to this writer, eulogists praise the prowess of victors in war as having vanquished five, seven or nine rulers. Here at least these numbers must mean only as many ruling chiefs, under the suzerainty real or nominal of one or the other of the three crowned kings of Tamilakam. Not only Tholkappiam, but even Purananuru (the oldest according to the author of the Chronology) refers to three monarchs almost in language identical with that of Tholkappiam he is here animadverting upon.

The parallel passages may here be compared with advantage in this connection.

Tholkappiam.	Purananuru.
வண்புகழ் மூவர் தண்பொழில் வரைப் பின் நாற்பெயரெல்லை யகத்தவர் வழங்கும் (தொல். செய். சூ. 391)	மண்டிணிகிடக்கைத் தண்டமிழ்க்கிழவர் முரசு முழங்குதானை மூவருள்ளும் அரசெனப்படுவது நினதேபெரும. (புறம். 39)

Vide also stanza 367 of Puram to the same effect.

The author of the Chronology takes the second line of his quotation from Tholkappiam "நாற்பெயரெல்லை" as referring to the four mandalams or kingdoms of the later Tamilian history, i.e. Chera, Chola, Pandya and the later born Thiraya or Thonḍai. On this assumption he concludes that Tholkappiam must have been composed only after the latest Tonḍai or Thiraya kingdom came into existence. In support of this argument he seems to rely on statements of Ilampuranar under this Sutram. He writes as follows:—

"The political division to which the third extract refers is not at all applicable to the period of the synchronistic tables. The commentator rightly expounds that it comprised the four major political provinces of the Tamilakam of Tholkappianar's days, *viz.*, Pandya mandalam, Malai (Chera) mandalam, Cholamandalam and Thonḍaimandalam. What we have to note in this connection is that the fourfold political division to which Tholkappianar alludes in his Sutrams is the picture of a later Tamilakam which we have no right to project into the times of the dynastic kings appearing in the synchronistic tables. Tholkappiyar's reference must be strictly construed as mirroring the conditions of a much later period in the political history of the Tamils." Perasiriyar's is acknowledged on all hands to be the standard commentary higher in authority than the Ilampuranar's for Cheyyuliyal of Tholkappiam; and Perasiriyar rightly repudiates Ilampuranar's gloss here, and interprets the Sutram in strict and logical conformity with its language which runs as follows:—

"வண்புகழ் மூவர் தண்பொழில் வரைப்பின் நாற்பெயரெல்லை யகத்து"

Perasiriyar's commentary for this is as follows:—

"நாற்பெயரெல்லை யகமென்பது தமிழ்நாடென்றவாறு. வடவேங்கடந் தென்குமரி யன்றிக் கிழக்கும் மேற்கும் கடலெல்லை கூறினரோ எனின்—அறியாதுகடாயினாய்; வரையறையிலவென்று கூறுதனவெல்லாங் களைந்து கொள்ளப்படுவன வல்ல; வகை கூறுமையும் தமிழ் கூறப்படுங்கண்டாய்; அவர் வழங்கும் யாப்பின் வழியதெ ன்பது, அந்நாட்டார் வழங்கும் யாப்புப்பகுதி அவை, என்றவாறு."

This is the only meaning that will square with the explicit words in the Sutram. When Tholkappiar expressly says that the entire Tamilakam was ruled by " the only three " monarchs in the whole country, the adjectival phrase " நாற்பெயரெல்லை" can never mean four kingdoms. For, ex-hypothese there were only three kingdoms. Besides the words " எல்லை " is unmistakably significant. It can only mean boundary and never a province at all. The Sutram is self-luminous. Tholkappiar here says only that the rules of prosody and poetics, he expounds in this section, strictly conform to the conventions and practices in vogue within the four boundaries of the entire Tamil country under the aegis of the three dynastic monarchs in Tamilakam. The learned author of the Chronology himself says that " one cannot immediately jump to the conclusion that there was a political province under the name Tonḍaimanḍalam in those days, for this name itself was brought into vogue at a much later date." After stating as much, he is not fair to himself to stretch the plain and explicit words of Tholkappianar " மூவர் வரைப்பின் நாற்பெயரெல்லை " so as not to refer to their natural import, *viz.*, within the four boundaries of the entire country, belonging to the three Tamil monarchs, but to suggest something else at once unnatural and inconsistent with the language in the Sutram. Ilampuranar's reference is perfectly innocent of its historic implications. Perhaps he meant merely to say that Tholkappianar here referred to the whole Tamil Nad comprising the four provinces known in his times. He never adverted to the chronological sequence at all. He simply stated the only important fact in this connection, viz., Tholkappiyanar here spoke of the practices extant in the entire Tamilakam under the three monarchs. He thought he might best put it by including all the four major provinces or mandalams known to his times to emphasise the entirety. If not, he would be stultifying himself beyond redemption. For, he believed in the great antiquity of Tholkappiam and so could not have said anything to discredit that faith of his. Here the Chronologist who chooses to torpedo Tholkappiam with an innocently inadvertant reference from Ilampuranar, ignores his express statement that what may be meant was the entire Tamilakam between Venkatam and the Kumari.' This explicit statement explains Ilampuranar's intention: and his innocently inadvertent word cannot subvert the import of the expressly definite words in the Sutram. It is unnecessary to labour this point at any further length. It is clear that there is absolutely nothing in the Sutrams cited in this connection that is not in perfect harmony with the traditional antiquity of Tholkappiam.

3. The third objection to the great antiquity of Tholkappiam is founded on some Sutrams found in Marapiyal which purport to sanc-

tion and accentuate the privileges of caste by birth. The convincing answer to this objection is what appears on the very face of these fugitive Sutrams. Their contents as well as their context bear unimpeachable testimony to their fabrication and foisting at some later period. The 15 Sutrams which purport to speak of the four castes and their brithrights are sandwiched between sutrams 69 and 86 in Marapiyal, This highly incongruous and inappropriate situation is self-suggestive. Tholkappiam scrupulously follows the most perfectly scientific method and system of treatment throughout. But in this instance, if these Sutrams were genuine, Tholkappiar must be deemed guilty of a strange and inexcusable lapse. For, all the Sutrams up to 69 speak of conventions regarding animal life, and all from 85th and after refer to the vegetable kingdom. What is the appropriateness in wedging between them these 15 Sutrams about the places and privileges of the four castes of men based on birth ? These might well have preceded the Sutrams relating to the beasts, or followed those dealing with the plants. In fact, if ever Tholkappiyanar intended to incorporate these in his great grammar, he could have placed them immediately after Sutram No. 33 which refers to mankind as standing at the top of the scale of all living things. That Sutram comes in the regular course of climax in gamut of life.

Again, if there were four castes in Tamilakam in Tholkappiyanar's times, surely they should have been referred to with other classifications of the Tamil people detailed in the Agattinaiyiyal and Purattainaiyiyal. None but the Brahmans are there spoken of, and they are treated as of a different race and culture. But the Tamil people are always mentioned only in their regional or vocational divisions. Not a single reference to Kshatriyas, to Vaisyas or even to Vellalas as a caste appears anywhere in Tholkappiam except in this ramshackle context in Marapiyal. The names Kshatriya and Sudra are carefully left over in these 15 Sutrams. This scrupulous avoidance of the word "Sudra", the name of the fourth caste of the Aryan social system is eloquently significant. Vellalas in Tamilakam were a respected sect in the post-Tholkappiyam age. They formed the highest rank among the Tamil people. The interpolators, whoever they may be, of these 15 Sutrams, dared not speak of any Tamil class as the ignoble Sudras. They therefore slyly referred to the fourth class as "Vellalas". As this was a respected name, the Tamils would raise no serious protest at the time. Another difficulty also was smoothed over by the authors of these interpolated Sutrams. The fourth caste among the Aryans formed the servile class. But the Vellalas in Tamilakam were of the proudest rank. So, in stating the pursuits and vocations of the four Varnas in these 15 Sutrams, their author takes care to confuse them between the last

two—Vanigars and Vellalas. The fact of the matter is that in the Tamil country at no time were any castes, Vaisyas or Kshatriyas. The Arasars are actual rulers, and the Brahmans claim to be of non-Tamil Aryan extraction. Tholkappiyam repeatedly proclaims that it deals exclusively with the actual conditions of the Tamils alone as were in vogue in the Tamilakam of that age or epoch. And if ever any Aryan institution or usage is referred to for parallel illustration, the Sutram says as much, and never leaves it in doubt as to whether it was Aryan or Tamil. In the face of these facts, these 15 fugitive Sutrams can only be spurious interpolations by some later writers to make it appear that this oldest classical grammar gives sanction and countenance to the four Varnas of the Aryan sociology in Tamilakam. It is thus clear that these 15 Sutrams, on whose incongruity the Chronologist hangs an objection to the antiquity of Tholkappiyam, are irrelevant interpolations of a later date. The very fact that Tholkappiyam does not refer to any existence of the four Varnas or castes by birth among the Tamils in the Agam and Puram chapters, is a proof that it was composed at a very early epoch in the history of Tamil Literature when the caste-system was unknown and unfamiliar to the Tamil society.

Moreover, it is clear that these Sutrams in the "Marapiyal", assigning pursuits and privileges to the four castes, do not offer any irreconcilable opposition to the antiquity of Tholkappiyam even if they were genuine. The four-fold caste-system is a very old institution in the Brahman or Vedic or Aryan culture. The four classes mentioned in these Sutrams really existed—though not by birth,—and exercised their useful function in the social economy of the Tamils as much in the pre-Purananuru as in the post-Purananuru times. Vellalas or agriculturists, Vanigars or traders, Arasars or rulers, and Andanars or priestly Brahmans were all well-known social units in the Tamilakam of yore. The author of the Chronology himself admits that "the few Aryans who first came into the Tamil country were of the religious order. There was a small sprinkling of secular Brahmans also (in the Tamil country of the Purananuru age) who pursued some handicraft work or other." Tholkappiyam does frequently refer to both these sections. It speaks of the higher order of the priestly Brahmans as "Andanars", and of the secular Brahmans as "Pārpārs". The very fact that the rulers and noblemen in Tamilakam invited these priestly Brahmans to perform Yagams for them and heaped honours and estates on them, as is admitted in the several verses in the old Puram or Aham collections, proves that these religious and social notions of the Aryans were not only known, but were not even averse to the Tamils of the Puram and Aham epochs. To aspire for the benefits of Yagams and to actually resort to their costly performances—a

fact observed not only on the part of the Tamil monarchs, but also among noblemen in the country—would reveal not a mere acquaintance with, but also a considerable assimilation of the Aryan practices and culture by the Tamils in the times of the Puram and Aham verses to which the Chronology assigns the oldest age. This in its turn should indicate that Brahmans must have lived long enough in Tamilakam from prior to this classic age to familiarise and persuade the civilised Tamils to acquiesce in and partially adopt these Aryan notions. Books like Purananuru and Ahananuru, Padirruppattu and Pattupãttu, which the Chronology assigns to an earlier pre-Tholkappiyam era, all of them bear testimony to the performance of Yagam by the rulers and citizens in Tamilakam; whereas Tholkappiyam has not a single reference to the practice of Yagam by any non-Brahman Tamil. In this view Tholkappiyam should imply, if anything, an earlier age when the Tamils might have been merely hospitable witnesses to the practices of the Brahman settlers in their midst, quietly observing and good-naturedly not objecting to these Aryans having their own ways which were not the ways of the Tamils in those days. And as clearly the extant Sangam literature which familiarly refers to the performance of Yagams as a common practice among the Tamil rulers and the rich and aspiring nobles in Tamilakam, it should bespeak of a much later post-Tholkappiyam age. It may well be that Tholkappiyam in these Marapiyal Sutrams is just drawing a parallel from the Aryan culture to the four classes of people in Tamilakam without any implication whatever that the Aryan Varnas existed in the Tamil country. This tendency to draw comparisons with the parallel Aryan practices and precepts is quite a common feature in Tholkappiyam. The reference to the Gandharva union as a close parallel to "Kalavu" practice of the Tamils in Kalaviyal, and the mention of the Brahmanic Siksha rules and standards of phonetic measures and sound sources of the alphabetic letters in contrast to those of the Tamil grammar in Pirappiyal are instances in point. These will only point to a fair acquaintance with the Aryan culture and learning on the part of the Tamil scholars and nothing more. This contact and acquaintance of the Tamils with the Aryans is just discernible in Tholkappiyam; but it is the Sangam poetry, for which the Chronology fondly claims pristine purity and priority, that breathes not a mere acquaintaince with, but also a considerable assimilation and adoption of Aryan notions and practices by the Tamil people of that age, and thus affords unimpeachable internal evidence of that poetry being later and post-Tholkappiyam works. The Sutram cited for the third objection is simply permissive. It only says that to rule over lands is not taboo to the Andanars or spiritually evolved Brahmans. It does not even speak of Brahmans in the Tamilakam being rulers. This may be a mere reference to the parallel

social standard in the Aryan system to show the position and privileges of the Brahmans in that system to which there need not have been any bar in Tamilakam also.

4. The fourth objection to the antiquity of Tholkappiyam is based on Sutram 5, Agattinai iyal. This Sutram need not frighten or distress any Tamilian at all. The same explanations which harmonise the Marapiyal Sutrams discussed above in dealing with objection No. (3) will reconcile this Sutram as well with the early age of Tholkappiyam. The author of the Chronology has no real objection to any reference to the gods mentioned in this Sutram. For, he admits that all the collections of his own choice contain verses relating to most of these deities. His only objection is to the regional distribution of these deities in Tholkappiyam and particularly to the position assigned to " Varuna " in this Sutram. If once the Gods were admitted to be familiar deities in the old Tamilakam, there can be no objection to their correlation with the regional topography. Muruga, Māyōn, Indra, and Varuṇa are the favourites or Adi-devatas in the hills, pasture lands, urban and maritime areas respectively as much in the Aryavartha as in the Tamilakam. This Sutram, if anything, would be even a more unexceptionable parallel reference than those in the Pirappiyal and Kalaviyal of Tholkappiyam. The point as to whether these four were ancient Aryan gods domiciled in Tamilakam, or were indigenous Dravidian deities incorporated in the Aryan pantheon is yet an open question. The recent theses of Western scholars suggest that even Vishnu and Varuna and Indra are of Dravidian origin. We need not go so far to harmonise this Sutram with its great age in Tamil literary history. There is nothing on record in the works admitted to the claim of antiquity in the Chronology to militate against Tholkappiar's reference in this connection; but there is everything to support the reference to these deities in this Sutram in Tholkappiyam. Verses in the Agam and Puram collections, Pattupattu and other Tamil poems do refer to one and all of these deities, and always in special reference to their favourite regional locations. Tholkappiyam simply reflects the myths and the faith current in Tamilakam.

5. The final and fifth shaft in the Chronology is the familar old stock-in trade argument founded on the word (ஓரை) Orai in Tholkappiyam. The late lamented and learned Mr. Swamikannu Pillay almost canonized this fetish. But no one tackled this gorgon scare-crow seriously so far. We generally accept the argument as axiomatic truth; and naturally on that footing we find no answer to this objection. The whole history of this argument is a fine instance of the power of auto-suggestive self-stultifying hypnotism. We are often overpowered by mere

sound similarity ; and we then flounder helplessly in irretrievable errors. What is the proved philological connection between the Greek 'hora' and the Tamil 'Orai' (ஓரை) So far as I know no one has given any convincing answer to this obvious elementary question. Until this connection is first conclusively established, it is idle to speculate on the origin or the fancied kinship of this Tamil word. It is unprofitable and even dangerous to enter upon endless and hair-splitting controversies.

In the first place it is said by competent Greek savants that the original import of "Hora" in Greek had nothing to do with the divisions of a day's time at all ; only in its later and secondary stage this Greek word was adopted to mean a part of a day. In Sanskrit there is no word corresponding to this Tamil word (ஓரை) in sense as well as sound. "Ahōrāthram" in Sanskrit can have no connection whatever to "orai" in Tamil. Were it necessary to dogmatise a foreign origin to this word "orai" in Tamil, it may as well have come directly into Tamilakam from Greece, and need not require a Sanskrit transporting agency for its transmission. For, it is a well-known fact of history that there was direct intercourse between Tamilakam and the Grecian and Roman countries from pre-historic times. But why this superstition that the Tamils could have had no indigenous culture of any kind, and every Tamil word for even elementary notions of time and space divisions should be of foreign origin ? To argue that borrowing was always the lot of Tamil. and to lend words and notions is ever the monopoly of the Aryan dialects is the order of the day. Dr. Caldwell has pricked this bubble decades ago and has laid the ghost to rest, it is to be hoped. Even the proud Sanskrit is now proved not to have disdained loans and even gifts from Tamil. "Orai" may well be an indigenous Tamil word from the beginning of time. As Sanskrit has no word to correspond to the Tamil "orai" in sense and sound, it is all the more reason why it should be a pure Tamil word. Kizhamai (கிழமை) Nāl (நாள்) Thingal (திங்கள்) Andu (ஆண்டு) are all pure Tamil words, and there is no insuperable impediment in believing that "orai" (ஓரை) also may be of Tamil origin. The contention is that the Tamils could not have evolved for themselves any advanced astronomical knowledge and should therefore have only borrowed the words with the notions of astronomical science. Even if this extraordinary and perverse proposition were conceded for argument's sake, it need not entail the foreign origin of the word (ஓரை). For it involves no advanced or technical astronomical notion whatever. If "orai" meant merely some part of a day's time set apart as suitable for certain rites and rituals, this requires no great astronomical attainments for anyone to entertain this idea, or to frame

a word to express it. "Orai" may thus be a Tamil word; and the endless speculation about its origin will have no solution; for, it needs none at all.

Secondly, apart from all this, this meaning of "orai" in the Tholkappiyam is not conclusively established. It is a fundamental canon that the meaning of a word must be first ascertained definitely before any controversy is raised about its origin. The Sutram reads as follows:

"மறைந்த வொழுக்கத் தோரையும் நாளும்
துறந்த வொழுக்கம் கிழவோற்கில்லை"

(தொல். களவி. 44)

It is the commentators of the modern age that first interpreted the word "orai" here as meaning a muhurtham or auspicious part of a day. There is nothing in the whole of Tholkappiyam to hold that this word is employed only in this astronomical or astrological sense here in this Sutram. The Sutram proceeds to emphasise only this simple truth *viz.*, while men may not forsake all other attractions and diverse distractions even in their love, women unlike men would crave for nothing but their love. Neither the nature and normal functions of the day, nor the fondest amusements and sports would distract women from their all-absorbing love. The plain meaning of this Sutram is that men in love do not forsake all other attractions of the day as well as their wonted sports and plays. The implication is that women in love do so, because love to them is their very existence, while to men love is merely a thing of joy. The language of the Sutram is plain as a pike staff. The word "orai" meaning pastime or play is as old as the Tamil literature. At first it simply signified sport or play in common. But as after childhood and youth, men ordinarily cease to interest themselves in amusements as civilization advances, while women ever revel in them throughout their life, the word "orai" by selective principle came to be applied in later times to the pastimes and amusements of women-folk. Tholkappiyam in the earliest unsophisticated Tamilian Era uses this word to express sports or plays, which men in their amphibious, attenuated and moderated love do not give up even for their love. The later day commentator who came nearly fifteen hundred years after this classic grammar, imported into this Sutram the astrological meaning of this word. While the original text gives no countenance to this view and while it admits of a fairly uncontroversial meaning, it will be doing violence first to give a new import and then to build a load of argument against the age of the book itself all based on unproved one-sided assumption. It is an instance of giving the dog a bad name to hang him.

தொல்காப்பிய ஆராய்ச்சி

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களவியல் சூத்திரம் 2.

ஒன்றே, வேறே, என்றிருபால்வயின்
ஒன்றியுயர்ந்த பாலதாணையின்
ஒத்தகிழவனுங் கிழத்தியுங்காண்ப ;
மிக்கோனாயினுங் கடிவரை இன்றே.

இதற்கு இளம்பூரணருரைவருமாறு :—"ஒருவனும் ஒருத்தியுமாக இல்லறஞ் செய்துழி, அவ்விருவரையும் மறுபிறப்பினும் ஒன்றுவித்தலும் வேறாக்குதலுமாகிய இருவகை ஊழினும், இருவருள்ளமும் பிறப்புத்தோறும் ஒன்றி நல்வினைக் கண்ணே நிகழ்ந்த ஊழினது ஆணையின், பிறப்பு முதலிய பத்துவகையினும் ஒத்த கிழவனும் (தலைவனும்) கிழத்தியும் (தலைவியும்) எதிர்ப்படும். இக்குணங்களால் தலைமகன் மிக்கானாயினும் கடியப்படாது'' என்றவாறு.

நச்சினார்க்கினியரும் ஈண்டு, "பால்வரைதெய்வத்தின் ஆணையாலே, பிறப்பு முதலியன பத்தும் ஒத்த தலைவனும் தலைவியும் எதிர்ப்படுப," என்றே கூறுகின்றார். இவ்வாறு பொருள் கொள்ளின், களவுக் காதலியலுக்கே முரணாகும். தமிழர் கற்பு மணத்துக்குக் களவுமுறைக் காதற் கூட்டம் இன்றியமையாதது எனக்கொண்டார். மெய்க்காதலின்றிக் கற்பறம் சிறவாது ; இருவயினொத்த மெய்க்காதலுண்மையும், பிறர்கூட்டுந்துணையின்றித் தலைவனுந் தலைவியும் தாமே கண்டுழிக்காதலித்துக் கூடுவராயின் மட்டும் துணியத்தகும். அன்றியும் பிறர் துணைகூட்டக் கூடும் கூட்டம் குறிக்கோள் கொண்டதாமாகவே, ஆண்டுப்பிறிது குறிப்பின்றி உள்ளுறுமன்பொன்றே உழுவலர் தம்மிற் கூடக்காரணமென்று துணிதற்கில்லை. பிறிது குறிப்பெதுவுமின்றி, முன்கண்டறியாத இருவர் தமியராய்க் கண்டாங்கே ஒருவரை ஒருவரின்றியமையா உணர்ச்சி தரும் மெய்க்காதல் உள்ளத்தூறக் கூடநேரின், அவர் காதலின் தூய்மையும் துப்பும் துணியப்பெறும். நாளும் பல பெண்களைக் கண்டுவரும் ஒருவனுக்கும், அவ்வாறே நாள்தோறும் பிற ஆடவரைக் காணும் ஒருத்திக்கும் காணப்பட்டார் யார் மாட்டும் அவரின்றித் தாமமையாத்தாபம் பிறப்பதில்லை. ஒரோவழி ஏதேனுமேதுப்பற்றிச் சிறிது காமவிகார மெழுவதாயினும், அது நிலையாது மாறியழியும்.

பணம், பதவி, இளமை, அழகு முதலிய காரணத்தொடு தோன்றுமன்பும், உழுவலன் பல்லாததால், நிலையாது. ஒருவரை யொருவர் முன்னறிவராயின், பிறகுறிக்கோள் உளத்துருவெடுத்து ஒருவகை நிலையற்ற அன்புக்கிடனுகலாம். அதுபற்றியே முன் னறியாரிருவரிடமும் காரணமின்றிக் கண்டுழியலைக்குங் காதலொன்றே, அன்றுபோ லென்றும் நின்று, மணந்து கற்புறவு கொள்ளுமுன் எவ்வாறே அவ்வாறே கரண மொடு மணந்துவாழும் பிற்காலத்தும் நிலைத்து, அழகு இளமைமுதலிய இங்கி தத் துணைகளிறந்தாலும் தான் நாளும் வளரும் பெற்றியதாகும். இதனுற்ருன் " அதுவே,

> தானே அவளே தமியர் காணக்
> காமப்புணர்ச்சி யிருவயினொத்தல்"

என்றிறையனுர் அகப்பொருட் சூத்திரம் வற்புறுத்திற்று.

அன்றியும் திருக்கோவையார் 7-ம் பாசுரத்தின் கீழ்ப்பேராசிரியர் தரும் விசேட வுரைக்குறிப்பும் இத்தமிழ்க்காதற்றன்மையை வலியுறுத்துகின்றது. "இவ ஞேடிவளிடை உண்டாய அன்பிற்குக்காரணம் விதியல்லாமை ஈண்டுப்பெற்ரும்" எனக்கூறி அக்கூற்றுக்கு ஏற்ற பலநியாயங்களும் எடுத்துக்காட்டி நிறுவியுள்ள பேராசிரியர் தமிழ் வழக்கறிந்து தெளித்து வடித்துக்கொடுத்த வாய்மையைமறந்து, பழையதமிழ் எழில் வழக்கொன்றையே தான் கூறுவதாக விதந்துரைத்துச் சூத்தி ரிக்கும் தொல்காப்பிய விதியில், 'ஊழ்வினையின் விதியால் காதலர் கூடுவர்' எனப் பொருள் காணுவது தமிழ் வழக்கழித்துத் தொல்காப்பியர் கருத்தையு மறுப்பதா கும். ஆகையாலிங்குப் "பாலதாணை" எனும் தொடருக்கு உரிய உண்மைப்பொரு ளைத் தெளிய முயல்வோம்; எளிதிலறிவோம். ஈண்டுக் காதல், பால்பற்றியெழும் பான்மையது. யாருக்கும் யார்மாட்டும் நிகழத்தகும் அன்பல்ல. ஆண்—பெண்— என்ற இயற்கை வேறுபாட்டின் மூலம், அவ்வேற்றுமையிடை ஒளிந்தொளிரும் உயிர் ஒற்றுமைச் செவ்வி வெளிப்படுதற் கேதுவாக ஒத்த இருவருள்ளத்தும் ஒருங் கே விளையும் தூயகாதலாகையால், இக்காதலரின் காமக்கூட்டம் பிறிதுகாரண மின்றி, அவர் தம் 'பாலியல்பே' காரணமாக வுடைத்து. அதனுல் அத்தகவுடைக் கூட்டத்தை ஆசிரியர் 'பாலதாணையிற்'கூடும் கூட்டம் என்றுள்ளவாறுரைக்கலானுர். இனிச் சூத்திரத்திற்குப் பொருள்காண முயல்வோம்.

"ஒன்றே, வேறே, என்றிருபால்வயின்"—"குறிஞ்சி முதலிய நிலங்களில், ஒரு நிலத்திற்கே இருவரும் உரியராயினும், அன்றி இருவரும் இருவேறு நிலத்தின ராயினும்,"

"ஒன்றியுயர்ந்த பாலதாணையின்"—"நாள்தோறும் காணுபவர்போலன்றி, முன்காணுரிருவர் முதலிற்கண்டாங்கே அவரிடை உள்ளுறையும் இருவயினொத்த காதல் முளை கிளைத்துத் தழையத்தக்கவாறு தம்முள் ஆண்பெண் வேறுபாட்டிடை உயிரொன்றி யுயர்ந்த அவர் தம் பால்விளியால் (sex urge)."

"ஒத்தகிழவனுங் கிழத்தியுங்காண்ப"—"பிறப்புமுதலிய எல்லாவகையானும் உள்ளமும் உயிரும் கள்ளமின்றி ஒத்துயரு முழுவலன்புக்குரியாரிருவரும் எதிர்ப்படில், ஆங்கே தாமுன்னறியாக் காதற் காட்சியராவர்."

"மிக்கோனுயினுங் கடிவரை இன்றே"—"அறவே தம்முள் எல்லாவகையினும் காதலரிருவர் ஒவ்வாமல் இருவருளொருவர் சிறிதளவுமிக்காராக நேரின், அது தலைவன் கண்ணதாயின் காதற்கூட்டம் கடிதற்கில்லை."

இங்குநாம் உய்த்துணர்ந்து ஓம்பற்குரியன ஒன்றிரண்டுண்டு. பாலதாணை யாண்டு நிகழும்? ஆணும் பெண்ணும் பால் வேறுபாட்டால் யாரும் யாரையும் காணக் காதலிப்பது இயல்பில்லை. தம்மிடை உள்ளுறையும் உழுவலுடையாரே காணுங்கால் உயிரொன்றி யுயர்தற்குரியர். அதனுலேதான் பால்வேறுபட்டார் யாருக்கும் 'பால்' ஆணை தராது. பெருந்திணைக் காமம் ஒருகால் சிலரை அலைத்தல் கூடும். அன்னுர் கூடில் தம்முள் உளம் ஒன்றியுயர்தல் இயலாது. உள்ளமும் உயிரும் இரண்டற்று ஒன்ருய்க்கலந்து உயர்தற்கேற்ற உழுவலன்பு மறைந்துறையு முள்ளமுடையார் இருவர் காணுங்கால்தான் மெய்க்காதல் முளை கூர்த்து வெளிப்பட்டுத் தழையும். உதவி, உறவுமுதலிய பிறகாரணம்பற்றி எழுந்து இடையழியுமன்புபோலாது இருவயி னெத்து என்றும் நின்றுதழையும் காதலால் மட்டுமே இருவர் ஒன்றியுயர்வர். அன்னுரையே தம்முட் காதலித்தொன்றியுயருமாறு "பால்" விளிக்கும்.

இனி "மிக்கோனுயினும் கடிவரையின்றே" என்பதும் ஆராயத்தக்கது. மிகுதி இருவருள் யார் மாட்டும் நன்றன்று. செவ்வொப்பே சாலச்சிறந்தது. ஒரோவழிச் சிறிதளவு தரமுயரினும், அது தலைவிமாட்டாமேல் தலைவனுக்கு நிலை குலையும். வாழ்க்கைத்துணையான மனைவி, மிகத்தாழ்தலும் நலம்தராது; ஒப்பது மனைமாட்சி தரும்; உயர்வது தலைவனைப் பெண்வழிச்சேறும் பழிக்கிழிக்கும் வழியாகும். ஆகவே, இருவரும் ஒத்தலே வேண்டப்படும். ஒருவர் சிறிதளவு மிகநேரில், அது தலைவன் மாட்டேயமைதல் காதலர் மாட்டேதம் குறைக்குமென்று கடியாது தழுவப்படும்.

இனி, இவ்வாறே சூத்திரங்களுக்கெல்லாம் பழைய உரைகாரர் உரைகளைச் சொல்லி மறுத்துப்போவது அவசியமில்லையென நினைக்கின்றேன். இன்றியமையா இடத்துமட்டும் பழைய உரைகளைக் குறிப்பதன்றி, நிரலே சூத்திரங்களுக்குரிய நேரியபொருளை நான் கண்டவாறே தரமுயலுவேன்.

களவியல் சூத்திரம் 3.

"சிறந்துழி, ஐயம் சிறந்த தென்ப ;
இழிந்துழி இழிபே சுட்ட லான." என்பது சூத்திரம்.

இதன்பொருள் :—"சிறந்துழி, ஐயம் சிறந்ததென்ப" — ஐயம் முன்னறியாதார் இருவர் தலைப்பட்டு ஒருவரை ஒருவர் காதலித்துக் கண்டபோது ஒருவருள்ளத்து மற்றவர்யாரோ என்றையம் எழுவது இயல்பு. எனில், அவ்வாறையப்

படுபவர் மற்றவரை அவருக்குரியதனினும் சிறந்ததொரு தகுதியுடையாராக ஐயுறு மாறமைதல் வேண்டும். அத்தகைய ஐயப்பாடே சிறப்புடைத்தாம்.

"இழிந்துழி, இழிபே சுட்டலான"—அவ்வாறு உயர்ந்தவழிப்படாது, உண்மைநிலையினும் தாழ்ந்தாராக ஐயம் நிகழின், அது இழிபுணர்ச்சியையே சுட்டுமன்றி மனத்துறும் காதலைக்காட்டாது.

எனவே, புலவர் காதலரிருவரின் முதற்காட்சியில் அவரிடை ஐயம் கூறுங்கால், இழிவுணர்ச்சியைக் காட்டும் இழிதகவையத்தைக்கடிந்து சிறப்பினைச்சுட்டிக் காதலைவளர்க்கும் சீரியமுறையில் செய்யுள்செய்வதே புலனெறிவழக்கம், என்பதை இயற்றமிழ்ப்புலவர்க்கு இலக்கணங் கூறுமாசிரியர் ஈண்டுத்தெளிக்கலானார். இப்பொருளே இளம்பூரணருக்கு முடம்பாடாதல், "ஐயமிகுதலாவது-மக்களுள் உள்ளாள் அல்லள், தெய்வமோ எனமேலாயினரோடே ஐயுறுதல்" எனுமவர் உரைக் குறிப்பால் தேறப்படும். இதற்கு மாறாக நச்சினார்க்கினியர் இச்சூத்திரத்துக் கூறும் புத்துரை, ஆடவரில் பெண்டிர் அறிவாற்றாழ்ந்தவரெனும் தமிழர்கடிந்த பிழையைப்பேணிப் பீழைபடும்.

களவியல் சூத்திரம் 31.

"முந்நா ளல்லது துணையின்று கழியாது;
அந்நா ளகத்தும் அதுவரை வின்றே."

இதன் பொருள்:—"முந்நாளல்லது துணையின்று கழியாது"—களவுக்காலத்துத் தலைவி பூப்பால் புறம்பெயராமல் மனையகத்தடங்கி யொழுகும் மூன்றுநாட்களைத்தவிரப் பிறிதெந்நாளும் தலைவனும் தலைவியும் கூடாது கழிவதில்லை.

"அந்நாளகத்தும் அதுவரைவின்றே"—பூத்தகாலத்தும் கூட்டம் களவிற் கடியப்படுவதில்லை.

இதுவே இச்சூத்திரச்சொற்றொடர் சுட்டும் செம்பொருளாகும். தொல்காப்பியர் கருத்தும் அதுவேயாதலால், அக்கருத்துக்கேற்ற சொற்கள் இச்சூத்திரத்தில் பெய்தமையானும், பின்கற்பியலில் "களவினுள் நிகழ்ந்த அருமையைப்புலம்பி, அலமரலுள்ள மொடளவியவிடத்தும், அந்தரத்தெழுதிய எழுத்தின்மான, வந்தகுற்றம் வழிகெட வொழுகலும்" என்று இவ்வாறு களவுக்காலத்தே காதல் மிகுதியால் நிகழ்ந்த தவறுகளை நீக்குதல் குறித்தமையானும், தெற்றெனவிளங்கும். இதற்குமாறாக உரைகாரர் கூறுவவனைத்தும் பொருந்தாமையை அவருரைக்குச் சூத்திரச்சொற்கள் இடந்தராமையொன்றே தெளிவிக்கும்.

களவியல் சூத்திரம் 44.

"மறைந்த வொழுக்கத் தோரையு நாளும்
துறந்த வொழுக்கங் கிழவோற் கில்லை."

இதன்பொருள்:—மறைந்தவொழுக்கத்து—களவொழுக்கத்திலே, ஓரையும் நாளும் துறந்தவொழுக்கம்—தனக்கியல்பான விளையாட்டுக்களையும் நாள்வேலைக

ளையும் துறந்து அனவரதம் காதலிலேயே அழுந்திக்கிடக்கும் வழக்கம், கிழவோற்கில்லை—தலைவன் மாட்டுக்காணப்படுவதொன்றன்று.

எனவே களவில் தலைவிக்குத் தன் காதலன்றிப் பிறிதெதிலும் உளங்கொள்ளாமல் முழுதும் தன்னைக்காதலுக்கே கொடுத்துப் பிறவெல்லாவற்றையும் மறந்தொழுகுதலியல்பா மென்பதும், தலைவன் அவ்வாறன்றித்தன் தகுதிக்கேற்ற விளையாட்டுக்களை ஒழித்துவிடாமல் ஆடியும் நாள்தோறும் தனக்குரிய தொழிலாற்றியும் வருவதுடன் ஏற்றபெற்றியால் காலமிடங்கருதிக் காதலின்பத்தையும் துய்ப்பானுவான் என்பதும், உலகியல் கருதி இச்சூத்திரம் கூறுகின்றது.

ஓரை—விளையாட்டென்பது, சங்க இலக்கியமுழுதும் அச்சொல்லுக்கு அப்பொருளாட்சி யுண்மையால் விளங்கும். ஓரைக்கு இராசி அல்லது முகூர்த்தம் எனும் பொருளுண்மைக்குத் தொல்காப்பியத்திலேனும் சங்க இலக்கியம் எதனிலேனும் சான்று காணுதலரிது. மிகவகன்ற பிற்காலப்புலவர் சிலர் முகூர்த்தம் (அதாவது ஒருநாளினுள் நன்மை தீமைகளுக்குரியதாகப் பிரித்துக்கொள்ளப்படும் உட்பிரிவு) என்றபொருளில் இச்சொல்லைப், பிரயோகிக்கலானர். அக்கொள்கைக்கே சான்றில்லாத சங்க இலக்கியத்தில், ''ஓரை''யென்னும் தனித்தமிழ்ச்சொல்லுக்கு; அக்காலத்திலக்கியங்களால் அதற்குரிய பொருளாகக் காணப்பெறும் விளையாட்டையே அச்சொல் குறிப்பதாகக்கொள்ளுவதே முறையாகும். அதைவிட்டுப்பிற்கால ஆசிரியர் கொள்கையான இராசி அல்லது முகூர்த்தம் எனும்பொருளை இத்தமிழ்ச்சொல்லுக்கு ஏற்றுவதே தவறாகும். அதற்குமேல் அச்சொல்லைக்கொண்டு தொல்காப்பியம் அடையப் பிற்காலத்து நூலென்று வாதிப்பது அறிவுக்கும் ஆராய்ச்சி யறத்திற்கும் பொருந்தாது. அடையின்றி 'ஓரை' என்பதற்கு முகூர்த்தமென்று பொருள் கொண்டால், நல்ல நேரத்தைக் குறிப்பதன்றித் தீய இராசியைக் குறிப்பதாகக் கொள்ளுதல் பொருந்தாது, ஒழுக்கமென்னுஞ் சொல்லைப்போலவே முகூர்த்தமும் தன்னளவில் நல்லதையே குறிக்கும் ஆகலான்.

கற்பியல் சூத்திரம் 31.

“பின்முறை யாகிய பெரும்பொருள் வதுவைத்
தொன்முறை மனைவி எதிர்ப்பா டாயினு
மின்னிழைப் புதல்வனை வாயில்கொண்டு புகினும்
இறந்த துணைய கிழவோ னாங்கட்
கலங்கலு முரிய னென்மனர் புலவர்”

இதன்பொருள் :— பின்முறையாகிய பெரும்பொருள்=வரைவிற்குப் பின் தலைவியைத் தணக்கப்போதிய பெருமையுடைத்தாகத் தலைவன் கருதிச்செய்தபொருளை. (148) வதுவைத் தொன்முறைமனைவி எதிர்ப்பாடாயினும் = மணந்து கற்புங்காமமும் நற்பாலொழுக்கமுமாய தொன்முறையுடைய மனைவிக்கெதிர்கொண்டு புகுங்காலும்,

அல்லது

அன்னநன்மனையாள் தன்னிற் பொருளைப் பெரிதாக்கித் தற்பிரிந்து தேடிய பொருளொடு மீளும் தலைவனைச் சினவாது (பிரிதற்கு முன் நடந்தபடியே நடந்து) தொல்லைக் கற்புறுகாம நற்பாலொழுக்க முறையில் எதிர்ப்படுவாளாயினும் எனலு மாம்.

மின்னிழைப் புதல்வனை வாயில்கொண்டு புகினும்=பரத்தைமையால் பிரிந்த தலைவன் தன் தவறஞ்சி மகனை வாயிலாகக் கொண்டுபுகினும், இறந்த துணைய கிழவோன் = தன் பிரிவுக்காலத்துத் தலைவிக்குத்தான் காதலறங்கடந்த அளவினனுய தலைவன். அதாவது, தவறிழைத்த வாழ்க்கைத்துணையாயதலைவன்.

ஆங்கண் கலங்கலுமுரியன் = அவ்வாறு பிரிந்து மீண்டு தலைவியை எதிர்ப் படுமிடத்து அவட்குத்தானிழைத்த தவறு நினைத்துக் கலங்கலுமுரியன்.

உம்மையால் கலக்கங்காட்டாமல் தன் காதல் நிறைவுகூறித் தலைவியைத் தேற்றவும் ஊடல்தீர்க்கவும் முயலுவதே தலைவனின் பெரும் இயல்பென்பது விளங்கும்.

இச்சூத்திரத்திற்கு இதுவே ஆசிரியர் கருத்தாம் என்பது, முன் கற்பியல் 9-ம் சூத்திரத்துப் 'பெரும்பொருள்' எனும் தொடரை இப்பொருளிலேயே தொல் காப்பியர் பெய்தமைத்தபெற்றி வலியுறுத்தும்.

"பெறலரும் பெரும்பொருள் முடிந்தபின்வந்த" என்ற சூத்திரமுதலடிக்கு இளம்பூரணர் இவ்வுரையே கூறுவதும் கருதற்பாலது. அவர் ஆங்குத்தரும்பொருளாவது :—"பெறுதற்கரிய பெரும்பொருளை முடித்தபின்னர்த் தோன்றிய தெறுதற்கரிய மரபு காரணத்தால் தலைவனைச் சிறப்பித்துக் கூறுமிடத்தும் தோழி கூற்று நிகழும், என்றவாறு." இவ்வாறு உரியபொருள் கூறியதோடமையாது, "பெரும் பொருள், ஈண்டு, வரைவிற்கேற்றது; தெறுதல், சுழலநோக்குதல்" என விசேடவுரையும் கூறி, "பெரும்பொருள்" என்னும் தொல்காப்பியத் தொடருக்கு அத்தொடர்ச் சொற்கள் சுட்டும் நேரியபொருளைத் தெள்ளத்தெளித்துப் போந்தார்.

அதே சூத்திரத்தில், பின் "சீருடைப் பெரும்பொருள் வைத்த வழி, மறப்பினும்" எனவருமடியும் கவனிக்கத்தக்கது. ஆண்டும், வரைந்துகொண்டு வாழும் தலைவன் இல்வாழ்க்கை இனிது நடத்தற்குவேண்டிப் பெரும்பொருள் தேடுவதைப் பெரிதாகத் தன் மனதில் கொண்டபொழுது, அது காரணமாகத் தலைவியுடனுறையும் காதற்கடனைத் தலைவன்மறந்து பிரிவுக்குறிப்பைத் தோற்றுவிப்பினும் தோழி கூற்று நிகழும், என்பதே இவ்வடிக்கு இனிது பொருந்தும் செவ்வியபொருளாகும். முதலடிக்குச் செம்பொருள் கூறிய இளம்பூரணர் இப்பின்னடிக்கு அதைமறந்து, "பெரும்பொருள்" என்பதற்குரிய செம்பொருளை விட்டு, இத்தொடரை இலக்கணையாக "இற்கிழமை"யைக் குறிக்கும் என்றெழுதலானுர். அதைக் கொழுகொம்பாக்கி, முதலடியில் வரும் இத்தொடரையும் ஆகுபெயராக்கிப் "பெரும்பொருள்" என்பதற்கு "வதுவை" எனப்பொருள் கூறுவர் நச்சினர்க்கினியர். அவரே, பிந்திய

அடிக்குத் "தலையாய இல்லறத்தைத் தலைவிமாட்டு வைத்த காலத்துத் தலைவன் அறஞ்செய்தற்கும் பொருள் செய்தற்கும் இசையும் கூத்துமாகிய இன்பம் நுகர்தற்கும் தலைவியைமறந்து ஒழுகினும்" என வுரைகூறினர். இலக்கணநூலில் ஒரு சொல்லையோ தொடரையோ பலவிடங்களில் பலவேறு பொருளில் பெய்துபோவது இலக்கணநூலார் முறையன்று. அது அறிவுக்கும் ஆட்சிமரபுக்கும் மாறான தவறாகும். சூத்திரம், மற்றைப்பாட்டுப்போலாது, திரிசொல் முதலிய மயக்கச் சொற்களைவிலக்கி, எளிய இயற்சொற்களால் சொற்சுட்டும் செம்பொருள் கற்பார்க்குக்கண்டளவே தோன்றுமாறு அமைதலே முறை. தொல்காப்பியரே

" அவற்றுட், சூத்திரந்தானே,
ஆடி நிழலி னறியத் தோன்றி
நாடுத லின்றிப் பொருணனி விளங்க
யாப்பினுட் டோன்ற யாத்தமைப் பதுவே"

எனச் சூத்திர இலக்கணம் கூறுபவர், அவ்விலக்கணத்துக்கு மாறாகத்தானே பல சூத்திரங்களில் ஒரேதொடரைப் பல வேறுபொருளிற்பெய்து மயங்கவைப்பாரா? ஒருகாலுமில்லை. பிறிது கருத்தைச் சுட்டாவிடத்தெல்லாம் சூத்திரச்சொற்றொடர் சுட்டும் செம்பொருளே ஆசிரியர் கருத்தாகக்கொள்ளுதல் கற்போர்கடன், ஆகையால் கற்பியல் 9-ம் சூத்திரத்தி லீரிடத்தும், 31-ம் சூத்திரத்திலோரிடத்தும் வரும் "பெரும் பொருள்" எனும் சொற்றொடர் அம்மூவிடத்தும் "பெரிதாகியபொருள்"என்பதேயே குறித்தல் வேண்டும். முன்னையதான 9-ம் சூத்திரத்தில், முதலடியில், வரைவின்பொருட்டு வரைவுக்கு முன்பொருள்செய்யச்சென்ற தலைவன், பொருளைச் செய்துமுடித்து, வரைதற்கு வந்தபொழுது, அப்பொருட் பொருட்டுச் சிறுகாலையவன் தலைவியைப்பிரிந்ததற்கு வெகுண்டுதெருமல், வரைதற்கு வந்த மகிழ்ச்சிமலிந்து தோழிக்குக்கூற்றுநிகழுமென்பது, கூறப்பட்டது, அதேசூத்திரத்தில் பிந்திய அடியில், வரைந்துவாழும் தலைவன் வரைந்தபின் இல்லறமினிது நடத்தற்பொருட்டுப் பொருள்தேட நினைத்துத் தலைவிக்குரிய தன் காதற்கடனை மறப்பானாகக்கண்டதோழிக்குக் கூற்று நிகழ்வதை ஆசிரியர் சுட்டுகின்றார். இவ்விருவகைப்பொருட்பிரிவையு மிதிற்கூறிய ஆசிரியர், இவற்றுள் முன்னதான வரைவுக்கு முன்பொருளாக்கியதை விலக்கி, வரைந்தொழுகும் தலைவன் கற்பொழுக்க முடைய தலைவியை மறந்து பிரியுங்குறிப்புக்காட்டிய பொழுது தோழி கூறுவதையு மிங்குக்கூறி, பின் 31-ம் சூத்திரத்தில் அவ்வாறு இல்லறத்திற்கு வேண்டியபொருட்குப் பிரிந்த கணவன், பொருளொடு மீளுபவன், தான் தணந்துவைத்த தலைவியை அப்பொருளொடு எதிர்ப்படுங்கால் தன் நெஞ்சில் கலக்கங்கொள்ளுமிடத்தை விளக்குகின்றார். இதனால், ஈண்டு, "பின்முறை ஆக்கியபெரும்பொருள்" என்பது, வரைந்தபின் தலைவன்செய்யும் பொருளென்பதைத் தெளிக்கவந்த தொடரெனத்தெளிதலெளிதாம்.

இனி, இச்சூத்திரத்தில் நச்சினார்க்கினியர் சில பாடபேதங்கொள்ளுகிறார். அவர் பாடமும் சூத்திரப்பொருளை மாற்றற்குரியதன்று. முதலடியில்"ஆகிய"என்ற இளம்பூரணர் பாடத்தை "ஆக்கிய" என மாற்றிக்கொள்ளுவர் நச்சினார்க்கினியர்.

எதுபாடமாயினும், வரைவுக்குப்பின் முறையாகத் தலைவன்செய்த பெரும்பொருளையே சுட்டுவதாகும். நச்சினார்க்கினியர் பாடத்தில், இச்சூத்திரத்தின் 4-வது அடியிற் பெரியதொரு மாறுதல் காணப்படுகிறது.

"இறந்த துணையகிழவோனுங்கண்" என்ற இளம்பூரணர் பாடத்தை அறவேமாற்றி, "கிழவோன் இறந்தது நினைஇ ஆங்கண்" எனப் புதிதொரு பாடங்கொண்டனர் நச்சினார்க்கினியர். தமக்கு முந்திய உரையாசிரியர் பாடத்தைச் சுட்டக்மலே புறக்கணித்துத் தாம் புதுப்பாடங் கொண்டதற்கேற்ற ஆதாரத்தையும் விளக்கினாரில்லை. அதன் முறையை ஈண்டாராய்தற்கவசியமில்லையாதலால், அதைவிட்டு, நச்சினார்க்கினியர் பாடத்தால் சூத்திரக்கருத்து வேறுபட்டதா என்பதைமட்டும் நோக்குவோம். இவர் பாடமும், "பிரிந்து மீண்டதலைவன், கழிந்த தன்தவறு நினைந்து, அம்மீட்சிக் காலத்துக் கலங்குவதுமுண்டு என்பதையே கூறுதலால், இச்சூத்திரத்திற்கு ஆசிரியர் கொண்ட கருத்து மேலே நாம் தெளித்துக் கூறியதேயாகுமென்பது வலியுறுகின்றது."

The Semantic Principle of Expansion

By

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Semantics or the Science of meaning is only a more recent development in linguistics than phonology and morphology.[1] No systematic and scientific treatment of this branch appears to have been made before Breal, Professor of Comparative Grammar at the College de France, published his book on Semantics in 1897. But Whitney as Professor of Sanskrit and Comparative Philology in Yale College seems to have taken an interest in this study as early as 1867.[2] Professor A. H. Sayce would even say that August F. Pott took an interest in this pursuit at about the same time.[3] Postgate, Professor of Comparative Philology at University College, London, in 1900, claims that just before Breal published his book in French he had bestowed some thought to the subject himself. If Breal published his book in July 1897, Postgate had delivered an elaborate lecture on the science of meaning at his college in October 1896. The latter had to take great pains then to exhort his audience to devote some attention to the subject. He is reported to have said, "We see a subject of almost limitless extent, but of workers not a score."[4] Still, of all departments of philology, Semantics is certainly the one most likely to be of great interest to the general public.

What is this science about? It deals with the principles regulating changes of meaning in a language.[5] That its contributions to comparative philology are inestimable is the opinion of Postgate. All linguists know that there have been changes from time to time in the meaning of certain words in a spoken language. Some of these changes are capable of explanation. And interesting observations can be made of certain tendencies but it may not be possible to go beyond this. The reason is that 'laws' of change in meaning have not yet been discovered and are

1. Taraporewala: Elements of the Science of Language, p. 191.
2. His "Language and Study of Language," p. 106.
3. "The Science of Language," p. 339.
4. *The Fortnightly Review,* September 1897.
5. Peile: Philology, p. 23.

probably undiscoverable, according to Tucker.[6] These tendencies then are generally classified under three heads: Expansion, Restriction and Transference. It is by means of transference or shifting that expansion and restriction sometimes take place. Hence these tendencies will ultimately resolve themselves into two, namely, Expansion or widening and Restriction or specialisation.

The process of expansion consists in the application of the name of a particular species to a genus in general. It is a normal phenomenon, which finds a place in languages that are spoken by people whose life is intense and whose thought is active. Children, for example, are prone to call any river they may see by the name of the river that runs through their own village or town. A child coming from Kumbakonam, on looking at the stream Pālamān in Chidambaram actually cried out to its mother, "Here is Kāvēri." Vendryes tells us that the child of Paris generally says, "I see a Seine before me," when as a matter of fact it does not see the River Seine but any stream before it.[7] And Damodhar Gune states that in Poona and Sangli women generally talk of *Gaṅga* even when they have before them only the Krishna or what is worse, any little stream.[8] From these instances it may be noticed that the name of a particular river has come to be applied to any other river in a general way.

This tendency is found not only among children and women. Even great men have not escaped it. That this is true may be evident from certain examples collected below from various languages. The French word *temps* originally meant only temperature or heat. Later on, it came to mean weather, good or bad. But now it corresponds to the English word 'time'[9] and indicates the abstract idea of duration in general. In the Southern Slavonic group of languages the name of the particular flower 'rose' has been used to indicate flowers in general. The Italian dialects of Friuli are said to have been contaminated by this usage.[10] They not only use the word *rose* in respect of any flower in general but they have given the flower rose itself a new name 'rosar' in order to distinguish it from all other flowers. The English word *place*, we understand, is a borrowing from Latin 'platea' which itself was derived from Greek 'platys'. And the English word is said to have kept

6. Natural History of Language, p. 373.
7. Language—A Linguistic Introduction, p. 202.
8. Introduction to Comparative Philology, p. 71.
9. Breal's Semantics, p. 117.
10. Vendryes, p. 202.

intact the meaning of 'broad' of the Greek word for sometime.[11] That word was originally employed to indicate 'a broad street'. But now it is employed even when one talks of a standing or sitting room. One would even say "this is a small place for me". Here it is doubtless that the idea of breadth is out of joint. The tendency to use this word in a larger and expanded sense is thus found to be at work here.

This tendency is more frequent in the use of compound words. The Sanskrit word 'gōshtha'[12] means a cow-pen. But it expands in its meaning when it is used in conjunction with asva as 'asva-gōshtha'. In gōshtha there is gō which means cow. And when *asva-gōshtha* is uttered, one does not mean that it is a stable for horses and cows, but only a stable for horses. Here gōshtha broadens into the meaning of a mere stable without any restriction made as to which animal is to be accommodated in it.

The word *taṇṇīr* illustrates this tendency in Tamil. It is a compound of two words, taṇmai and nīr according to native grammarians[13] though foreign grammarians like Dr. Caldwell[14] would regard it as a compound of taṇ and nīr or taḷ and nīr. That the latter may be justified in so doing is evident from such groups of words as taṇḍalai (grove), taṇṇam (chill), taṇṇavan (moon), and taḷam (green leaf), taḷavam (*Jasminum sambac*), taḷi (rain-drop), taḷir (sprout) and taḷpam or taṭpam (coldness), where we see that taṇ or taḷ is the real element which conveys the significance of the cold atmosphere of the things mentioned. At any rate, there is no gainsaying the fact that the word taṇṇīr originally meant cold water. The following instances from Tamil literature show that this word was used in this sense formerly:

i. antīn taṇṇīr amuthoḍu koṇargēm (*Maṇimēkhalai,* X. 37.)

ii. taṇṇīr malaraṇindu (*Chintāmaṇi,* I. 75.)

iii. taṇṇīr koḍu pōy aḷittu (*Kambarāmāyaṇam—Nagarnīṅgu,* 81.)

11. Tucker, p. 380.
12. Breal, p. 120.
13. *Vide* Nannūl, § 135 and 136.
14. Cf. Caldwell's suggestion that 'nallan' has been formed from 'nal' and 'an' rather than from 'nanmai—mai+an.' (*Vide* his Comparative Grammar. 3rd edition, p. 316).

These passages from the epics of Tamil literature of different periods, namely, of the 2nd, 9th, and 12th centuries A.D., leave no doubt as to the cold nature of the water expressed in these places. And that water in general did not go by the name of taṇṇīr but only of 'nīr' is evident from the following passages :

i. karuṅ kuḷal kaḷīiya kalavai nīrum

(*Maṇimēkhalai,* XXVIII. 6.)

ii. nīr nirandu vandu iḷidara

(*Chintāmaṇi,* I. 142.)

iii. kaṇṇum nīrāy oḷuga

(*Kambarāmāyaṇam—Nagarnīṅgu,* 56.)

If we peep still further back we see that the word nīr is used in a general manner there too. Stanza 186 of Puṟanānūṟu[15] and stanza 20 of Tirukkural, which surely are of an age anterior to Maṇimēkhalai, bear testimony to this. Expressions such as āṟṟunīr (river-water), ūṟṟunīr (fountain-water) and maḷainīr (rain-water) also show that only nīr was used in the sense of water.[16]

But if we turn to Kalingattupparaṇi, a laudatory poem of about the eleventh century A.D., we come across a passage where 'taṇṇīr' is used in a sense not compatible with cold water.[17] Here the poet talks of a water that is hot and has to be cooled. Still, the word used is taṇṇīr and not nīr. Does this not show then that the poet has employed the word in the general sense of water ? This cannot be ascribed to the individual fancy of the writer, for there is behind this usage the tendency of expansion in meaning. We too nowadays say cuḍutaṇṇīr for hot water. If taṇṇīr is cold water, cuḍutaṇṇīr should be hot-cold water. But it is not. We further say sometimes kāpitaṇṇīr, tētaṇṇīr or kañjitaṇṇīr, even though the coffee, tea or gruel we are speaking of is hot. We simply mean thereby the liquid coffee, tea or gruel. Here also nothing but the principle of expansion is at work. That this is so is further augmented by the fact that when we want to speak of cold water we very often say 'pachai taṇṇīr' or 'kuḷirnta taṇṇīr'. Poet Jayaṅkoṇḍār also has used the latter expression in his Kalingattupparaṇi.[18] If taṇṇīr is cold water,

15. I. 1.
16. Cf. Telugu nīru (singular) ; Kan. nīru ; Mal. (lity.) nīr.
17. *Vide* stanza 543.
18. Stanza 569.

kuḷirnta taṉṉīr ought to be cooled cold water or cold-cold water. If we remember that we employ this expression not in respect of water boiled and cooled nor even of water that is very cold, we shall have no difficulty in accepting that 'taṉṉīr' used here only discloses the process of generalisation that has been the cause of change of meaning from the particular to the general. It has more or less taken the place of 'nīr' which was used in earlier days in the sense of water in general. To prove this only one more usage will be cited here. We say very often "kaṇṇīl-taṉṉīr varugiradu" when we simply mean by taṉṉīr 'water' without any reference to its temperature.

There is another word in Tamil that affords an excellent example of the same process. It is *eṇṇey*. In this compound there are two words eḷ and ney. Eḷ means sesamum. 'Ney'[19] appears to have been employed indifferently to any gleamy semi-liquid or liquid in olden times. This word with a formative 'pu' appears to have been employed in the sense of gleam[20] by Nachchinārkkiniyar, a commentator of about the 9th century A.D.[21] That it was used in the sense of coldness is evident from the commentary of the same person to Tirumurugāṟṟuppaḍai.[22] And it looks as though that since some oil of a fish corresponding to the modern cod-liver oil was a gleamy liquid it was styled 'ney' in the 2nd century A.D.[23] And honey too, because of the same reason, was called a ney, as is evident from Porunar āṟṟuppaḍai (*l.* 214) and Chintāmaṇi (stanzas 1198, 1051, 2747, etc.). The web-like substance found at the bottom of palmyra or cocoanut leaves which in Tamil is called 'paṉṉāḍai' is otherwise called 'ney(y)ari'. And the latter expression simply denotes that it is a thing which filtrates 'ney' or honey.[24]

That the word 'ney' was employed to indicate the perfume civet also may be understood from such passages as the following:

i. ney(m)māṇ civiṟiyar

(*Paripāḍal*, 6. *l.* 34.)

ii. kūntal ney(y)aṇi maṟappa

(*Chilappu*, IV. 56.)

iii. ney(t)talai(k)karuṅkuḷal

(*Chintāmaṇi*, IV. 251.)

19. Cf. Telugu 'neyyi'; Malayalam 'ney.'
20. Chintamaṇi—Commentary—I. 170.
21. V. C. Chengalvararya's History of Tamil Prose Literature, p. 29.
22. l. 20.
23. *Vide* Porunar āṟṟuppaḍai, l. 213.
24. See Dr. V. Swaminatha Ayyar's footnote on p. 124 of Pattupāṭṭu (3rd edn.).

It was further used for signifying unclarified as well as clarified butter in the ages preceding the third Sangam period (2nd century A.D. circa). We have an indubitable reference to the unclarified substance in Paripāḍal.[25] There the expression used is simple 'ney'. Citations are not absolutely necessary to show that this word was employed in the sense of clarified butter also.[26] Then it looks as though that since butter and ghee were fluids in one sense or another, the same word was considered for some time enough to signify either of these two according to context. But this state of things could not continue long. A line of distinction had to be drawn. And that is why we see Nalluruthiranār, a poet of the third Sangam period, using 'veṇṇey' for indicating butter.[27] Thus it is evident that the necessity to make some distinction or other in the form of the word itself was felt even in his days. And now too we use 'ney' only when we talk of ghee, and 'veṇṇey' when of butter, pure and simple.

But what may look strange to us to-day is that our very remote ancestors once used 'ney' to indicate oil of sesamum too. Even if doubts may be entertained as to the clear import of the word occurring in such passages as "ney umiḻ curaiyar"[28] and "ney umiḻ cuḍar",[29] which perhaps admit either of the two meanings, the expression occurring in an important passage in Tolkāppiyam,[30] the earliest extant Tamil grammar, takes us to a surer ground. Even if we dismiss the two former citations as capable of indicating ghee too, since the torch of a king in the first instance, and the lighting of a city on a festive occasion in the second are spoken of, we cannot so easily dispense with the phrase "ney aṇi mayakkam" which occurs in Tolkāppiyam. In this last instance, the oil-bath a lady has after her confinement is spoken of. The commentator of Aganānūṟu who is concerned with the second instance does not throw any light as to the exact nature of the thing used. Nachchinārkkiniyar, the commentator of Mullaippāṭṭu, in which the first instance is found and of Tolkāppiyam in which we have the last, seems to give us a clue however that the expression used in Mullaippāṭṭu did not perhaps indicate the

25. St. 16, l. 3.

26. Those that need will, however, refer to Puṟanānūṟu, st. 44 and Perumpāṇāṟṟuppaḍai, l. 394.

27. Kalittogai, st. 108.

28. Mullaippāṭṭu, l. 48.

29. Aganānūṟu, st. 17.

30. Poruḷadikāram—Kaṟpiyal, §. 5.

oil of sesamum, for whereas he clearly interprets ney of Tolkāppiyam by using the expression eṇṇey, he slurs over the passage of Mullaippāṭṭu by interpreting ' ney ' as ' ney '.

To Nachchinārkkiniyar, a person living in about the 9th century A.D. and well-versed in the literature of the Sangam Age, the word eṇṇey should have been an expression conveying the distinctive nature of the oil used. That he is found to use ' eṇṇey ' in the commentary of Tolkāppiyam as also in that of Kuriñchippāṭṭu, where eṇṇey itself occurs in the text[31] commented upon, is proof positive to show that he might have used this word if he had thought that oil of sesamum was spoken of in Mullaippāṭṭu.[32]

But when we turn to Jayaṅkoṇḍār of the 11th century A.D., we see that this word eṇṇey has expanded in its meaning. We notice that this poet uses this word when he speaks of the rutty juice of the male elephant.[33] He might have been more justified if he had used ' ney ' instead of ' eṇṇey ', for the former originally indicated, as was shown above, any fluid that was gleamy. But finding that he uses only the latter, are we to put it down as a peculiar usage permissible only in poets ? No. This usage is only a result of the process of expansion in meaning, for even to-day we talk of tēṅkāy eṇṇey or āmaṇakku eṇṇey[34] when we mean only oil extracted from cocoanuts or from the plant *Ricinus communis*. But the expressions literally mean cocoanut-sesamum-oil and castor-sesamum-oil. When we realise that there is not even a bit of sesamum in these oils, how strange should it appear that they are called eṇṇeys unless they are explained by the semantic principle of Expansion ? So then, we see that ' eṇṇey ', which was used in early times as the name of a specific oil, came to be used even as early as the 11th century A.D. to denote any oil and that it keeps its expanded sense even to-day. That is why we call also ' kerosene ' ' maṇ-eṇṇey.' That ' eṇṇey ' has lost its original significance is rendered very clear by the way in which we call sesamum-oil itself by another name, namely, ' nalla eṇṇey ' or the sesamum-oil proper. In this respect we have already seen an analogy in the use of ' rosar ' for ' rose ' in the Italian dialects of Friuli.[35]

31. l. 107.

32. In Puṟanāṉūṟu st. 50 and Paripāḍal st. 10 also there is the expression ' eṇṇey ' in the sense of sesamum-oil.

33. Kalingattupparaṇi : st. 494.

34. *Vide* V. G. Surianarayana Sastriar's Tamiḻ moḻi varalāru, p. 88.

35. *Vide* p. 148 *supra*.

Thus we see that the semantic principle of expansion explains a few changes in the meaning of words in several languages, which otherwise would appear to us strange and whimsical.

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n—	ந
ṅ—	ங
ñ—	ஞ
ṉ—	ன
ṇ—	ண
l—	ல
ḷ—	ள
ḻ—	ழ
ṟ—	ற
r—	ர

Action of Sulphuric Acid on Glucose and Sucrose

By

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In reviewing E. J. Holmyard's "Outlines of Organic Chemistry", K. V. (*Current Science,* 1936, 5, 313) writes, "the statement (p. 340) that sucrose differs from glucose in charring with hot sulphuric acid is incorrect as glucose also chars." Such statements are to be found in other text-books also, *e.g.,* Perkin and Kipping's Organic Chemistry, where it is stated (p. 285) it (glucose) is not carbonised when it is gently warmed with sulphuric acid (distinction from sucrose).

Such expressions as "*hot*" and "*gently warmed*" do not convey any precise idea of the temperature at which the carbonisation takes place and may be interpreted by different workers differently. Since the behaviour of these two sugars with sulphuric acid can be very conveniently used (and is being used by students of chemistry) as a test to distinguish between them, it is useful to know as to how best the test could be carried out.

When glucose or sucrose is mixed with concentrated sulphuric acid, heat is evolved and sucrose carbonises very rapidly, while glucose takes a much longer time to darken, so that although a distinction can be made, it is not very satisfactory. If, however, cold sulphuric acid is added to glucose and the temperature is not allowed to rise above 25° C., there is no change; it is only when it is slowly warmed to about 50-60° C., that charring takes place. This is true of both the anhydrous (m.p. 146° C.) and the hydrated (m.p. 86° C.) forms of glucose. Sucrose, on the other hand, on addition of the cold acid, darkens and carbonises very rapidly, the liquid becoming deep brown within three to four minutes. This happens even when the liquid is kept at 25° C.

The difference is more marked still, with dilute sulphuric acid (1 : 1). Both glucose and sucrose do not carbonise with acid of this strength at the ordinary temperature. When warmed to about 50° C. sucrose begins to darken, carbonisation taking place by about 70-80° C. Under these conditions *i.e.,* even at 80° C., glucose is only pale yellow, darkening rapidly above this temperature.

Therefore, sulphuric acid (both concentrated and dilute, 1 : 1) can be conveniently employed to differentiate between glucose and sucrose, if these facts are borne in mind.

Chemistry Department,
29th January, 1937.

A Note on the Spirit and Pharmaceutical Industry of India

By

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We heartily support the appeal made by Rajyaratna B. D. Amin, Managing Director and Agent, Messrs. Alembic Chemical Works, Ltd., Baroda, to His Excellency the Marquis of Linlithgow, on behalf of the Spirit and Pharmaceutical Industry of India. It cannot be said with any seriousness that the Government of India and the Provincial Governments are not aware of the disabilities under which the manufacturer of pharmaceuticals in India labours and their continued indifference in this respect can only be taken to mean that they are not particularly keen on fostering the growth of this industry in our country.

"It is ridiculous and absurd that imports from Germany and Japan should get better treatment in India than India's own manufactures" and unfortunately it is so; spirituous preparations imported from foreign countries enjoy unrestricted movement all over India once the tariff duty has been paid at the port of entry, while products manufactured in India are subjected to all sorts of petty annoyances and restrictions.

Nobody—not even the Member for Education, Health and Lands—has seriously questioned the urgency of legislation to prevent the sale of adulterated drugs. At least three recognised systems of medicine—Ayurveda, Unani and Allopathy—are widely practised in India and almost anything can be sold as a panacea for all ills, without the least fear of prosecution. The series of prosecutions in Bombay recently, of people who were engaged in the practice of filling patent medicine bottles of reputable firms with adulterated products and passing them off as genuine must have brought the seriousness of the situation to the notice of all people who are interested in the welfare of the nation.

We are glad to notice, however, that the Government of India have recently taken up this matter and are arranging for the assay of medicines in the School of Tropical Medicine at Calcutta. It is some satisfaction to see that an attempt is being made to attack the problem of drug adulteration, although it is some years after the Drugs Enquiry Committee submitted their report.

Mr. Amin wants the excise rules and procedure to be revised throughout India before Provincial Autonomy is duly inaugurated, because he is afraid that under Provincial Autonomy, the Provincial Governments will be less sympathetic. He is very unfair, we consider, in suggesting that the future Provincial Governments manned by Indians, will not do what is good for India as a whole, purely on provincial considerations. He is certainly optimistic in expecting the Government of India to do in the next few months what they have failed to do all these years. The adroit way in which the whole question was shelved when it was brought up at the All-India Industries Conference held at Lucknow recently indicates the correct position of how matters stand.

May we conclude by appealing to the future Provincial governments, whatever their political complexion, to help this suffering Indian Industry, which is essential for the welfare of the Nation ?

SIDDHITRAYA

By

Yāmunācārya

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रागद्वेषादयस्तु चैतन्यस्यैवावस्थाविशेषास्तद्वदेव प्रत्यक्षीभवन्तीति, न तन्निदर्शनेनानुमानोदयः। सुखप्रयुक्तविषयीकारचैतन्यं रागः। तद्विरोधप्रयुक्तविषयीकारं तदेव द्वेषः। भूतदुःखज्ञानेन चेतश्चलनं * शोकः। आगामितज्ज्ञानेन चेतश्चलनं भयम्, इत्यादि लक्षणग्रन्थादेवावगन्तव्यमित्यलं प्रविस्तरेण॥

एकस्य चात्मनो निरंशस्य‡ न स्वापेक्षया ग्राह्यग्राहकभावः, विरोधादित्यप्युक्तमेव। अंशभेदाश्रयणे तत्सिद्धये चांशान्तरमाश्रयितव्यम्; तथा तत्र तत्रेत्यनवस्था। सङ्घातत्वञ्चात्मनः।

ननु च ग्राहकावभासश्रुत्या स्वसिद्धान्तश्रद्धाविप्रलब्धबुद्धिभिरभिहित इन्द्रियादि-

Being, in fact, only different states of consciousness, desire, aversion and the like must be perceptible, even as consciousness is; hence, with these as illustrative examples, you cannot advance your argument. Desire is consciousness which is directed towards objects, with a view to obtaining pleasure. The same (consciousness), when directed towards objects with a view to obtaining the opposite of pleasure, is aversion. Sorrow is mental agitation caused by consciousness of past pains. Fear is mental excitement produced by the awareness of pains to come. Since these (i.e., terms, namely, desire, aversion, sorrow and fear) and others like them may be understood even from treatises dealing with definitions, it is needless to discuss them (here) at length.

It has already been shown that, as it involves a contradiction, one and the same self which is partless, cannot possess, in respect of itself, the quality of being at once the perceiver and the perceived. If the distinction of parts (within the self) be admitted, to establish the same, (for each of these parts) other parts would have to be admitted; similarly, for these latter, other parts, and so on *ad infinitum*. Besides, the quality of being a collocation would have to be attributed to the soul.

(Here is yet another attempt to show that the self is open to mental perception). A consciousness, like the following: 'I perceive the pot' posited to exist on the strength of scriptural references to the awareness of the perceiver,[145] by those whose intellect has been blinded by excessive faith in their own system, must be said to exist on some

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* The reading *taccalanam* found in the Chowkamba and Telugu editions is manifestly wrong; it has been altered into *cetaścalanam*. If, however, the original reading must stand, the sentence "bhūtaduḥkhajñānena taccalanam śokaḥ" must come after and not precede the sentence "āgāmitajjñānena cetaścalanam bhayam."

‡*Niraṁkuśasya* is a variant reading. In the context, it makes no sense.

145. cf. tadātmānamevāvet aham Brahmāsmi, *Bṛh. up.* I. iv. 10.

प्रत्यासन्नतत्तत्पदार्थमात्रस्फुरणात् तादृशोऽपि क्वचिदस्तु नाम प्रत्ययः । स त्वागन्तुकात्मप्रतियोगिकप्राकट्यप्रकाशादिपदाभिधेयार्थधर्मानुमितज्ञानविशिष्टमानसप्रत्यक्षसिद्धात्मनिबन्धनः ।

उच्यते—अहो खलु स्वानुभव एव विभ्रमः परीक्षकाणाम्, यद्विषयानुभवसमये पूर्वावस्थातो न किञ्चिद्विशेषमयमात्मनोऽवबुध्यत इति । उक्तं ह्येतत्—'ईदृश एवायमर्थः, ज्ञायते न वेति न विद्मः, मम वा प्रतिभासते परस्य वेत्यपि न विद्मः' इति न जातुचिदेव प्रतीतिरस्ति; ज्ञानज्ञात्रोरनवभासे तादृश्यपि प्रतीतिरापद्येतेति । सोऽयं परसञ्चेतितात्स्वसञ्चेतितस्यातिशयस्सर्वत्र परिस्फुरन् असति ग्राहकावभासे नोपपद्येत । अनुमितज्ञानावलम्बनत्वे चाज्ञासिषमित्येव प्रतिभासः स्यात्; न जानामीति । ज्ञानजन्या-

occasions (at least); for, (often) only the several objects which are near the senses are apprehended (and not the self). Such a consciousness pertains to the self which is established by mental perception, and which is associated with a knowledge, whose existence is inferred from the quality found in the object (known)—a quality which is occasional, which is related to the soul, such as, *prākaṭya* and *prakāśa*.[146]

To this it is replied—"It is, indeed, surprising that the confusion—namely, that, in respect of their own experience the self does not notice any difference at the time objects are apprehended—should occur to eminent investigators. It has already been stated (vide p. 30) that the following experience—"This object is really such and such; we do not know whether it is known or not; nor do we know whether it appears to me or to others"—does not exist at any time, and that, when there is no apprehension of knowledge and the knower, such an experience would also have to occur. If there is no apprehension of the knower, the special feature observed everywhere in what is perceived by us rather than in what is perceived by others, cannot be appropriately explained. If the consciousness 'I perceive the pot' has for its object a knowledge which is inferred, then, the experience would only take the form 'I knew' and not 'I know'; for, when there is the observation of the special feature (*prākaṭya*) produced in the object by

146. Briefly stated, this view maintains that on some occasions, at least, we get a consciousness like 'I perceive the pot'; it involves three factors—the 'I,' knoweldge and the pot. Of these, the second is inferred from the illumination (*prākaṭya*) found in the object known; and the third is directly perceived by the outer senses. Regarding the 'I,' as it is beyond the reach of the external senses, and as it has already been shown that it is not open to inference, it must, by a process of elimination, be concluded that it is open to mental perception.

र्थातिशयदर्शनतद्व्याप्त्यनुसन्धानानुमानोदयसमयेऽनुमित्सितज्ञानस्यातिवृत्तत्वात् । ज्ञानानुमानासम्भवः पूर्वमेवोक्तः । मानसप्रत्यक्षत्वञ्चात्मग्राह्यधीनिरस्तम् । तथा सति हि स्वपरवेद्ययोरनतिशयः स्यात् ।

ननु कथमिव ग्राहकानवभासे स्वपरवेद्ययोरनतिशयप्रसङ्गः ? न हि ग्राहकसिद्धिनिबन्धनः स्वपरवेद्यविशेषः । स्वसमवेतविषयबोधजन्मना परसमवेतबोधजन्मना च तद्विशेषोपपत्तेः । स्वपरसम्बन्धिबोधविशेषोदयव्यवस्थापि स्वीयपरकीयेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षादिज्ञानहेतुसामग्रीभेदनिबन्धना । न चात्मसिद्धिरपि तत्सामग्र्यनुप्रवेशमर्हति ; इन्द्रियादे-

knowledge, and when its (i.e., of *prākaṭya*) invariable concomitance with knowledge is brought to mind, and when the inference originates, the knowledge which is sought to be inferred must have already disappeared. The impossibility of inferring knowledge has already been pointed out. Besides, the view that the soul is open to mental perception is refuted by the very fact that knowledge (which is said to be inferred) is grasped by the self as belonging to itself. If it be said that knowledge is inferred without any reference to the self, then, between what is known by oneself and what is apprehended by others there would have to be no distinction.[147]

How, it may be asked, could the indistinguishability of what is known by oneself from what is known by others be said to result when there is non-apprehension of the knower? Indeed, the distinction of what is known by oneself from what is known by others is not dependent on the apprehension of the knower. Their distinction can be rendered intelligible by the fact that the knowledge of objects takes birth as being inherent in oneself or as being inherent in others. This demarcation, too, in the birth of the several items of knowledge of objects which belong to oneself and to others is explainable on the basis of the distinction of the means namely the causes of knowledge, such as, the contact of the senses, belonging to oneself or others, with objects. It cannot be said that the manifestation of the self too deserves to be included among the causes of knowledge; for, in the manner of the senses and the like, it (i.e., the self) may act as the cause (of know-

147. Every one of the statements made by the opponent is refuted. First, it is shown that the knowledge of 'I' as perceiver cannot be occasional, and that, in fact, all cognitions of objects involve, in addition, the apprehension of the self and knowledge. Next, it is pointed out that knowledge cannot be inferred with the aid of *prākaṭya*. Lastly, the attention of the opponent is drawn to an inconsistency in his argument. He must admit that when knowledge is inferred, it is necessarily inferred as related to the self. Hence, in the very act of inferring knowledge, the self also is apprehended; and it is futile to talk of the self being open to mental perception.

रिवानवभासमानस्यैव हेतुत्वसम्भवात् । न च विषयबोध एवात्मबोध इति साम्प्रतम् । न ह्यर्थान्तरसिद्धिरर्थान्तरस्य सिद्धिर्भवति ; अतिप्रसङ्गात् । अपि च यदधीना भावानां रूपभेदव्यवस्था तदपि हि संवेदनं तदानीं निलीनरूपमेव इन्द्रियादिवत् ; कुतस्तु पुनस्तदाश्रयस्यात्मनः प्रतिभासप्रसक्तिः ? यदाहुः—इदमहं जानामीति त्रितयावभासः सार्वत्रिक इति, तदप्यनुभवानारूढमेवानन्तरमेव प्रतिक्षिप्तमिति ।

अस्तु तर्हि ग्राहकतयैव सर्वार्थग्रहणसमयेष्वात्मसिद्धिः । अभ्युपगन्तव्या हि संविदः स्वतःसिद्धिः, सर्वप्रकारसाधनान्तरनिराकरणात् सत्याश्च तस्याः कदाचिदनवभासादर्शनाच्च । यथा च संविदः प्रकाशाव्यभिचारस्तथा प्रपञ्चितं प्रथमाधिकरण इति

ledge) without itself being manifest. It is not right to maintain that the manifestation of the object is itself the manifestation of the self. Indeed, the manifestation of one object cannot be the manifestation of another; for, otherwise, an unwarranted extension of this principle would become possible. Further, at the time objects are presented, even knowledge itself, one on which the very distinction of the respective shapes of objects depends, is altogether hidden from view, even as the senses and the like (remain hidden). (When that is so) where is the possibility for the manifestation of its substrate, the self.[148] Even the contention of some that the threefold manifestation occurs everywhere taking the form 'I know this' does not fit in with experience; and is forthwith refuted.

If that be so[149], let it be granted that the self is manifested as the knower at the time every object is apprehended. The self-luminosity of knowledge has necessarily to be admitted, because, the refutation of the view that knowledge depends for its manifestation on some means other than itself has been effected, in every possible manner; and because when knowledge does exist, it is never noticed to be unmanifest. How knowledge never fails to be manifest has been

148. When objects are known, knowledge which is responsible for bringing to light the respective shapes of objects is not itself revealed; just as when things are perceived, the senses which are the instruments of perception are themselves not cognised. While knowledge itself remains unmanifested, there is absolutely no room for the presentation of its substrate, the self.

149. If the consciousness of the self as the perceiver in every cognition of objects is not necessary for accounting for the distinction between objects known by oneself and those known by others, at any rate, on the ground that knowledge which is self-luminous has the quality of revealing everything, it should be admitted that, when it reveals objects, it manifests the self also.

नात्रोपक्षिप्य प्रतिक्षेप्तव्यम् । सतोऽपि प्रमेयजातस्य स्वापादिसमयेऽनुपलब्धेरभ्युपगतं तावत्संविदस्तत्साधकत्वम् । अतः क्लृप्तार्थान्तरसाधनभावया तयैवात्मनोऽपि सिद्धिरभ्युपगन्तुं न्याय्या ।

यत्तु विषयवित्त्युपरमेऽपि स्वापसमयेऽयमात्मा प्रकाशत इति, तदुपपत्तिभिरुपपद्यमानमपि यथाप्रतीति व्यवहरतां न चित्तमनुरञ्जयति ।

अपवृक्तस्य तु ज्ञानं हेत्वभावान्न सम्भवि ।
नित्यत्वे नित्यमुक्तिस्स्यादर्थवादास्तथोक्तयः ॥

निर्धूतनिखिलकरणकलेबरज्ञानकर्मवासनानुबन्धस्यापवृक्तस्य न खलु स्वपरसंवेद-

elaborately dealt with in the *Prathamādhikaraṇa*.[150] Hence, it is needless here to refer to the view (that knowledge depends upon something else for its manifestation) and refute the same. For the reason that during states, such as sleep, even though collections of objects of knowledge exist, there is non-apprehension of the same, it has to be admitted that the capacity to reveal the same belongs to knowledge. Therefore, it is but proper to admit that the manifestation of the self also is effected by knowledge itself, which has definitely been proved to possess the quality of revealing other objects.

(If it be said that the self need not depend on knowledge for its manifestation, for the reason that even in the absence of the latter, the self shines forth, it is thus replied to). The view that even when knowledge of objects is absent in deep sleep the self is revealed may be rendered intelligible by arguments, but (it) does not satisfy the mind of those who think and act in the light of experience. Again, to the released soul knowledge cannot arise, as its causes do not prevail (in that state). If it be contended that the knowledge which obtains in the state of release is eternal, being independent of causal conditions, then, there must be perpetual release; and those scriptural passages (which teach the existence of jñāna in this state) must be considered to be *arthavādas*.[151]

There is no possibility of the occurrence of any cause which could account for the birth of knowledge concerning himself and others to the released soul, who is devoid of all senses, body and contact with

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150. The elaborate treatment of the nature of jñāna set forth in Prathamādhikaraṇa of Nāthamuni's *Nyāya-tattva-śāstra* is, unfortunately, not available. But there are some extracts from this work in Vedānta Deśika's *Nyāya-Siddhāñjana*. cf. 'Nyāyatattvetu Prathamādhikaraṇe lakṣaṇāntarāṇi bahūni dūṣayitvā "atyantavegitātyanta saūkṣmyam nirbharatā tathā svasattākāla bhāvyāptiḥ jñāne lakṣma catuṣtayam" iti svoktalakṣaṇopasamhāraḥ kṛtaḥ' Buddhipariccheda, p. 249.

151. Arthavādas are those scriptural passages which do not directly convey positive or negative injunctions; but which, by extolling prescribed or censuring forbidden acts, aim at infusing in the mind of the listener a keen desire to engage in his sacred duties at the earliest opportunity.

नोदयनिबन्धनं किञ्चित्सम्भाव्यते । न च मनसो नित्येन्द्रियत्वेन तत्संयोगादेव तदा ज्ञानं जन्यत इति युक्तम् ; स्वरूपतो गगनवन्नित्यस्यापि सतस्तस्येन्द्रियभावेन ज्ञानोत्पादकत्वस्य धर्माधर्मावरोधनिबन्धनत्वात् ।

धर्माधर्मावरुद्धं सन्मनो ज्ञानस्य साधनम् ।
सति नित्येन्द्रियत्वेऽपि श्रोत्रवत्करणत्वतः ॥

ननु योगजधर्मानुगृहीततत्संयोगस्य साधनत्वम्, 'क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि' 'तदा विद्वान्पुण्यपापे विधूय निरञ्जनः' इत्यादिशुक्लेतरसकलकर्मप्रक्षयश्रुतिविरोधात् । धर्मफलत्वे चापवर्गस्य पुनरावृत्तिप्रसङ्गः, 'नास्त्यकृतः कृतेन,' 'तद्यथेह कर्मचितो लोकः क्षीयते' इत्यादिश्रवणाच्च ।

impressions of knowledge and actions. And, it is not right to maintain that, as the mind (maṇas) is an eternal organ, through its conjunction itself knowledge is caused in that state; for, although, like ether, mind is, in its essential nature, eternal, its being the originator of jñāna by acting as an organ is dependent on its association with merit and demerit.[152] Being associated with merit and demerit, manas acts as the means of knowledge; for, although it is an eternal sense organ, the mind, like the mechanism of hearing, acts as an instrument of knowledge.

Nor is the view tenable—namely, that contact with manas, which is assisted by the merit resulting from concentration, is itself the instrument of knowledge; for, it contradicts scriptural passages which declare that all good and bad deeds perish; for example: "The deeds of this person (i.e., the released soul) perish";[153] "Then, he who knows (Brahman), shaking off good and evil deeds, leaving the spotless. . .".[154] If final release were the result of good deeds, there would be a further return (to the state of bondage). Besides, in view of the following scriptural passages (it is evident that release does not result from deeds). "The uncreated (Puruṣa) cannot be attained by what is created (i.e. deeds).[155] "Hence, just as here the world won by deeds perishes, even so after bodily death, the world won by good deeds perishes."[156]

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152. Even though the organ of hearing is nothing but ether (*ākāśa*) it is only the ether which is limited by the winding walls of the auditory apparatus (*karṇaśaṣkulī*) that can function as a sense-organ and possess the capacity to appreciate sounds. In the same way, though manas is eternal, it can act as the originator of knowledge not always, but only when associated with merit and demerit.

153. *Muṇḍa. up.* II. ii. 8

154. *Muṇḍa. up.* III. i. 3.

155. *Muṇḍa. up.* I. ii. 12.

156. *Chānd. up.* VIII. i. 6.

न चात्मा सत्तयैव तदानीं तज्ज्ञाननिमित्तमिति वाच्यम् ; क्लृप्तत्यागाक्लृप्तकल्पनप्रसक्तेः । तन्मात्रनिमित्तत्वे च सर्वदा आत्मनि स्वरूपवत् * तदपि विद्यत इति संसारानवतारप्रसङ्गात्, बन्धमोक्षावस्थयोरविशेषापत्तेश्च । न च देहेन्द्रियादिप्रतिबद्धतयेदानीं तदभाव इति वाच्यम् । तत्खलु प्रतिबन्धकम्,यत्सति पुष्कलकारणे कार्योदयं निरुणद्धि । न चाद्याप्यात्मनस्तत्पुष्कलकारणत्वं सिद्धम् । शरीरेन्द्रियवतामेव ज्ञानदर्शनात् , क्लृप्तज्ञानकारणभावस्य तस्यैव तद्बन्धकत्ववचनमुन्मत्तवचः । अतो नास्त्यपवर्गदशायां ज्ञानम् । तात्कालिकज्ञानसुखादिवादास्तु आत्मज्ञानविधिशेषतया गुणवादेन नेतव्याः । अतो

Nor can it be contended that in the state of release, the self, by its very existence, acts as the cause of knowledge concerning itself; for, that would involve the rejection of what is well-established and the positing of something unproved. If the very existence of the soul were itself the cause of knowledge, knowledge also would, like the existence of the soul, persist therein at all times ; and, as a consequence, the stream of births and deaths would not arise at all ; hence, there would be no distinction between the states of bondage and release. It is not helpful to suggest that as knowledge is obstructed by the body, senses and other impediments, it comes to be absent in the state of bondage. Indeed, that must be the obstructing factor which prevents the origin of the effect, even when the entire set of causal conditions is present. So far it has not been proved that the self is the entire cause of jñāna. While the body and senses are well established to be the cause of knowledge, for the reason that the latter is found to arise only to those possessing them, to speak of the very body and senses as constituting an impediment to jñāna is a mad man's assertion. Therefore, jñāna must be said to be absent in the state of release ; and the scriptural passages speaking of the existence of jñāna, pleasure and the like as prevailing in that state, must be taken as being auxiliary to the injunction prescribing knowledge of the self,[157] and interpreted in accordance with *gauṇī vṛttī.*[158] Therefore, since there is

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* *Ātmasvarūpavat* is a variant reading.

157. cf. ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyaḥ mantavyaḥ nididhyāsitavyaḥ. *Bṛh. up.* VI. v. 6.

158. In the proposition 'Devadatta is a lion,' the term 'lion' cannot, obviously, be understood in a literal sense. The judgment only signifies that Devadatta possesses a strength, ferocity, cruelty and the like which are similar to the corresponding qualities owned by the lion. This interpretation of the word *lion* is in accordance with what is known as *gauṇī vṛttī. Gauṇī vṛttī* has been defined by Khaṇḍadeva in his famous *Bhaṭṭadīpikā* and *Kaustubha* thus : 'Svaśakyasamavetavattā gauṇī vṛttiḥ | samavetavatvañca kvacit āropitatvasambandhena kvacit svasamāna jātīyaguṇavattāsambandhena iti bhedaḥ.' Jaimini's *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā-Sūtra*, I. iv. 23 mentions six varieties of gauṇī vṛtti : 'tatsiddhi jāti sārūpya praśaṁsā bhūma liṅga-samavāyā iti guṇāśrayāḥ.'

विषयवित्तिसमय एवात्मसिद्धिनियमाद्यथोक्तनीत्या अर्थवित्तिषु वेदितृतयैवात्मसिद्धिरिति।

इदमप्यात्मतत्त्वापरिज्ञानोल्लसितपरिमितमतिविकल्पजल्पितमिति न रोचयन्ते त्रय्यन्तविदः। विषयवित्तिर्हि विषयवित्तिरेव, न हि तया आत्मवित्तिः स्वरूपं वा सेद्धुमर्हति ; अतद्विषयत्वात्। यो हि यत्संविद्विषयो न भवति नासौ तया सिद्ध्यति, रूपसंविदेव रसः। अविषयौ च विषयवित्तेर्बुद्धिबोद्धाराविति तावपि न तया सिद्ध्यतः।

ननु वेद्यस्वभावोऽयं यत्स्वविषयसंविदा सिद्ध्यतीति। वित्तिस्तु वित्तिरेव, वेदिता च वेदितैवेति कुतस्तयोर्वेद्यस्वभावानुप्रवेशः। उक्तं हि तयोर्मानसप्रत्यक्षागोचरत्वमनुमेयत्वासम्भवश्च। कुतस्तर्हि वित्तिसिद्धिः? । स्वतन्त्रैव स्वयंप्रकाशा हि संवित्।

मैवम् ; सापि हि विषयवदेवान्यस्यैव प्रकाशमानतया न स्वतः सिद्ध्यति,

invariable presentation of the self at the very time when the knowledge of objects arises, it must be concluded that, in the manner indicated already, the self presents itself as the knower in all knowledge of objects.

Those who have understood the (true import of the) Vedānta do not countenance this view either, as it is the prattle of that form of narrow mind which is the result of ignorance of the true nature of the self. Indeed, the knowledge of objects is no other than the presentation of objects; and with its aid neither the self, nor its knowledge is capable of being presented; for, neither of these is the object of the cognition of objects (*viṣayajñāna*). That which is not the object of a given consciousness cannot be presented by that consciousness; just as taste could not be revealed by the consciousness of colour. Knowledge and knower are not the object of viṣayajñāna; hence, they too are not manifested by it.

(The opponent may say) the quality, namely, that of being manifested by knowledge concerning itself is the character of objects known; (and may ask) how can the character of objects known be thrust on knowledge and knower, when knowledge is only knowledge and the knower is only the knower? It has already been shown that they are not open to mental perception; and the impossibility of inferring them has also been proved. (It may be asked) If so, how is knowledge manifested? (The opponent's reply is) it does not depend on anything else; because consciousness is self-luminous.

(The reply to the above is:) it is not so; for, consciousness too cannot shine forth by its own aid, since, like objects, it is revealed for

स्वतः सिद्ध्यन्ती च सा किमिति कञ्चिदेव प्रति चकास्ति? न सर्वान्प्रति? तत्समवायादिति चेत्—यत्समवायिनी हि या संवित् तस्यैव सा चकास्ति नेतरस्य तदसमवायादिति—यद्येवम् आश्रितस्तर्हि आत्मसम्बन्धनिबन्धन एव संविदः प्रकाशः, तद्भावाभावानुविधानात् ।

यदुच्यते प्रकाशस्वभावाया एव सत्याः प्रतियोगिविशेषावच्छेदायैव तदपेक्षा, न स्वरूपसिद्धये इति ; कुतः खल्वयं निश्चयः? यदि हि प्रतियोगिनिरपेक्षैव कदाचिदात्मस्वरूपमिव संवित्प्रकाशेत, तत एवमध्यवस्येमापि । न च तथास्ति ; आश्रयप्रतियोगिसापेक्षैव संयोगपुत्रत्वादेरिव तस्याः स्वरूपसत्तेति न पृथक्सिद्ध्युत्प्रेक्षावकाशः ।

सत्यास्संविदः प्रकाशव्यभिचाराभावात् स्वरूपप्रयुक्तः प्रकाश इति चेत् ; सत्याः किं तस्याः आत्मसम्बन्धव्यभिचारोऽस्ति? अपि चैवं सुखदुःखादयोऽपि त्वन्मते स्वतः सिद्धाः स्युः । न हि तेऽपि सन्तो न प्रकाशन्ते ।

some one other than itself. How can self-consciousness, which, on your view is self-luminous, shine forth to some one person only and not to all? It may be argued that because of its inherence in that particular self, (it shines forth to that self only). In other words, that consciousness which is inherent in a given self can manifest itself only to that self and not to others ; for, it is not inherent in the latter. If so, (we reply) it amounts to admitting that the manifestation of consciousness is dependent upon the relation of consciousness to the self ; for, the presence or absence of this manifestation is dependent respectively upon the presence or absence of this relation.

If it be said that while consciousness is, in its essential nature, self-luminous, it still stands in need of this relation for being associated with the different correlates (*pratiyogin*) and not for its own manifestation ; (we ask) how did you arrive at this conclusion ? If at any time consciousness, like the soul, presents itself without depending upon the correlatives, then, we may come to this conclusion ; but such a presentation is not met with. The very existence of consciousness, like that of the quality of being son or conjunction, presupposes a substrate and a correlative ; hence, there is no room for thinking of the manifestation of knowledge apart from these.

If it be maintained that the manifestation of jñāna is dependent upon its very being, for the reason that, as long as it exists, it never fails to present itself ; (we ask) when it exists is its relation with the self absent ? Further, if this were so, even pleasure, pain and the like would, on your view, be self-dependent ; for when they exist, they never fail to be manifested.

अथ अर्थान्तरसाधकतया सर्ववादिसम्मतायाः संविद एव परं स्वयंप्रकाशत्वमाश्रितम्, तयैव तथाभूतया तदितरबाह्याभ्यन्तरसकलपदार्थसिद्ध्युपपत्तेः किमनेकस्वयंप्रकाशभावाभ्युपगमेनेति भावः ; तथा सति,

सर्वस्यार्थस्य तद्वित्तेः साक्षी सर्वत्र सम्मतः ।
आत्मैवास्तु स्वतःसिद्धः किमनेकैस्तथाविधैः ॥

किञ्च

यो यस्य साक्षी तेनैव तस्य सिद्धिर्न लौकिकी ।
अर्थस्येवार्थवित्तेरप्यात्मा साक्षी हि लक्ष्यते ॥

सन्तु नामार्थवित्तयः स्वतःसिद्धाः, तथापि न ताभिरयमात्मा प्रत्यक्षीभवति ; तत्साक्षित्वात् । यत्साक्षी खल्वयं पुरुषः न तेनासौ प्रत्यक्षः ; घटसाक्षात्कारीव घटेन । अर्थसंविदां च साक्षात्कारी चेतन इति सोऽपि न ताभिरपरोक्षीभवति ।

सजातीयस्वसाध्यार्थनिरपेक्षात्मसिद्धयः ।
सर्वे पदार्थास्तेनात्मा निरपेक्षस्वसिद्धिकः ॥

If it is your intention to say that the quality of being self-luminous has been admitted to belong only to consciousness, which is accepted by all disputants as being the means for the manifestation of all things other than itself, and if you were to ask where the need is for positing self-luminous entities, when with the aid of such a consciousness alone, the manifestation of all other objects, internal and external, becomes intelligible, (we may as well reply:) Let the self alone which is admitted on all hands to be the witness (sākṣin) of all objects and their cognitions, be considered self-luminous; (and ask you in turn) where is the need for several entities of that description ?

Moreover, the view that the revelation of what stands witness to a given entity is effected by that given entity itself is not supported by everyday experience. The soul is, indeed, found to be the witness of the knowledge of objects, even as it is the witness of objects. Let all items of knowledge concerning objects be admitted to be self-established; even then, with their aid, the soul cannot be directly apprehended; for, it is their witness. Indeed, the self cannot be revealed by that for which he stands witness; just as he who witnesses the pot cannot be revealed by the pot. As the conscious entity is the witness of all object-cognitions, it cannot be directly revealed by them.

All objects possess a manifestation concerning themselves, a manifestation which is not dependent on something similar to them or on something manifested by themselves. Hence, the soul owns a manifestation concerning itself—a manifestation which is not dependent

न हि कश्चित्पदार्थः स्वप्रकाशाय स्वसाध्यसाधारणजातीयार्थान्तरापेक्षो ‡दृष्टः। न खलु घटः स्वसिद्धये घटान्तरमपेक्षते, अपेक्षते तु विजातीयमालोकादि। एवमालोकोऽपि प्रकाशमानो नालोकान्तरमपेक्षते; नापि स्वापेक्षप्रकाशं घटादिकमपेक्षते; अपेक्षते तु विजातीयमिन्द्रियम्। एवमिन्द्रियमपि नेन्द्रियान्तरम्, स्वापेक्षप्रकाशं आलोकादि घटं वापेक्षते; अपेक्षते तु विजातीयं संवेदनम्। एवं संवेदनमपि संविदन्तरं स्वाधीनसिद्धिकमिन्द्रियादिकं वा नापेक्षते स्वसिद्धौ, अपेक्षते तु विजातीयं स्वाश्रयभूतं स्वतन्त्रमात्मानम्, एवमात्माप्यात्मान्तरं स्वाधीनसिद्धि संविदिन्द्रियादिकमपि स्वापरोक्षे नापेक्षते इत्यनन्यापेक्षा ह्यात्मस्वरूपसिद्धिः।

तदेवं चित्स्वभावस्य पुंसः स्वाभाविकी चितिः।
नानापदार्थसंसर्गात्तत्तद्वित्तित्व*मश्नुते॥

(upon something similar to it or on anything revealed by itself). No object is found to depend for its manifestation on some other entity which is similar to itself, or on something which is manifested by that object itself. In fact, the pot does not require for its manifestation some other pot; but it stands in need of light and so on. Likewise, light also, when it shines forth, does not require some other light; nor does it need pot and the like, which depend for their manifestation on light itself; but it stands in need of the sense-organ, an entity which is dissimilar to it. Similarly, the sense-organ also does not require (for its manifestation) light and the like, or the pot, which alike depend on the sense-organ for their manifestation; but it requires consciousness, which is an altogether different type of entity. Similarly, consciousness, in its turn, does not depend (for its manifestation) on some other consciousness; nor on the sense-organ and the like, whose manifestation is dependent on itself; but it requires the self-dependent soul, which is its substrate and which is a different type of entity. In the same manner, the self, in its turn, does not require for its direct presentation some other self; nor does it require consciousness, sense-organ, and the like, whose presentation is dependent upon it. That is why the presentation of the essential nature of the self is not dependent upon anything other than itself.

To the soul which has thus been shown to have consciousness as its essential nature, consciousness must indeed be an invariable attribute. On account of its conjunction with manifold objects, conscious-

‡ The reading *asādhāraṇasajātīyārthāntarāpekṣaḥ* found in the mss. and printed copies makes no sense. Hence the following emendation *svasādhyasādhāraṇajātīyārthāntarāpekṣaḥ* has been suggested.

**tattadvittitvam* is the reading found in some manuscripts. It is preferable to *tattaccittatvam* found in the Cowkamba and Telugu editions.

यथैव खलु सूर्यालोकस्तेन तेनार्थभेदेन संसर्गात्तत्तत्प्रकाशो भवति घटप्रकाशः पटप्रकाश इति, एवमात्मनः प्रकारभूतं चैतन्यं अर्थविशेषसंसर्गात् घटसंवित्पटसंविदित्यादिप्रख्योपाख्ये प्रतिपद्यते। ते च चैतन्यस्य दशाविशेषाश्चेतयितुरात्मनो धर्मविशेषत्वादेव तस्यापरोक्षा भवन्ति, कादाचित्कबोधवादिनामिव बोधस्य विषयभेदावच्छेदादयः।

ननु आत्मनश्चैतन्यमागन्तुकमिति **न्यायवैशेषिका**स्तन्मतोपजीविनश्चा**भिनवमीमांसकाः**; अर्थेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षाद्यन्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधानात्, गच्छामि, अगच्छमित्यादिवज्जानामि, अज्ञासिषमित्यादिकालावच्छेदप्रतीतेः, स्वापतुरीयादिदशासु च बोधाधारत्वे सुप्तप्रबुद्धबद्ध-

ness comes to be such and such a knowledge (e.g. knowledge of the pot, knowledge of the cow, and so on). Just as the rays of the sun, by virtue of their contact with several different objects, come to be treated as different illuminations, such as the illumination of the pot, the illumination of the cloth and so on; even so, consciousness which is an attribute of the soul, on account of its contact with diverse objects, acquires different names and comes to be spoken of as being distinct, such as the cognition of the pot, the cognition of the cloth, and so on. And these (different cognitions) are merely the several states of consciousness. As they are, thus, the different attributes of the self, which is a conscious entity, they become perceptible to the self; even as, on the view of those who maintain that consciousness is an occasional attribute of the self, the delimitation of knowledge by the different objects is perceptible to the self.

Those who know the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika darśanas and the Neo-Mīmāmsakas who follow their doctrines declare that consciousness is an occasional quality of the soul; because consciousness depends (for its presence or absence) on the presence or absence of such factors, as the contact of the senses with the objects; and because experiences, such as, 'I know,' 'I knew,' are known to be limited by time; and because the distinction between the sleeping person and the person awake, and that between the soul in bondage and the soul released, would disappear, if the soul were regarded as the substrate of consciousness even in states such as, sleep and *turīya*[159]. Further, in respect of con-

159. The psychology of the Upaniṣads mentions four states of the soul—*jāgrat* (waking), *svapna* (dreaming), *suṣupti* (deep sleep) and *turīya*. During the waking state, manas and the outer senses are active. In the dream state, the outer senses are in abeyance, but manas continues to function. In deep sleep, even manas is quiescent. *Turīya* is a transcendental state not to be grasped by the experience of the ordinary man. While it resembles dreamless sleep in so far as there is complete withdrawal of normal consciousness, and the absence of desires, it differs from it in so far as in this state the self reveals itself fully.

मुक्तादिव्यवस्थाभावप्रसङ्गाच्च। नित्यस्य च ज्ञानस्यात्मसमवायिनः प्रतिकर्मव्यवस्थापि दुरुपपादैव। तदा हि प्रकाशनशीलतया तस्या एकस्यां संविदि सर्वमेव प्रकाशेत ; न वा किञ्चिदविशेषात्। अन्यदा तु यदर्थसन्निकर्षजुषा इन्द्रियलिङ्गादिना या धीर्जन्यते तदीयैव सेति व्यवस्था युक्तिमती।

स्यान्मतम्—इन्द्रियादिप्रणाडिकया चैतन्यमेव तेन तेनार्थेनानुरज्यमानं तत्प्रकाशतया तदीयत्वेन व्यवतिष्ठते; अनुरागस्य चागन्तुकतया इन्द्रियाद्यनुविधानं कालावच्छेदस्वापादिव्यवस्था चोपपद्यत इति—तदसत्। अर्थान्तरसन्निकर्षेऽर्थान्तरस्यानुरागासम्भवात्। चैतन्यमपि तथा निष्क्रम्य सन्निकृष्यत इति चेन्न; अमूर्तस्याकाशस्येव निष्क्रमणप्रवेशाद्यनुपपत्तेः। गुणश्च चैतन्यं गुणिनमपहाय कथमन्यतो यास्यति। न चार्थोऽन्तः

sciousness which is eternal and which is inherent in the soul, all distinctions based on each object known become unintelligible. Indeed, then (i.e. if consciousness is eternal), as it possesses the nature of manifesting (objects), either all objects will shine forth in one and the same knowledge or none at all, there being no distinguishing feature (favouring one object rather than another). When it is admitted to have a different character (i.e. when it is occasional), the distinction of knowledge (into, knowledge of the pot or knowledge of the cloth) based on this principle, namely, that knowledge which arises from the sense-organ or probans or something similar, coming into contact with a particular object, pertains to that object only—becomes reasonable.

It may be contended that consciousness itself, through the medium of the senses and the like, becomes coloured by different objects, and (thereby) comes to be distinguished into such and such a knowledge pertaining to such and such an object ; and that, as this process of being coloured is accidental, the dependence on the senses, the limitation by time into the past, present, etc., and the distinction of states, such as, sleep and the like become intelligible. This (contention) is erroneous. When one object is near, another (which is not near by) cannot be coloured (by it). If it be said that consciousness itself proceeding outward gets so close a contact (with the object as to be coloured by it), (the reply is :—) not so ; for, in the case of a formless object, such as ether, proceeding outward, entering and the like are impossible. How can consciousness, which is an attribute, depart from the substance wherein it inheres and proceed elsewhere ? Nor does the object enter into (consciousness) ; for the object is perceived by everybody as being

प्रविशति । स हि बहिर्देशसम्बद्धः सर्वलोकप्रत्यक्षः । जात्यादिषु चानुपपत्तिस्तुल्यैव ।

अथोच्येत द्वेधा खल्वयं प्रत्यगर्थोऽवतिष्ठते—बहलो विरलश्च । तत्र बहलः प्रत्यक्चेतनक्षेत्रज्ञादिपदपर्याय आत्मा; विरलस्तु चैतन्यज्ञानादिपदाभिधेयः प्रत्यगर्थतन्त्रतया गुण इत्युपचर्यते तेजोवत्, यथा बहलस्तेजः प्रदीपोऽग्निरिति, विरलं तु प्रभा ज्योतिरिति । अतो विरलात्मप्रदेशतया चैतन्यस्यालोकस्येव गमनं संयोगादिकमुपपद्यत इति ।

इदमनुपपन्नम् । निरवयवस्यामूर्तस्यासङ्गस्यात्मनो बहलविरलादिधर्मानुपपत्तेः । यदि सावयवत्वमूर्तत्वानित्यत्वसंसर्गित्वादिकमपि धर्मजातमात्मन्यनुमन्वीमहि, तत एवमङ्गीकुर्वीमहि । न च तदनुमन्तुमुचितम्, अचेतनत्वापातादित्यलमनेनार्हतमतानुकारदूषितेनात्मवादेन ।

located in the space outside. Besides, in the case of (formless) entities, such as, generality, the same difficulty (i.e. the impossibility of proceeding outward or coming in) holds good.

It may be said that the inward entity, like the luminous substance, exists in two forms, viz., in a dense and in a sparse form; of these the entity in the dense form is the self; and it has the words *pratyak, cetana, kṣetrajña* and the like as its synonyms; but the entity in the sparse form, referred to by the terms *caitanya, jñāna* and the like, is called, by courtesy, a quality, for the reason that it is dependent on the pratyagartha (the inward entity in the dense form); even as the luminous entity in the dense form is termed flame, fire and the like; while the same entity in its sparse form is referred to as *prabhā* (radiance) and *jyotiḥ* (light); proceeding outward and coming into contact would be appropriate in the case of consciousness, as in that of light (*āloka*); for, consciousness is only the sparse region of the self.

But this view is untenable: For, qualities, such as, those of existing in a dense and in a sparse form cannot be attributed to the self, which is without parts, and without forms and which has no contact (with anything else). We could admit the self to exist in such a manner, if we were prepared to admit the following set of qualities, viz., the character of possessing parts, of having forms, of being non-eternal, and of having relations, as belonging to the self. But it is unreasonable to make such an admission; for it would result in reducing the self to a non-intelligent entity. This peculiar theory of the self, which stands condemned for the very reason of its imitating the Ārhata (Jaina) doctrine, need not detain us any further.

अथ मतमात्मा अयमनवयवेन सर्वतः सर्वार्थविभाससमर्थचैतन्यानुबन्धः सर्वव्यापी अथ च न सर्वमस्य परिस्फुरति, तमोगुणप्रतिबन्धात् । सत्त्वोत्कटैस्तु करणैः स्वकस्वकपाटवानुसारेण पाटिते तु तमसि, ते तेऽर्थाः प्रतिभासन्ते । अतोऽन्तरेणापि ज्ञानार्थयोर्निष्क्रमणप्रवेशावुपपद्यत एवार्थविशेषोपरागः संविद इति ।

एवमप्यर्थातिशयमात्रहेतुत्वादिन्द्रियलिङ्गादेर्ज्ञानस्येव ज्ञापकत्वं न स्यात्, ज्ञानहेतुत्वाभावात् । न चार्थप्रकाशस्य ज्ञानत्वम्; प्रकाशमानतयार्थस्यापि ज्ञातृत्वप्रसङ्गात् ।

यदाहुः—आत्मधर्मस्य चैतन्यस्य विषयेण संयोगो ज्ञानमित्युच्यत इति ; तत्रापि संयोगस्योभयनिष्ठतया स एव प्रसङ्गोऽनुभवविरोधश्च ; अहमिदमिदानीं जानामि, नेदानीमित्यात्मसमवायिनोरेव ज्ञानभावाभावयोरनुभवात् ।

It may be contended that the self is, in its entirety, related to consciousness, which is capable of illuminating all objects and in all ways; that it is all-pervasive, and that although it is of this nature, all objects do not present themselves to it, since there is the obstruction proceeding from the quality of darkness (*tamas*); and that when, with the aid of the sense-organs, wherein the sattva quality predominates, this darkness (tamas) is dispelled in accordance with their different capacities, the respective objects shine forth; and that, thus, without there being any proceeding outward or coming in on the part of consciousness and objects, all reference to knowledge as pertaining to particular objects becomes intelligible.

Even if this were so, the senses and probans (*hetu*), like jñāna, could not be considered the cause of knowledge, for, they are responsible only for helping objects to be illumined (by removing the enveloping tamas), and not for originating knowledge. (It is no escape to say that) the illumination of objects is itself knowledge; since (in that case) the objects also, for the reason of their being illumined would have to be considered the knower.

Even on the view advanced by some that the conjunction of consciousness, which is a quality of the self, with the object is spoken of as knowledge, the same difficulty (the unwelcome result, viz., that the object would have to be considered as the knower) persists, since conjunction exists in both (the self and the object); and, in addition, there is contradiction with experience, since the presence or absence of knowledge is experienced to inhere in the self only (and not in the object), as is evident from the experience 'I know this now,' 'I do not know this now.'

अविकृतप्रकाशहेतुकिरणसंहतावप्यहिममहसि प्रकाशकत्वप्रख्योपाख्यानवदुपपद्यत इति मा वोचः। तत्र हि गभस्तीनां द्रव्यतया अकुञ्चनप्रसारणद्रव्यान्तरसंयोगविभागादेस्सम्भवादुपपद्यते व्यवस्थोपलब्धिः; चैतन्यं तु गुण इति न तथा व्यवस्थामर्हति।

अथोच्येत—द्विधा हि ज्ञानमात्मनः स्वस्मिन्नन्यत्र च। तत्राद्यमुदयास्तमयरहितमात्मस्वरूपप्रयुक्तमनवरतमनुवर्तते, इतरत्तु तत्तदर्थसम्बन्धीन्द्रियाद्यागन्तुकहेतुभेदायत्तात्मलाभं तद्भावाभावानुविधायि तत्तदर्थप्रकाशतयोदीयते लीयते च। तदपेक्षयैव स्वापजागराद्यवस्थाव्यवस्थापि सङ्गंस्यत इति। उच्यते—अभ्युपगच्छेमाप्येवं यदि नित्यमात्मनि ज्ञानमस्तीत्यत्र किमपि साधनमुपलभेमहि।

ननु अङ्गीकृतस्तावज्जाग्रदवस्थायां सर्वदात्मानुभवः स्वापादिषु चानुमीयते;

Do not say that, just as in the case of the sun which is unchanging and which possesses hosts of rays which are responsible for manifesting objects, it is the sun, and not the object, that is considered to be the manifester and called like that, (here also, the reference to the self, and not the object, as the possessor of knowledge becomes intelligible). For, in the case of the sun, since the rays are substances, contraction and expansion, contact with objects and separation therefrom, are possible; and hence, the consideration (of the sun rather than the object) as the manifester is quite intelligible. Consciousness, on the other hand, is a quality; hence, in this case, there is no adequate basis for the consideration of the self, rather than the object, as the knower.

It may be said that the knowledge belonging to the self is twofold—one relating to itself, the other to everything else; and of these, the former is without a beginning and an end, is dependent on the very existence of the self and persists at all times; while the latter, whose very existence is dependent on several occasional factors, such as, the senses which are in contact with the various objects, originates and perishes as the knowledge of such and such an object—a knowledge whose presence or absence is based respectively on the presence or absence of the causal factors. And it is on this basis that even the distinction of states into those of sleeping, waking and the like would be rendered intelligible. To this it is said in reply that we may accept this if we notice any proof for the assertion that knowledge exists in the self eternally.

(One may ask: Does not the following argument prove that consciousness is an eternal and not an occasional property of the soul?) It is admitted on all hands that in the state of waking the consciousness

तात्कालिकस्वविषयज्ञानाभावस्योत्तरोत्तरकालं परामृश्यमानत्वात् । यत्कालीनोऽभावः परामृश्यते तत्कालीनेन तदाश्रयस्वरूपज्ञानेनापि हि भाव्यम्, मध्याह्नकालपरामृश्यमान इव प्रातस्समयपरिदृष्टतटाकतीरादिवर्तिनि कुञ्जराद्यभावे । यत्कालीनाभावाश्रयतया यः परामृश्यते सः तत्कालीनस्वरूपानुभववान्, यथा प्रातरनुभूततटाकतीरादि । स्वापादि कालिकार्थानुभवाभावाश्रयतया चायमात्मा परामृश्यते; अतस्तात्कालिकस्वरूपानुभववानिति ।

मैवम् । अनैकान्त्यात्, प्रातस्तत्र नाहमासमिति स्वाभावभूमितया प्रतीतेन

of self always exists; but its existence in states of sleep and the like is inferred, for the non-existence of knowledge of objects in those states is remembered on subsequent occasions. Whenever the non-existence of a thing is remembered as having existed at a given time, there must necessarily have existed at that time a knowledge of its locus, as in the case of the non-existence of the elephant remembered at noon-day as having prevailed in the morning on the bank of a tank or thereabouts witnessed then. That which is known as the locus of the non-existence obtaining at a given time involves knowledge concerning itself at that time; for instance, the bank of the tank or thereabouts perceived in the morning.[160] The self is remembered as the locus of the non-existence of the consciousness of objects—a non-existence which prevailed in the states of deep sleep and the like; hence, at that time (also) it must have possessed knowledge concerning itself.

The reply is 'not so'. For, in the light of instances such as, the hill, tank and the like which were not noticed in the morning by a person, and which are known to be the substrate of his non-existence as

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160. It is well known that in the walking state consciousness always exists. If it could be shown that it exists in sleep and other kindred states also, it would follow that consciousness is an eternal quality of the soul. For this purpose, the following analogy is employed. Just as when a person remembers at noon-day that there was no elephant at the tank in the morning, he must have noticed in the morning the tank which is the locus of the non-existence of the elephant. Even so when a person remembers on walking that he had no cognition of objects at the time of sleep, he must necessarily have known, in the state of sleep, the self which is the locus of the non-existence of the cognition of objects. Thus, it is to be concluded that even in the states of sleep, swoon and the like, there is consciousness In other words, consciousness is an eternal property of the soul.

प्रातरनवगतगिरितटाकादिना। अभावप्रतिपत्तिसमये प्रतिपित्सिताभावसमकालवर्तिनस्तदाश्रयस्वरूपस्यावगत्या, विद्यमानत्वे तत्कालतयावगमप्राप्तस्य प्रतियोगिनोऽनवगत्या च भवितव्यमभावज्ञानस्येत्येतावत्। अन्तरेणापि स्वापकालीनमात्मानुभवमिह तदुभयमुपपद्यते; प्रत्यभिज्ञयैव प्रबोधे स्वरूपसिद्धेः, जाग्रदनुभवस्येव पटीयसः स्वापेऽपि सतोऽनुभवस्य स्मर्तव्यस्य सतस्तदानीमस्मरणाच्च।

'सुखमहमस्वाप्सम्' इत्यादिवृत्तयश्च तात्कालिकदेहेन्द्रियलाघवपाटवादिपर्यालोचनपूर्विकाः न स्मृतयः जातिवेषसंस्थानादिष्विव। तेऽपि हि परामृश्यन्ते, 'एवंजाती-

is evident from his experience 'I was not present there in the morning,' it is clear that your reason is liable to be charged with *anekānta doṣa*. For the cognition of non-existence two conditions would suffice, namely, (i) at the time of the cognition of non-existence, there must be knowledge of its locus—a locus which exists simultaneously with the non-existence which is sought to be apprehended, and (ii) the absence of the knowledge of the pratiyogin (counter-correlative)—which, had it existed, must surely have been grasped as having existed at that time. Here, even without there being any self-consciousness at the time of sleep, those two conditions may possibly exist; for, at the time of waking, there is the knowledge of the locus (i.e., the self), as is evident from remembrance; and in the waking state, there is no remembrance of the experience existing at the time of sleep also—an experience, which is as clear and distinct as waking experience and which is capable of being remembered (if only it existed).[161]

It cannot be said that experiences, such as 'I slept well,' prove the presence of the cognition of 'I', in the state of sleep; for, experiences such as 'I slept well' (found in the waking state) are based on the consideration of the then existing brightness and briskness of the body and senses; and are not remembrances (of what took place in sleep); even as knowledge of caste, dress, configuration and the like is not remembrance. (It cannot be maintained that caste and the like are not experienced, while the 'I' is experienced). They too are cer-

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161. The foregoing analogy is shown to be unsound. To be able to say at noon-day that there was no elephant in the morning at the tank, a person need not have noticed the tank in the morning. It is enough if he has a knowledge of the tank at noon-day, and if there is no knowledge of the elephant, which, if it had existed, would surely have been known. Similarly, in order to state that there was no consciousness during sleep, it is enough if the person has a knowledge of the self at the time of waking, and if there is the absence of the cognition of objects.

योऽहमीदृशेन वेषेणानेन संस्थानेनात्र इयन्तं कालमस्वाप्सम्' इति ।

अपि च स्मृतित्वेऽपि जाग्रदवस्थायामिव निद्रालक्षणया प्रमाणविपर्ययादिवृत्त्यभावकारणतमोगुणालम्बनया प्रतीत्या तत्कालप्रसिद्धस्यात्मनः स्मरणम् ; न तु सहजसंवेदनसिद्धस्य स्वप्रकाशस्य वा, प्रमाणाभावात् । निद्रापि प्रमाणविपर्ययादिवत् वृत्तिविशेष इति तत्रभवान् **पतञ्जलिः** । यदाह—' अभावप्रत्ययालम्बना वृत्तिर्निद्रा ' इति ।

प्रयोगश्च—विमत्याक्रान्तात्मस्वरूपसिद्धिः विषयानुभवनिबन्धना, आत्मस्वरू

tainly experienced thus : " I belonging to this caste, slept here so long, in such and such a dress, in such and such a form."[162]

Moreover, even if the cognition 'I slept well' were admitted to be a recollection, the remembrance of 'I' pertains only to the self which is known at the time of sleep to be in association with the *vṛtti*, known as *nidrā*—a *vṛtti* based on the quality of *tamas* (darkness) which makes for the absence of other *vṛttis*, like *pramāṇa* and *viparyaya*—even as it is known in the waking state to be in association with some vṛtti or other ; it does not pertain to either the self which manifests itself (*svaprakāśa*) or to that which shines forth with the aid of a knowledge which is its innate quality ; as there is no warrant (for stating that it refers to either of these). The revered Patañjali thinks that *nidrā* (sleep) also, like *pramāṇa viparyaya* and so on, is a form of *vṛtti*.[163] He says, " *Nidrā* (sleep) is the *vṛtti* which has for its object tamas, which is the cause of the non-existence of other *vṛttis*, (like waking and dreaming.") [164]

The same may be expressed in syllogistic form.—The knowledge of the self—the matter under dispute—is dependent upon the cognition of objects, because it is knowledge of the self, like the knowledge of self

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162. Even those who think that the self is cognised in deep sleep admit that its caste, dress and the like are not cognised then, but are apprehended from a consideration of the state of the person on waking. Similarly, it could be said that the cognition 'I slept soundly' does not point to a knowledge existing at the time of sleep, but is based on a consideration of the condition of the body, senses, etc., at the time of waking.

163. *Vyāsa Bhāṣya* on *Yoga-Sūtra* I. 10 and Vācaspati Miśra's ṭikā thereon deal with the question whether *nidrā* must rank as a *vṛtti* alongside of *pramāṇa* and *viparyaya*.

164. Pātañjala *Yoga-Sūtra* I. 10. The translation of this sūtra is based on Vācaspati Miśra's ṭikā. See also Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa's *Yoga-Sūtra-Vṛtti*.

पसिद्धित्वात्, जाग्रतस्तत्सिद्धिवत् इति । तथा आगन्तुकं ज्ञानं, आत्मविशेषगुणत्वात्, सुखादिवत् । न च सुखदुःखादयो नात्मगुणाः; अप्रसिद्धाश्रयान्तरत्वे सति अहम्प्रत्यय-सामानाधिकरण्येन प्रकाशमानत्वात्, ज्ञानवदिति ।

अत्राहुरात्मतत्त्वज्ञाः स्वतश्चैतन्यमात्मनः ।
स्वरूपोपाधिधर्मत्वात्प्रकाश इव तेजसः ॥
चैतन्याश्रयतां मुक्त्वा स्वरूपं नान्यदात्मनः ।
यद्धि चैतन्यरहितं न तदात्मा घटादिवत् ॥
चितिशक्त्या न चात्मत्वं मुक्तौ नाशप्रसङ्गतः ।

बुद्धिसुखदुःखादिनिश्शेषवैशेषिकात्मगुणात्यन्तिकोपरमलक्षणो हि मोक्षः कणभक्षाक्षचरणमते । न चात्यन्तलुप्तकार्यं वस्तु तत्कार्यजननशक्तमित्यत्र किञ्चित्प्रमाणं क्रमते ।

found in one who is awake.[165] Knowledge is an occasional quality; for it is a specific quality of the self, like pleasure and so on. It cannot be maintained that pleasure, pain and the like are not the qualities of the self; for, while they are not known to have any other basis, they shine forth as residing in the same substrate wherein self-consciousness resides; as knowledge and the like (which are not known to have any other substrate than the self and which are known to dwell in the self (e.g., we may say 'I am happy').

Those who have understood the true nature of the soul declare that consciousness is an innate quality of the soul; for, it is a quality dependent on the soul itself; just as illumination is an innate quality of light. Apart from being the substrate of consciousness, the self has no other form. That which is devoid of consciousness cannot be the soul, as in the case of the pot and the like. It cannot be said that the soul becomes a soul by virtue of its capacity to know; for, (if that were so) in the state of release, it would have to perish. For in the systems of Kaṇāda and Gautama release consists in the total annihilation of all special qualities of the soul, such as, intelligence, pleasure and pain. There is no warrant to declare that a substance, which altogether fails to produce its effect, possesses the capacity of producing it.

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165. Just as the consciousness of the self found in waking is dependent upon the cognition of objects, even so, in sleep also the consciousness of self must depend on the cognition of objects. But as there is no knowledge of objects then, there cannot be consciousness of the self.

NYAYAKULISA

EDITED WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

BY

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॥ स्वयंप्रकाशवादश्चतुर्थः ॥

ख्यातिस्स्वतः किमन्यस्मात्सिद्धयेदित्यत्र संशये ।
निर्णयन्ति यतीन्द्रोक्ति(त्थ)(क्त)भारतीभाविताशयाः ॥

अत्र केचिदाहुः—ख्यातिर्नप्रकाशेति(स्वप्रकाशेति) । तथाहि— सर्वमेव वस्तुजातमुत्पत्तितः प्रभृत्यावसानमनवच्छेदेन सत्तामनुभवति । कदाचिदेव तु प्रकाशते । तत्कस्य हेतोः यदि सत्तातिरेकी प्रकाशो न स्यात् ? अन्यदापि सत्ता कथं सिद्धयतीति चेत् ; केयं सिद्धिः ? । किं ज्ञप्तिः, उत वस्तुस्वरूपमात्रम् ? । आद्ये मा भूत्सिद्धिः । अस्तु वा इदानीन्तनज्ञानगोचरत्वेन कथञ्चित् । नैतावता सा निवर्तते । इदानीन्तन्या ज्ञप्तेरेव तत्र प्रमाणत्वात् । इतरथा वर्तमानावभासत्वेऽप्यनाश्वासप्रसङ्गात् । अपरोक्षप्रकाशेषु ह्यर्थस्य हेतुत्वात् । पूर्वभावस्सामान्यतः[1] परोक्षज्ञानेषु चेति केचित् । इतरथा ह्यनालम्बनत्वप्रसङ्गात् । वस्तुपक्षस्तु प्रतिक्षिप्तोऽन्यत्र । अतो विरुद्धधर्माध्यासेन सत्ताप्रकाशयोर्भेदसिद्धौ कः खलु ब्रूयात् संविदां सत्तैव ज्ञप्तिरिति ? । न च सर्वभावानुगतमनौपाधिकं रूपमेकोऽतिवर्तितुमर्हति । सर्वस्य हि सततस्वगोचरज्ञानाधीनः प्रकाशः, संविदामपि तथैवाभ्युपगन्तुमुचितः ।

ननु ज्ञानमेव प्रकाशस्सर्वभावानाम् । तत्कादाचित्कत्वमेव प्रकाशकादाचित्कत्वमपि । अतो न ज्ञानस्यापि (अतो ज्ञानस्यापि) स्वात्मैव स इत्यनन्यापेक्षत्वमिति चेत् , यद्येवं यत्नलभ्यं (न यत्नलभ्यं) भवतां सार्वज्ञ्यम् । तथापि खलु मदुक्तमपि न जानन्ति भवन्तः। यदि हि ज्ञानसत्तैव विषयविषयिभावलक्षणप्रत्यासत्तिनिरपेक्षा वस्तुनः प्रकाशस्स्यादेकज्ञ एव सर्वज्ञस्स्यात् । अथ प्रत्यासत्तिविशेषसापेक्षा, कथमियं स्वात्मनि घटते ? ।

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1. सामान्यत इत्यादि—अतीतवस्तुषु परोक्षज्ञानगोचरेषु पूर्वभावमात्रन्निर्विवादम् । अविष···अविषयकत्वेऽपि तद्व्यक्तेर्भावित्वेऽपि तज्जातीयस्य पूर्वभावित्वमस्त्येव ।

कर्मकर्त्रादेरपि[1] द्विरूपत्त्वमंशभेदादेवेत्यविरोधः। इह तु कर्मक्रियाभावो निरंशस्य विरुद्ध एव। न च ज्ञाने विषयविषयित्वलक्षणप्रत्यासत्त्यनपेक्षा। तथा सत्येकस्यैव ज्ञानस्य सर्वज्ञानगोचरत्वप्रसङ्गात्। ज्ञानभेदै(देऽ)स्तु प्रत्यासत्त्यपेक्षा। सा तु स्वात्मनि नास्तीति चेत्, सत्यम्; तत्तु अयोग्यत्वादेव। तत एव प्रत्यासत्तिलक्षणः प्रकाशोऽपि निवृत्त इति दृश्यताम्। ज्ञानस्वरूपमात्रे च तत्प्रकाशे ख्यात्याख्यधर्मिणि स्वप्रकाशत्वविप्रतिपत्तिर्न स्यात्। [2]संप्रतिपत्तिविप्रतिपत्त्योरेकत्रायोगात्।

एतेन ज्ञानं स्वप्रकाशमित्युक्तिरेवानुपपन्नेति व्याख्यातम्; अन्यपदार्थासिद्धेः[3]। तत्पुरुषे हि लिङ्गानुपपत्तिः। असामानाधिकरण्यादनन्वयश्च। व्यतिरेकविभक्तिर्हि सामानाधिकरण्यं प्रतिबध्नाति।

यदि च ज्ञानस्य स्वप्रकाशत्वम्, अनुव्यवसायव्यवसाययोर्वैलक्षण्यं स्यात्। ज्ञान-[4]भेदादेव वैलक्षण्यमिति चेन्न; भेदकधर्मानवभासे तदनवभासात्। न च स्वप्रकाशसिद्धेः प्रकाशान्तरेण[5] ज्ञानान्तरं प्रकाशयतीति (प्रकाश्यत इति) युक्तम्। प्रमाणभेदस्य प्रमेयाकारभेदापादकत्वायोगात्। **बौद्धा** हि ग्राहकभेदाद्ग्राह्याकारभेदमातिष्ठन्ते। स्वरूपभेदस्त्वकिञ्चित्कर एव। इतरथा धारावाहिबुद्धिष्वपि भेदावसादप्रसङ्गात्।

यदि च पटप्रकाशो ज्ञानं स्वप्रकाशोऽपि,तदा कथं ज्ञानपटयोर्भेदस्सिद्ध्येत्। संविन्निष्ठा हि नो वस्तुव्यवस्थितयः। संविदेव चेन्न भिद्यते कथं वस्तुभेदः। यथैकस्यां संविदि घटपटयोर्विषयीभूतयोर्भेदस्सिद्ध्यति,तथा विषयविषयिणोरपीति चेन्न;विषयत्वलक्षणप्रकाशभेदादेव

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1. कर्मकर्त्रादेरिति—श्लोकवार्तिके च शून्यवादे "नन्वात्मा ग्राहको ग्राह्यो भवताभ्युपगम्यते" इत्याशङ्क्य "कथञ्चिद्धर्मरूपेण भिन्नत्वात्प्रत्ययस्य तत्। ग्राहकत्वं भवेत्तत्र ग्राह्यं द्रव्यादि चात्मनः" इति परिहृतम्।

2. सम्प्रतिपत्तीति—ज्ञानमत्र सम्प्रतिपन्नं, स्वयंप्रकाशश्च विप्रतिपन्नः।

3. अनेकमन्यपदार्थे इति ह्यनुशासनम्। नच स्वपदप्रकाशपदयोरर्थादन्यो ज्ञानपदार्थः।

4. ज्ञानभेदादिति—किं व्यवसायानुव्यवसायप्रकाश्यज्ञानभेदो विवक्षितः, उत तस्स्वरूपभेदः। आद्ये आह—भेदकेति। अन्त्येत्वाह—स्वरूपभेद इति।

5. सिद्धेः प्रकाशान्तरेणेति—स्वप्रकाशसिद्धिविषयकानुव्यवसायेनेत्यर्थः।

घटपटयोर्भेदोपपत्तेः। अत्र तु प्रकाशभेदो नास्तीति त्वयैवोपपादितम्। विषयविषयित्वेनात्राप्यस्तीति चेत्, तर्हि स्वात्मनि दुर्लभमेवेत्युक्तम्। विषयित्वावच्छिन्नस्य प्रकाशान्तरविषयिकर्मकत्वेन स्वात्मत्वेन सम्पादयितुमशक्यत्वात्। तथा च ज्ञानपरिशेषप्रसङ्गः। अर्थमात्रस्य ह्यप्रकाशमानस्य सत्तायां प्रमाणाभावादभावस्स्यात्। अयमेव हि ज्ञानादर्थस्य भेदः यदप्रकाशमानमप्यस्ति। तदापि स्वयंप्रकाशमानत्वे त्वर्थशब्द एव ज्ञाने प्रयुक्तो भवति। तथा च जितं योगाचारैः। सहोपलम्भनियमादयोऽपि तदा सिद्ध्येयुः। [1]अतस्संविदायत्तो विषयगतः कश्चित्प्रकाशज्ञाततादिपदवेदनीयो धर्मः कल्पयति संविदम्। अतस्तत्करणक[2]ज्ञानांतरगोचरतया तत्सिद्धिः।

अथवा[3] कृतमर्थगतेन प्रकाशेन। ज्ञानमेवार्थस्य प्रकाशोऽस्तु। न च सर्वसाधारण्यम्; विषयासाधारण्यात्, तत्तत्सामग्र्यधीनत्वाच्च तत्तद्विषयभावस्य। संयुक्तसमवायस्य साधारण्येऽपि कथं रूपमेव चाक्षुषज्ञानगोचर इति चेत्, तव वा कथं तत्रैव प्रकाशोदयः? चक्षुरशक्तिविशेषाज्ज्ञानविशेषसिद्धेरिति चेत्, समानमिदं तद्विषयत्वस्वभावेऽपि। चाक्षुषं हि ज्ञानं स्वभावादेव रूपप्रकाशः, न स्पर्शादिप्रकाशः। रूप एव वा प्रकाशं जनयति, न स्पर्शादावित्यत्र चक्षुरशक्तिरेव नियमवति शरणं (यति करणं) (वती शरणम्)। सा च नावयोर्विशिष्यते। तत्कल्पने तु व्यवहारविशेषः प्रत्यासत्तिविशेषं ज्ञानं .... [चापेक्षमाणो हेतुः। स च सन्निकर्षस्य साधा]रणसे(त्वे)प्यावयोरविशिष्ट इति कृतं प्रकारान्तरकल्पनग्रहणेन। अतस्सामग्रीसम्पादितस्वभावप्रत्यासत्तिविशेषं ज्ञानमेव प्रकाशोऽस्य। सा च प्रत्यासत्तिः प्रतियोगिविशेषापेक्षैव। तथा हि—स्वपरनिर्वाहिकेति चेत्, तत्किं विषयप्रतियोगिकयैव तया स्वात्मप्रकाशतानिर्वाहः, (किं वा) इतर(प्रतियोगिकेव) स्वात्मप्रतियोगिकापि सा, किं वा प्रत्यासत्त्यनपेक्ष एव प्रकाशः? न प्रथमः; अतिप्रसङ्गात्। प्रत्यासत्तिकृतश्चेत्प्रकाशभावः, सा यत्प्रतियोगिका तदपेक्ष

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1. भाट्टमतेनोपसंहरति—अत इति.
2. ज्ञानान्तरेति—ज्ञातताहेतुकानुमितीत्यर्थः।
3. मुरारिमिश्रनैयायिकादिमतमाह—अथवेति.

एव हि सोऽभ्युपगन्तुमुचितः । इतरथा तत्कल्पनैव निष्फला स्यात् । न द्वितीयः ; अनभ्युपगमात् । न हि स्वप्रकाशवादिनापि स्वात्मा विज्ञानस्य कर्मेत्युपेयते । तथात्वे च स्वात्मप्रकाशस्यानुमानादौ पारोक्ष्यप्रसङ्गः । प्रत्यक्षत्वेऽपि स्वजन्यत्वं[1] स्वात्मनि भ्रान्तत्वं वा स्यात् । एवं क्रियाकारकभावेऽपि प्रत्यासत्तावात्मगोचरता पराकार्या । न हि कस्याश्चिदपि क्रियायाः स्वात्मैव कारकतामनुभवति, कर्मकारकतां वा । तथा च सति कारकाणां व्यभिचारादकारकत्वप्रसङ्गः। न हि कारकान्तरे सत्यपि स्वात्मापि कारकं भवति । बहिर्विकल्प(बहुविकल्प)दर्शनात् । कर्मणि तु समुच्चय इति चेन्न ; कर्मकारकरूपस्याभेदात् । इन्द्रियादिकरणसम्बन्धा (द्वा) नां हि बहूनामप्येकज्ञानक्रियावशीकृतानां कर्मत्वमेकमेव । तर्हि तत्रैवात्मा विज्ञानस्यान्तर्भाव्यतामिति चेन्न ; तदन्तर्भावे क्रियाया एवासिद्धेः । तदपेक्षस्य कारकत्वस्याप्यप्रसिद्धिप्रसङ्गात् । न हि भङ्गस्यै(?)-कस्यैव क्रियात्वं कारकत्वञ्चेति द्रष्टव्यम् । प्रत्यक्षे तु पौर्वापर्ययोगेन व्याघातो भ्रान्तत्वप्रसङ्गो वेत्युक्तम् । तत्स(अतत्स)म्प्रयोगजं हि प्रत्यक्षं भ्रान्तमिति सर्वसम्मतम् । न च तृतीयः ; अतिप्रसङ्गादेव । बहिरतिप्रसङ्गपरिहाराय प्रत्यासत्त्यपेक्षा । अत्र तु नेति सर्वस्य च तत्तदसाधारणं रूपमन्वेष्टुं शक्यमेव । यदुपाधिकोऽनपेक्षाकल्पः (इति चेत्) तर्हि तस्य यावत्समस्तं प्रकाशस्स्यात् । अतज्ज्ञाना(वि(व)च्छेदादिति चेत्, तत एव तत्रानपेक्षा निवर्तताम् । ज्ञाने तु नैवमनिष्टापात इति चेत्, अस्ति तु अव्यवहारदशायामपि प्रकाशही(मा)नत्वकल्पनागौरवम् । अनिष्टान्तरञ्च पूर्वमेवोक्तम् । न च प्रचुरविषयपरिदृष्टानिष्टप्रकल्पितसामान्योपाधिकोधि (क्रोडी) करणाय सर्वत्रानिष्टमन्वेषणीयम् । तथाहि सति विद्युदादिषु संवित्कर्मता न कल्प्येत । अस्ति हि तस्यैकस्य क्षणिकेषु सम्भवः, यस्य ज्ञानं यस्यैव सत्तेति । यदि च सर्वमेव विज्ञानं सत्तामात्रेण प्रकाशत इति स्फुटा संवित्, ततोऽनपेक्षापि कल्प्यताम् । प्रत्यक्षे चैवमेव युक्तम् । न च तथा दृश्यते, किं कल्पनामूलम्? अतश्च सर्वभावानुगतस्वभावापरित्यागेन ज्ञानान्तरमेव ज्ञानस्य प्रकाश इति गम्यताम् । इच्छादीनामपि तदानीं कर्मैवेष्टादि-

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1. स्वजन्यत्वमिति—प्रत्यक्षे विषयस्य कारणत्वात्स्वप्रत्यक्षे स्वजन्यत्वस्यावश्यकत्वादिति भावः । सन्निकर्षानधीनप्रत्यक्षत्वे शुक्तौ रजतबुद्धिवत्स्वांशे भ्रमत्वम् ।

भावमनुभवति, न स्वरूपमिति विषयिधर्मस्वभावन्यायेनापि तथाभ्युपगन्तुमुचितम्। एतेनानुभूतिरनन्याधीनस्वधर्मव्यवहारा, स्वसम्बन्धादर्थान्तरे तद्धर्मव्यवहारहेतुत्वादिति प्रत्युक्तम्।

यत्त्वेकदेशिनामनुभूतित्वादित्यासिहेतुः, तस्यानुभूतिरिति धर्मिनिर्देशेनापि बाधः। तद्धि पदं स्वजन्यानुभूत्यालम्बनतामापादयति। अथ नापादयति, निरर्थकमेव स्यात्; न वाननुभूतिव्यवच्छेदकत्वमात्रम्; निरधिष्ठानव्यवच्छेदानुपपत्तेः। अथाज्ञानविशेषनिरासकवृत्तिभेदजननादर्थवत्तेति मतम्, तन्न; अन्योन्याश्रयत्वात्। तत्प्रक्रियासिद्धौ हि तत्सिद्धिः। न हि दृश्यस्य कस्यचित्सत्यत्व(त्वे) विश्वाध्यासादिसिद्धिः। न च सिद्धान्तिनोऽयं प्रयोगः; केवलव्यतिरेकिप्रामाण्यानभ्युपगमात्। आभाससमानयोगक्षेमता च दूषणम्। एवं हि स्वप्रकाशत्वं न सिद्ध्येत्। एवं वक्रानुमानानामपि निरासोऽनुसन्धातव्यः। न च जानामीति वर्तमानावभासात्स्वेनैव प्रकाशत इति वाच्यम्; गच्छामीति वर्तमानावभासाद्गमनस्यापि स्वयंप्रकाशत्वप्रसङ्गात्। न च वर्तमाने ज्ञाने ज्ञानान्तरानुदयात्तथा ग्रहणानुपपत्तिः; बाध्यबाधकयोरेकक्षणे सामानाधिकरण्यात्। तन्मात्रेण (वर्तमानावभासोपपत्तेः। न च) [1]जिज्ञासितग्राह्यजिज्ञासाव्यवधानादिन्द्रियसम्बन्धानुपपत्तिः। तस्यास्तदविरोधित्वात्। विरोधोऽ(धेऽ)पि जिज्ञासानन्तरभाविनो ज्ञानस्येन्द्रियेण ग्रहणात्। पूर्वभाविनश्च विषयस्मरणानुमानोपपत्तेः। न च इदमहं जानामीति त्रैरूप्यदर्शनात्स्वप्रकाशत्वसिद्धिः; अनुव्यवसायस्यैव तद्रूपत्वात्। सविषयस्य हि ज्ञानस्यानुव्यवसायेन ग्रहणात्तद्रूपत्वोपपत्तिः। तस्माज्ज्ञानान्तरेणैव ज्ञानसिद्धिः। तत्कारणज्ञान्तःकरणमेवासन्नत्वादिन्द्रियाशक्तिसिद्धेश्च कल्प्यत इति न सङ्कटं किञ्चित्।

नन्विदं बुभुत्सितं (अबुभुत्सितं) वाऽन्तःकरणेन गृह्यते? (न) प्रथमः। अनवस्थाप्रसङ्गात्। तद्ग्रहणपरम्पराया अवश्यवेदनात् ततश्च विषयान्तरसञ्चाराभावः। द्वितीयेऽपि इच्छा ज्ञानपूर्विकेति पूर्वज्ञानापेक्षया मूलक्षयकरी सैवानवस्था स्यात्। तत्रोत्तरं बुभुत्सितवेद्यमे-

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1. न चेति—ज्ञानं बुभुत्सितवेद्यमिति त्वयाङ्गीकारात्तज्जिज्ञासया व्यवधानमिति भावः।

वेति । न चानवस्था । न हीच्छायाः कारणं ज्ञानं विशेषगोचरमेवेति सार्वत्रिकम् । तथाहि बुभुत्सैव न स्यात् । अनुपरमो वा तस्याः । अतस्सामान्यतो ज्ञाते विशेषे बुभुत्सा भवति । सा च तज्ज्ञानहेतुरिति युक्तम् । ज्ञानञ्च सामान्यतस्सर्वैरेव पूर्वं ज्ञातु(त)-मेव संसारिणां प्रवाहानादित्वात् ज्ञानतज्ज्ञानसंसारि(रा)णाम् । अतो बुभुत्सितं ज्ञानं मानसप्रत्यक्षवेद्यमेवेति न स्वप्रकाशत्वमिति ।

अत्रोच्यते—

सत्ताघटत्वयोर्भेदो यथा ..... [वो युक्त्य]पाश्रयः ।
अप्रकाशेषु तद्वत्स्याद्भेदस्सत्ताप्रकाशयोः ॥

प्रकाशस्य तु सत्तैव प्रकाशपदगोचरः ।
यथा घटादिभावानां सत्ता तत्तत्पदास्पदम् ॥

प्रकाशस्सर्वभावानां सम्बन्धो (द्धो) व्यवहारकृत् ।
नैष स्वात्मनि तत्कर्तुं प्रकाशान्तरमीक्षते ॥

स्वरूपमेव हि भावानां सत्पदार्थः । जातिस्संस्थानमात्रमिति स्थितमन्यत्र । तदेव च कादाचित्कात्प्रकाशाद्भेदेन तद्गोचरतया भवताप्युपवर्णितम् । सा सत्ता भावान्तरेषु प्रकाशाद्भिन्नापि प्रकाशे(न) भिद्यत इति स्थिते चिन्त्यते, प्रकाशः कथमर्थेषूपकरोतीति । व्यवहारं जनयतीति दृश्यते । हानादिलक्षणश्च व्यवहारः । तत्र वस्त्वन्तरेषु सम्बन्धपुरस्सरं तत्तद्व्यवहारसहकारिमध्यमधिशयानस्तत्र व्यवहारहेतुर्भवति । सम्बन्धश्च वर्तमानेषु संयोगद्वारको योग्यतालक्षणः कार्यकल्प्यः । स एव प्रामाण्यस्वभावादिशब्दैरप्यभिधीयते । स च चक्षुरादिकरणसम्बन्धानुसारेण भवतीति सर्वसम्मतम् । अवर्तमानेषु वर्तमानावस्थद्रव्यसंयोगद्वारको योग्यतालक्षण एव ।····[तत्र च] कार्यमेव प्रमाणं व्यवहारश्च कार्यमित्युक्तमेव । संयोगस्तु प्रसरणवैभवादिप्रतिपादकशास्त्रबलादाश्रयते ।

“ वालाग्रशतभागस्य शतधा कल्पितस्य च ।
भागो जीवस्स विज्ञेयस्स चानन्त्याय कल्पते ॥ ”

इति ज्ञानरूपस्य जीवस्याणुपरिमाणत्वं तद्धर्मभूतस्य ज्ञानस्य च वैभवमाह। आराग्रमात्रो ह्यवरोऽपि दृष्ट इति चात्मनोऽणुत्वमाह ।

"यया क्षेत्रज्ञशक्तिस्सा वेष्टिता नृपसर्वगा ।
तया तिरोहितत्वाच्च शक्तिः क्षेत्रज्ञसंज्ञिता ।
सर्वभूतेषु भूपाल तारतम्येन वर्तते ॥"

इति धर्मभूतज्ञानं स्वतस्सर्वगतं कर्मणा सङ्कुचितं तारतम्येन वर्तत इति विज्ञायते। एतेन द्रव्यत्वमप्यात्म(वत्) विज्ञानस्यापि सिद्धयतीत्यन्यदेतत्। एवञ्च येन रूपेण परस्मिन्व्यवहारजनने ज्ञानमुपकरोति आत्मविषयव्यवहारजनने तथाविधमुपकारं कर्तुमन्यं प्रकाशं नापेक्षत इति स्वप्रकाशमुच्यते। यथा ह्यग्न्यादीनामन्धकारस्य निरसनेन सहकारितया वा परत्रोपकुर्वतां तदुपकारजननायात्मन्यग्न्यन्तरापेक्षा न विद्यते॥ तथा चोक्तम्—

"[1]अग्न्यादयो घटादीनां प्रसिद्धा ये प्रकाशकाः ।
न ते प्रकाश्यरूपा हि प्रकाशस्यानपेक्षणात् ॥ इति "॥

तत्र ह्यवयवानां मिथः प्रकाशकत्वकथने सम्भवत्यपि गौरवभयान्नाश्रीयते। त(अ)त्र तु ज्ञानान्तरमेव मृग्यमिति विशेषः । एतेन धर्मिसिद्धावपि स्वप्रकाशत्वविप्रतिपत्तेस्स्वरूपातिरिक्तप्रकाशसद्भावः प्रत्युक्तः; प्रकाशान्तरभावाभावयोर्विप्रतिपत्त्युपपत्तेः । प्रकाशान्तरस्य स्वस्य च स्वप्रकाशत्वेऽपि तयोर्भेदकधर्मानवधारणाद्भेदाभेदविप्रतिपत्तिर्युक्तैव। अत एव च प्रतिज्ञोपपत्तिः। स्वस्य प्रकाशस्स्वयमेवेति—स्वयमेव स्वव्यवहारहेतुः प्रकाश इति यावत्। आत्मेश्वर इत्यादिवदन्यपदार्थोऽपि द्रष्टव्यः ।

अपि च सर्वभावानामेव हि सजातीयापेक्षा नास्तीति दृष्टम्। यथोक्तम्—

"सजातीयस्वसाध्यार्थनिरपेक्षात्मसिद्धयः ।
सर्वे पदार्थास्तेनात्मा निरपेक्षस्वसिद्धिकः ॥" इति ॥[2]

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1. श्लो. वा. शून्यवादे श्लो. 65.
2. आत्मसिद्धौ अयं श्लोकः ।

अत्र सजातीयापेक्षाभावव्याप्तज्ञानस्य स्वप्रकाशत्वसिद्धिः। स्वापेक्षा अस्तु वा मा वा। स्वसाध्यापेक्षाभावादात्मनस्स्वप्रकाशत्वम्।

यत्तु प्रत्यासत्त्यपेक्षत्वमुक्तम्। तदयुक्तम्। यथा हि संयोगिन्यन्धकारन्निरस्यतस्तेजसस्त्वात्मनि तन्निरासे स्वसंयोगापेक्षा नास्ति; एवमितरत्र व्यवहारे साध्ये सम्बन्धापेक्षस्य स्वात्मनि तं साधयितुं न सम्बन्धाभ्यर्थनम्। अत्र तु हेतुभावमात्रे न तमोनिरास इति चेत्, ज्ञानेऽपि सामान्यविशेषाभ्यां सहकारित्वेन कर्मत्वेन च व्यवहारं प्रति हेतुत्वमेवेति तुल्यम्। सहकारित्वमेव तेजसि न कल्पनीयमिति चेत्, ज्ञानेऽपि तुल्यम्। प्रकाशव्यवहारेऽपि हि प्रकाशापेक्षा नास्ति; विषयापेक्षामात्रमेवेत्यपि सुवचत्वात्। तस्माद्विषयव्यवहारे सम्बन्धापेक्षा, स्वात्मव्यवहारे न तदपेक्षेति स्थितम्। तत्र चायं विशेषः। विशिष्टसामग्रीसम्बन्धं कृत्वा [1]तत्तत्प्रावण्यलक्षणस्य सम्बन्धस्य तत्तत्सामग्रीभेदेन [2]प्रावण्यस्य तारतम्यदर्शनाद्विषये पारोक्ष्यापरोक्ष्यादिभेदः। स्वात्मनि तु तन्निरपेक्षस्यैव सर्वदा व्यवहारहेतुत्वादपरोक्षरूपतैव। वैशद्यं ह्यापरोक्ष्यम्। नन्वेवं स्वव्यवहारे प्रकाशान्तरानपेक्षत्वे परेणापि व्यवह्रियेत। तेन तज्ज्ञानमेव व्यवहर्तव्यञ्चेत्, अनपेक्षत्वव्याघातः। नैवम्; विषयवदुपपत्तेः। विषयोऽपि ह्यनेन व्यवहर्तव्यस्स्वयञ्च तत्र विषयः यथा अनेन ज्ञानेनास्यैव ज्ञातुर्व्यवहारार्हो न सर्वस्य; एवं ज्ञानमपीति न दोषः। एवञ्चात्र प्रयोगः—ज्ञानमनन्याधीनप्रकाशं, अर्थप्रकाशकत्वाद्दीपवत्; सजातीयानपेक्षप्रकाशं वस्तुत्वाद्घटवदिति। प्रकाशश्च साक्षाद्वा परम्परया वा जायमानं ज्ञानफलं व्यवहारानुगुण्यमभिधीयते। आनुगुण्यन्नाम व्यवहारसामग्र्या ज्ञानेन सम्पूर्तिः। ज्ञानस्य व्यवहारकारणान्तरसम्बन्ध[3] इत्यर्थः।

नन्वेवं व्यवहारानुगुण्यापादकस्य तदापादकान्तरेण न भवितव्यमित्युक्ते दीपस्य ज्ञानानपेक्षव्यवहारत्वप्रसङ्गः। तदपेक्षव्यवहारत्वेऽनैकान्तिकत्वं वेति चेत्, नैवम्; यदा-

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1. तत्तदिति—सामग्रीप्रावण्य इत्यर्थः।
2. ज्ञानप्रावण्यस्येति भावः।
3. व्यवहारेति—व्यवजिहीर्षाजनकत्वमिति यावत्।

कारेण यस्य व्यवहारानुगुण्यापादकत्वं तस्य तदाकारोपपादकानपेक्षत्वस्य [1]विवक्षितत्वात्। क्वचिदनुमानादावनुमानाद्यन्तरा[2]द्यपेक्षायामप्यनुमान[3]त्वप्रयुक्तापेक्षाभावादनैकान्तिकत्वपरिहारो द्रष्टव्यः। विशेषप्रयुक्ता त्वपेक्षा न वार्यते; ज्ञानेऽपि परसमवेतेऽतीतादौ च ज्ञानान्तरापेक्षादर्शनात्। (स्व)प्रकाशे परानपेक्षेति वचनात्। उपकारकमात्रस्य तदुपकारजनने परापेक्षादर्शनात्। (अत एव) इच्छादिष्वनैकान्त्यमपि पूर्वोक्तं परिहृतम्[4]। [5]एतेन स्वसम्बन्धादर्थान्तरे तद्धर्मव्यवहारहेतुत्वादिति पूर्वोक्तः प्रयोगस्सम्भावनामात्रपरः नानुमानाभिप्रायेण प्रयुज्यत इति वेदितव्यम्। अत एव हि भगवद्भाष्यकारपादैरपि संवेदनवद्रूपादिवच्च परत्र व्यवहारविशेषहेतोस्स्वस्मिन्नपि तद्व्यवहारहेतुत्वं युष्माभिरभ्युपेतं भेदस्यापि सम्भवत्येवेति पराभ्युपेतस्य स्वपक्षे सम्भावनामात्रमभिधीयते। एवञ्च नातिप्रसङ्गो न चात्मकर्मकत्वम्। तथाप्यनन्यापेक्षप्रकाशत्वं ज्ञानस्येति न कश्चिद्विरोधः।

किञ्च—

अन्वयव्यतिरेकित्वेऽप्यन्यथासिद्धियोगिनः।
हेतुत्वेन न गण्यन्ते किं पुनस्तदसम्भवे॥

वैशेषिका ह्यवयवरूपाद्यन्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधानेऽप्यवयविगन्धादेः, अन्यथासिद्धेरतत्कारणता-

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1. विवक्षितत्वादिति—तिमिरनिरासकत्वाकारेण दीपस्योपयोगो न तेनाकारेणान्यापेक्षेति भावः।

2. अग्नावनुमेयत्वापादकस्य धूमस्यानुमेयत्वं हि स्थलमलिनताद्यधीनमिति।

3. अनुमानत्वाकारेण परामर्शविषयत्वाकारेण धूमस्यानुमेयतावहत्वं, न हि तेनाकारेण तस्य मालिन्याद्यपेक्षेति।

4. ज्ञानस्य स्वतो ज्ञातत्वानङ्गीकारात् इतरनिरपेक्षस्वव्यवहारकारणत्वमेव ह्यङ्गीक्रियते तदिच्छादावपि तुल्यम्।

5. एतेनेति—स्वसम्बन्धादर्थान्तरे ज्ञातत्वव्यवहाराद्यापादकेन स्वस्मिन् ज्ञातत्वव्यवहाराद्यनापादनेन।

मातिष्ठन्ते। वयञ्च प्रतिबन्धकाभावस्याकारणत्वं ब्रूमः। ज्ञानविषये व्यवहारे जायमाने ज्ञानान्तरमन्वयव्यतिरेकवत्तया नोपलब्धम्। अनुपलम्भेऽपि केन कारणेन कारणमित्युपकल्प्येत; येन कल्पनागौरवप्रसङ्गान्मुच्येत। ननूक्तं वस्तुत्वानुमानम्। सत्यम्। तत्तु विशेषविरुद्धमिति भावि(वयि)तव्यम्। यद्धि ज्ञानगोचरतयैव प्रकाशते, तज्ज्ञानोत्पत्तेः प्राक्सदप्यप्रकाशितमिति दृष्टम्। ततस्साध्यं ज्ञानान्तरगोचरत्वनियमं साधयद्वस्तुत्वं तद्व्यापकं तदुत्पत्तेः प्रागप्रकाशमपि साधयेदिति विशेषविरोधः। नेदमनिष्टमिति चेन्न; अप्रामाणिकत्वात्। न हि ज्ञानं सदप्येतावन्तं कालमनुपलब्धमिति दृष्टम्। आशुतरविनाशित्वात् (न) तदितरवद्विवेचितमिति चेन्न; कथितस्य पश्चादनुमितस्यापि पूर्वाप्रतिज्ञात (पूर्वाज्ञातत्व)परामर्शोपपत्तेः। न चाभावप्रमाणवादिनो ज्ञाततानुमेयस्य ज्ञानस्यातीतत्वस्य योग्यानुपलब्ध्यभावादभावो दुरपह्नव (दुरवधर) इति वाच्यम्। स्मरणाभावादपि अनुभवाभावानुमानोपपत्तेः। इतरथा ह्यज्ञानव्यवहारः क्वापि न स्यात्। विषयस्मरणादनुमिते ज्ञाने विषयवत्स्मर्यतेऽनुमीयते वेति सन्देहात्स्मरणाभावो दुरवधर इति चेन्न; अनुव्यवसायमालायामपि तथात्वात्सन्देहापातप्रसङ्गात्। न च कार्यस्मरणाभावात्कारणाभावो दुरवधरः, व्याप्याभावाद्व्यापकाभाव(वा)सिद्धेरिति युक्तम्; घटादावपि पूर्वाज्ञातत्व(त्वा)परामर्शप्रसङ्गात्। पतितविशीर्णञ्च फलमुपलभ्य सुदूरपतनादिदं पुरा विशीर्णं तदानीन्नोपलब्धमिति स्फुटमनुसन्धीयते। एवं ज्ञानप्रवाहसमनन्तरञ्च पूर्वाज्ञातं ज्ञानं पाश्चात्यार्थस्मृतिव्यापाराद्यनुमितं पूर्वाज्ञातमित्येवानुसन्दधीरन्। न च जिज्ञासितस्य स्मर....[णाद]ज्ञानापरामर्शः; अवश्यजिज्ञासानुपपत्तेः। व्यासङ्गादज्ञातस्यापि तथा प्रतिसन्धानात्। न च विषयप्रकाशाद्विप्रलब्धो ज्ञानाप्रकाशकं नानुसन्दध्यात्; अर्थान्तरप्रकाशेनार्थान्तराप्रकाशस्यातिरोधानात्। यदि च कार्योन्नेयमेव विज्ञानम्, अन्तःकरणयोगसंस्कारादिवदखिलजनप्रसिद्धिगोचरो न स्यात्। सर्व एव हि ज्ञानामीति स्फुटतरमनुसन्दधते। ज्ञानाभावञ्च सहसा प्रतिक्षिपन्ति। यच्चाज्ञातं तदज्ञातमित्येवानुसन्दधते। न च सन्दिहते। आत्मावस्थाविशेषैः प्रकाशमाने सर्वदैव हि ज्ञानाज्ञानसंशयो नास्ति। न चायं ज्ञाननिर्णयो ज्ञानस्यानुमेयत्वेनावकल्पते। अस्मरण-

नियमस्यानुभवाभावेन व्याप्त्यु[1]पलम्भोऽप्यप्रत्यक्षज्ञानाभावस्य नावकल्पत एव। अर्थप्रकाशेन ज्ञानानुमा[2]नम(मानेऽ)शेषजनप्रसिद्धिदौस्थ्यमेव। आत्मान्तःकरणसंयोगातिरेकश्च तदानीं ज्ञानस्य [3]न स्यात्। ततश्च मनश्चैतन्यप्रसङ्गोऽप्यर्थान्तरविवक्षया तैराशङ्कितस्तानेवास्कन्दति। अतस्सतोऽपि ज्ञानस्याज्ञानापरामर्शान्नानुमेयज्ञानवादः।

मानसप्रत्यक्षतायामप्यज्ञानापरामर्शो न घटते। तथाहि—न तावत्सुखादिवदबुभुत्सितवेद्यतया; सर्वदाज्ञातत्वात्। तथा सत्यनवस्थाप्रसङ्गाच्च। न चावश्यजिज्ञासितत्वात्; तत एव। न च सुखादीनां ज्ञानान्तरवेद्यत्वम्; ज्ञानत्वेन स्वयंप्रकाशत्वात्। तस्य च ज्ञानत्वं **मोक्षसिद्धौ** द्रष्टव्यम्। न च जिज्ञासितस्य सहसैव ग्रहणेऽप्यजिज्ञासितस्य चिरातिवृत्तस्याज्ञानानुसन्धानानुपपत्तिः। न च जिज्ञासासमनन्तरमेव सर्वदा गृह्यते। वर्तमाने ज्ञाने जिज्ञासमानस्यैव ह्यन्तःकरणसंयोगेन ग्रहणोपपत्तिः। अतीते ज्ञाने जिज्ञासितेऽपि मनस्संयोगाभावेन स्मृत्यादिकार्योन्नेयत्वात्तस्य पूर्वाज्ञानं सुग्रहमेव।

स्मरणानुमेयस्य स्मर्यमाणत्वारोपादग्रहणाभिमानाभावः प्रत्युक्तः। यदा हि स्मर्यते ज्ञानमित्यारोपस्तदा स्मृतिहेतुरनुव्यवसायोऽप्यनुमातव्यः। तस्यापि विषयज्ञानवत्स्मर्यमाणत्वारोपः केन वार्यते। अथ विषयज्ञानादनुव्यवसायस्य कर्मक्रियालक्षणवैलक्षण्योपलब्धियोग्यस्य तथाऽनवसाया[4]त्स्मरणाभिमानो दुरारोप इति मतम्; तन्न। व्यवसाय-

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1. व्याप्तीति—ज्ञानाभावस्यास्मरणनियमस्य चायोग्यतयाऽनुपलम्भे तद्गतव्याप्तेरप्युपलम्भासम्भवात् घटाद्यस्मरणनियमेन घटाद्यनुभवाभावानुमानमेव न स्यादिति भावः।

2. ज्ञानानुमान इति—नान्यथाह्यर्थसद्भावो दृष्टस्सन्नुपपद्यते।

ज्ञानं चेन्नेत्यतः पश्चात्प्रमाणमुपजायते॥ श्लो. वा. 5 सू.— 182. श्लो. इत्युक्तप्राकट्यानुमेयत्वपक्ष इत्यर्थः

3. न स्यादिति—तद्धेतोरेवास्य तद्धेतुत्वे मध्ये किन्तेनेति न्यायादिति भावः। यथोक्तं श्रीमति न्यायसिद्धाञ्जने कल्प्यैव धीश्चेत्कल्प्येत तत्सामग्र्येव लाघवात्। प्रत्यक्षायास्ततोऽन्यत्वकल्पसौ नैवं प्रसज्यते॥ इति बुद्धि. परि. पृ. 250

4. विषयज्ञानविषयकत्वेनानुव्यवसायानुभवात्।

स्मरणानुमितानुव्यवसायगोचरज्ञाने सति तथा अनुव्यवसाया(ऽनवसाया)सिद्धेः। अनुव्यवसायोत्पत्तिवेलायां तथा व्यवसायो न प्रतीयत इति चेन्न ; अनुव्यवसायगोचरानुमानगोचरज्ञेयज्ञानाकारस्यैव[1] तत्राप्यारोपात्। ननु पूर्वाप्रसिद्धपरामर्शात् दुरारोप इति चेत्, एवन्तर्हि व्यवसायेऽप्यर्थज्ञानयोः कर्मक्रियालक्षणस्य वैलक्षण्यस्य पूर्वाप्रसिद्धेः(द्धस्य) परामर्शात्तदनुमाने स्मृत्यभिमानोऽपि नाशङ्क्येत ; अविशेषात्। अतो व्यवसाये स्मृत्यारोपशङ्कामनुव्यवसाये तदनर्हताञ्च ब्रुवाणो यावदवगतं स्मर्यत इति, [2]अनन्यशरणत्वात्स्वप्रकाशतामेव व्यवसायस्यानक्षरमूरीकुरुते। तस्मात्सतोऽप्यज्ञानावभासाभावादपि स्वप्रकाशत्वसिद्धिः। एवं तर्हि सर्वदा प्रतीयमानं विषयान्तरवत्स्फुटतरमवसीयेत, येन स्वेन परेण वेति सन्देहो न स्यादिति चेत् ; सत्यम्। अनुव्यवसायो नास्तीति निश्चयेऽप्यज्ञानोपलम्भाभावात्स्वेनैवेति विविच्यत एव ; प्रकाशत इति च। तथापि न सर्वेण स्फुटम् ; निर्धर्मकत्वात्। विषयव्यतिरेकेण स्वगतविविधधर्मसद्भावे हि विवेकोपपत्तिः। सर्वज्ञानसाधारणज्ञानत्वादिव्यतिरेकेण प्रतिनियतधर्मभेदाभावात्, बहुतरधर्मविशिष्टप्रतीतिलक्षणवैशद्याभावात्, क्षणभेदानां दुर्विवेचत्वाच्च, स्वेन स्फुटतरमुपलब्धमिति सर्वेण न विकल्प्यते। निरूपकास्तु यथोक्तप्रकारेण विविञ्चत एवेति। अतो वस्तुत्वानुमाने विरोधः। विपक्षे बाधकाभावश्च। अपि च,

अस्ति नास्तीति सन्देहो यतो ज्ञाने न विद्यते।
ततस्स्वयंप्रकाशत्वं ज्ञानस्येत्यवसीयते ॥

यस्य हि स्वरूपे विद्यमानेऽपि प्रकाशार्थमन्यापेक्षास्ति, तस्य तद्गोचरप्रकाशसामग्र्यसन्निधानात्, सन्निधाने वा दोषसम्भावनया कदाचित्संशयास्पदत्वमपि भवति। ज्ञाने तु संशयानर्हता दृश्यते। अतो व्यापकव्यावृत्त्या व्याप्यस्यान्याधीनप्रकाशत्वस्यापि व्यावृत्तिः। प्रस्मृते ज्ञाताज्ञातसन्देहो भवत्येवेति चेन्न; वर्तमाने ज्ञाने तदभावात्। तस्यैव स्वयंप्रकाश-

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1. अर्थगतस्मर्यमाणत्वस्य व्यवसाये आरोपवद्व्यवसायगतस्मर्यमाणत्वस्यानुव्यवसाये आरोपसम्भवादिति भावः।

2. इत्येतावद्दशाभिसन्ध्यन्यशरणत्वाभावात्।

त्वाभ्युपगमात् । तस्य जिज्ञासितस्य मनसा सहा(सहसा) ग्रहणादसंशय इति चेत्, तथापि ज्ञानास्तमयसमनन्तरं तदेव जिज्ञासमानस्य सन्देहो भवेत् । विषयस्मरणात्सहसा अनुमानसिद्धौ तत्रापि न सन्देह इति चेन्न ; [1]अन्वयव्यतिरेकाग्रहणात् । स्वप्रकाशत्वे हि तदुपपत्तिः । [2]तथापिकारणानुमाने संस्कारानुमानापत्तेः । तथापि(हि)—

विषयस्मरणं साक्षात्संस्कारादुपजायते ।
अनिश्चये .... [च] तस्यैष कथं ज्ञानस्य निश्चयः ॥

न चानुभवस्य कदाचित्प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वात्तस्यैवानुमानं सहसा भवतीति वाच्यम् ; यतः कदाचिदेव जिज्ञासितं ज्ञानं गृह्यत इत्युक्तं भवता। जिज्ञासानन्तरमपि तज्ज्ञानसामग्र्यनुवृत्तौ हि तद्ग्रहणोपपत्तिः । न....[च सर्व]दा असावनुभूते ज्ञाने तद्विषयमेवावश्यं स्मरति । तद्विषयमपि स्मरन्नन्यश्चा(श्वा)नुभूतमर्थं स्मरन्नेकः कश्चित्त(कदाचि)दनुभवमतीतं प्रति संशयीत ।

संशयोऽपि हि संस्कारे न स्यान्नित्यमदर्शनात् ।
कदाचिद्दर्शनाज्ज्ञाने संशयस्यैव सम्भवः ॥

कदाचिदन्वयमात्रमुपलभमानस्य (न) तत्कारणकत्वनिश्चयः । व्यतिरेकस्तु दुर्ग्रह इत्युक्तम् । अत्यन्तव्यवहिते चानुभवेऽर्थस्मरणमुपलभमानस्य तद्विनाभावात्तदकार्यताध्यवसायो वा भवेत् । अपि च—

विषयत्वेन सिद्धस्य विसंवादोऽपि सम्भवेत् ।
व्यवहारादिसंवादनियमस्तु स्वसिद्धितः ॥

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1. अन्वयेति—अनुभवस्मरणयोरप्रत्यक्षत्वेनान्वयव्यतिरेकग्रहणस्यायोगान्न तेन तदनुमानसम्भव इति ।

2. तथापीति—अनुभवत्वादिरूपेणाग्रहणेऽपि कार्यात्कारणानुमानमात्रमिति चेत्, संस्कार एव साक्षात्कारणभूतोऽनुमीयेतेति भावः ।

यस्य हि स्वव्यतिरिक्तज्ञानविषयत्वेन सिद्धिस्तस्य स्वज्ञान(स्य) कारणदोषाद्विशिष्टरूपग्रहणासामर्थ्ये स्वगोचरो व्यवहारो बाध्यत इति दृष्टम् ; यथा रजतादिषु । ज्ञाने तु न कदाचिद्व्यवहारविसंवादो दृश्यते । अतोऽवगच्छामोऽत्र स्वव्यतिरिक्तज्ञानानालम्बनत्वेन सिद्धिरिति । न च स्वरूपप्रकाशत्वेन सामग्र्यधीनसम्बन्धापेक्षास्तीत्युक्तम् । यतस्तद्दोषा[1]द्विवेकाग्रहाद्यवसरो भवेत् । न च स्वसमवेतधर्मान्तराभावाज्ज्ञानस्य स्वरूपमात्रस्फुरणे भेदकधर्मान्तरग्रहणाग्रहणकृतव्यवहारबाधाबाधयोरनवसर इति वाच्यम्; शङ्खपीतादिवदुपपत्तेः । अत एव ज्ञानान्तरविषयतया सिद्ध्यतस्तस्यैव ज्ञानस्य व्यवहारबाधो दृष्टः, यथा ह्यज्ञातरि परस्मिन् जानातीति । स्वप्रकाशतायां तु न विपर्ययावकाशः ; स्वरूपसत्तामात्रेण साक्षादवभासे तदसम्भवात् । तत्रापि ज्ञानभेदाभेदयोरस्त्येवावसरः ; ज्ञानान्तरापेक्षत्वाद्भेदादिव्यवहारस्य, तस्य च स्वमात्राधीनत्वात् ।

प्रकाशनियमं धत्ते संशयादेरयोग्यता ।
स च स्वेनैव चेन्न स्यादनवस्था प्रयु(स)ज्यते ॥

सुखादिवत्संशयाद्यनर्हत्वादव्यभिचरितप्रकाशसत्ताकत्वं तावदनुमीयते । ततश्च सर्वज्ञानप्रकाशव्यवस्थायास्सजातीयापेक्षया अनवस्थाप्रसङ्गाद्विषयान्तरसञ्चाराभावप्रसङ्गाच्च स्वेनैवेति नियमः । अपि च विषयस्मरणकाले तद्वदेव निस्संशयानुभवस्मरणा(णम)-खिलजनगोचरो (र उ) पलभ्यमानं विषयवदनुभवस्यापि तदानीं स्वेनैवानुभवनियमं व्यवस्थापयति ।

यः पुनर्मानसाध्यक्षगोचरं ज्ञानमृ(मि)च्छति ।
मनसश्शक्तिमप्यत्र कल्पयेदिति गौरवम् ॥

विज्ञानस्यानपेक्षत्वं व्यवहारेष्व(षु) पश्यताम् ।
न कश्चित्कल्पनीयोऽर्थो येन प्राप्नोति गौरवम् ॥

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1. विवेकाग्रहः—भेदाग्रहः, तेन हि विपरीतग्रहः.

अगत्या हीन्द्रियाणां प्राप्तिसामान्येऽपि केषुचिच्छक्तिः केषुचिन्नेत्यनन्यथासिद्ध-कार्यदर्शनबलात्कल्प्यते। इह तु व्यवहारस्य स्वेनैव सिद्धत्वात्प्रकाशाख्यकार्यान्तरस्या-नुपलम्भात्केन हेतुना गुर्वीमिमां कल्पनामाद्रियेमहि। ज्ञानाभावो हि ज्ञानान्तराद्यात्मा केवलात्मस्वरूपो वा स्वप्रकाश एवेति न तदर्थमपि मनसश्शक्तिकल्पनागौरवम्।

यच्चोक्तं ज्ञानस्य स्वप्रकाशत्वे विषयज्ञानयोरेक एव प्रकाश इति भेदाभावप्रसङ्ग इति। तदतिस्थवीयः; निराकारं ज्ञानं, साकारोऽर्थ इत्येव स्फुरणात्। एतदुक्तं भवति—ज्ञानोत्पत्तौ ज्ञानार्थयोः परस्परविलक्षणव्यवहारयोग्यर्थं(र्थः) सम्पद्यत इति। यदि चैकज्ञानाधीनप्रकाशत्वमात्रेणाभेदस्स्यात्, गुणगुणिनोर्घटपटादीनां वा न भेदस्सिद्ध्येत्; घटपटौ भिन्नौ शतं घटा इत्याद्येकप्रतीतिदर्शनात्। न चासङ्कीर्णव्यवहारयोग्यता-मन्तरेण स्फुरणभेदोऽपि प्राकट्यनिर्मुक्तं(क्तः) कैश्चिदिष्यते। तच्चानुपपन्नमित्युक्तमेव। तस्मादाकारभेदस्फुरणादेव तत्तदर्थभेदसिद्धिः, न ज्ञानव्यक्तिभेदात्।

सहोपलम्भनियमादभेद इति चेन्न; विरुद्धत्वात्। साहित्यस्यैव भेदमन्तरेणानु-पलब्धेः। पृथगनुपलम्भमात्रेणाभेदस्तु सोपाधिकत्वान्न सिध्यतीति भेदाभेदनिरासे विस्तरेण द्रष्टव्यम्। एतेन विषयावच्छिन्नज्ञानप्रकाशाविशेषाद्व्यवसायानुव्यवसाययोर-विलक्षणत्वप्रसङ्गः प्रत्युक्तः। विषयविषयिणोर्भेदेनैव प्रधानाद्विषयात्मन एव ज्ञाना-धिक्यन्यूनत्वाभ्याञ्च भेदसिद्धेः। न च धारावाहिना(हने) बुद्धिभेदः; [1]तद्वदव-भासत्वे तेषां मिथो विषयविषयिभावाभावात्। न च स्वानुभूतिसिद्धबुद्धिसंतानगोचर-चरमस्मरणविषयतया भेदसिद्धिः; [2]दीपसन्तानगोचरानुभवमालाजनितान्तिमस्मरणवत्त-स्यापि विवेकविषयसामर्थ्यायोगात्। न ह्यनुभूतादर्थात् मात्रयाप्यधिकं स्मृतिर्विषयीकरोति। अनुभवाश्चोभयत्रापि प्रत्येकवस्तुगोचराः, न तु मिथो भेदगोचरा इति कुतो भेदप्रतीतिः?

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1. तद्वदिति—उत्तरस्य पूर्वतुल्यावभासत्वे सतीत्यर्थः।

2. दीपेति—स्मरणं दीपसन्तानविषयकम्। एवं स्मरणेन विविक्ततया अग्रहणादेव हि प्रकारान्तरेण ज्वालाभेदानुमानमिति भावः।

यतस्स्वरूपभेदे सिद्धेऽपि वैधर्म्याग्रहणे सति स्फुटमस्मादिदं भिन्नमिति बुद्धिर्न लभ्यते। एतेन विशिष्टापरोक्षादर्वागेव विशेषणादिगोचरा विशिष्टप्रत्यक्षप्रतिपत्तिर्युक्ता (त्तिः प्रत्यु-क्ता); विषयस्य ज्ञानस्य च भासमानत्वेऽपि कदा किं भासत इति क्षणभेदानां दुरवधरत्वात्। न हि तत्रापि ज्ञानस्याप्रकाशमानस्य सत्ता तावताभ्युपगन्तव्येति कृतं प्रपञ्चेन।

नन्वेवमस्तु ज्ञानस्य स्वतस्सिद्धिः। आत्मा तु मानसेनैव ग्राह्यः। न ह्युक्त-रीत्या तस्य स्वयंप्रकाशत्वसिद्धिः। आत्मान्तरानपेक्षत्वस्यैव तया सिद्धेः। आत्म-नश्च ज्ञानत्वात्सजातीयानपेक्षत्वसिद्धौ तत्सिद्धिरिति चेन्न; ज्ञानत्वस्यैवासिद्धेः। न ह्यात्मनः [1]कर्मविशेषप्रकाशात्मकत्वम्। न च तदन्तरेण ज्ञानत्वसिद्धिः। स्वप्रकाश-त्वाज्ज्ञानत्वमिति चेन्न; अन्योन्याश्रयत्वात्। श्रुत्या ज्ञानत्वस्वयंप्रकाशत्वयोस्सिद्धिरि-त्यपि नाश्वसनीयम्; योग्यत्वापेक्षत्वात्तस्याः। अयोग्यत्वे हि 'आदित्योः' यूप इत्या-दिवदर्थान्तरपरतया निर्वाहात्। ग्राह्यग्राहकज्ञानद्रव्याद्याकारवत्तया स्वप्रकाशवादः। ज्ञान-गुणकत्वाज्ज्ञानत्वमिति हि केचित्प्रतिपद्यन्ते। 'मनसा तु विशुद्धेन' 'हृदा मनीषा मनसाभि-क्लृप्त' इत्यादिना मानसप्रत्यक्षत्वदर्शनाच्च।

अत्रोच्यते—

यद्धर्मस्यापृथक्सिद्धिः (यस्य धर्मोऽपृथक्सिद्धः) प्रकाशः प्रतिलभ्यते।
तस्य तन्निरपेक्षस्य प्रकाशस्स्यात्प्रदीपवत्॥

यस्य हि साक्षात्परम्परया वा व्यवहारानुगुण्यापादनलक्षणः प्रकाशोऽपृथक्सिद्ध-विशेषणं भवति, तस्य धर्मिणस्तत्प्रकाशनिरपेक्षसिद्धित्वं दृष्टम्; यथा दीपादौ। अतो धर्मभूतज्ञाननिरपेक्षसिद्धित्वादात्मनस्स्वयंप्रकाशत्वम्। [2]एतदेव च ज्ञानत्वम्।

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1. कर्मेति; विषयेत्यर्थः।
2. एतदेवेति—प्रकाशत्वमेवेत्यर्थः।

नैतावता अहं जानामीति ज्ञानान्तरगोचरता सर्वथा निवर्तनीया ; उपहितस्य संस्कारोपनीतस्य च रूपस्य तत्तत्प्रमाणगोचरत्वोपपत्तेः । 'मनसा तु विशुद्धेन' इत्यादीनि तु प्रमाणान्तरागोचरत्वमनोमात्रग्राह्यत्वप्रतिपादकानि परमात्मपराणि । यद्यपि जीवात्मापि योगशास्त्रेषु ध्येयतयोपदिश्यते, तथापि न तावता मानसप्रत्यक्षवेदनीयो भवति ; प्रमाणान्तरप्रतिपन्नरूपगोचरस्मृतिसन्तानरूपत्वाद्ध्यानस्य । तस्य चादृष्टप्रकर्षवशादपरोक्षतापन्नस्यापि न मनोमात्रनिबन्धनमानसप्रत्यक्षत्वमवकल्पते । तस्य च परिपाकदशायां सविभूतिकभगवद्गोचरतया विश्वमपि मानसप्रत्यक्षमापद्येत । इदञ्च प्रत्यगात्मनस्स्वप्रकाशत्वं सर्वविषयप्रकाशनिवृत्ताद(व)पि सुषुप्तौ भासमानत्वात्स्पष्टम् । सुप्तोत्थितो हि 'सुखमहमस्वाप्सम्' इति परामृशति । तेन परामर्शेन सुषुप्तिसमये सुखरूपस्याहमर्थस्यानुभवोऽस्तीति विज्ञायते । ननु नेदं प्रत्यभिज्ञानं स्मरणं वा, किन्तु प्रबुद्धस्य तदानीन्तनमनुमानम् । अन्यथा स्वापस्यापि तदानीमनुभवप्रसङ्गादिति चेत्, यद्येवं कथं सुखस्य सतस्तदानीमननुभवः । न हि सुखमननुभूयमानमस्ति भवतामपि । स्वापे तु ज्ञानाभावात्मनि तदानीमनुभवाभावेऽपि पश्चादनुमानमेवाश्रीयताम् । तर्हि तद्विशेषणत्वं तु सुखस्य कथमुपपद्यतामिति चेन्न ; अविरोधात् । न ह्यनुमीयमान .... [स्य] स्मर्यमाणविशिष्टत्वे कश्चिद्विरोधः ; यथा गन्धाद्याश्रयस्य । अथवा स्वापोऽपि केवलात्मावस्थानलक्षणस्स्वप्रकाश एवानुभूतः पश्चाद्विकल्प्यताम् । अभावो हि वस्तुस्वरूपात्मना पूर्वमनुभूतः । पश्चात्प्रतियोगिज्ञानानुसारेण भावि(अभाव)तया विकल्प्यत इति किन्नोपपद्यते । येषामभावस्तत्त्वान्तरं तेऽपि प्रतियोगिना विशेषण(भूतेन विना) स्वरूपेण पूर्वमनुभूतस्याभावस्य पश्चात्प्रतियोगिना ज्ञातेन विकल्पनं यदा वर्णयन्ति, तदा कल्याणमेवास्माकमिति । अत एव नेदमपि शङ्कनीयम्—यथा इदानीं सुखं भवति तथा तदानीमस्वाप्समिति प्रत्येतीति ; क्रियाविशेषणत्वे बाधकाभावात् । प्रत्युत 'इयन्तं कालं सुखमहमस्वाप्सम् इदानीं प्रबुद्धो नितरां दुःख्यामि' इति प्रतीतेः । न च स्वापफलसुखालाभवचनमिति युक्तम् ; स्वापनैष्फल्ये तन्निन्दाप्रसङ्गात् । प्रशंसाभिप्रायत्वाद्वाक्यस्य । न च प्रतिषेधगोचरसुखानुवाद इति प्रतिपत्तिरस्ति, भाविसुखानुकीर्तनमिति वा । अतस्सुखत्वप्रत्यक्त्वविशिष्ट आत्मा स्वप्रकाश एवास्थेय इति । एवं हि श्रुत्यनुसारोऽपि भव्यो भवति ।

अत एव विषयवेदनेषु त्रिपुटावभासोऽपि निरस्तः। विषयवृत्तिव्यतिरेकेऽपि सुषुप्त्याद्य-वस्थासु स्वप्रकाशत्वस्यात्मनि सिद्धौ तदधीनत्वकल्पनानुपपत्तेः। आत्मनस्स्वप्रकाशतया विषयवृत्तिवेळास्वपि प्रकाश(शा)व्यतिरेक एव तद्भ्रान्तेरपि निदानमिति।

इति श्रीरामानुजमतधुरन्धरस्यात्रिगोत्रप्रदीपश्रीपद्म-
नाभार्यनन्दनस्य वादिहंसाम्बुवाहस्य श्रीम-
द्रामानुजार्यस्य कृतौ न्यायकुलिशे स्वयं-
प्रकाशवादश्चतुर्थः।

ईश्वरानुमानभङ्गवादः पञ्चमः ।

ईश्वरस्यानुमानेन सिद्धिमिच्छन्ति केचन ।
शास्त्रप्रामाण्यसिद्ध्यर्थं तेषामत्र निराक्रिया ॥

ननु आनुमानिकेश्वरपक्षेऽपि शास्त्रस्य स्वतः प्रामाण्यमनपोदितमेव धर्मादिषु प्रसिद्ध्येत् । तथा ईश्वरेऽपि शास्त्रस्यानुवादत्वमपि तत्रांशे नाशङ्कनीयमेव, यत्रानुमानाप्रवृत्तिः । न हि नित्यसूरिपरिषदि तन्निर्देशविशेष (तस्मिन् देशविशेषे) निमित्तोपादानैक्ये वा अनुमानं प्रवर्तितुं शक्नोति । एवमादिसहस्रप्रकारविशिष्टश्चेश्वरश्शास्त्रेण प्रतिपाद्यते । अनुवादांशेऽपि नायाथार्थ्यम् । तथाविधं वाक्यं कर्तव्यपरमपि बहुलमुपलभ्यते ; किमनेन निर्बन्धेन ? अत्रैके वदन्ति—अनुमानासामर्थ्य(र्थ्यात्) तन्निरास इति । तन्न ; अतिप्रसङ्गात् । उच्यते—

एकदेशेऽनुवादत्वं बाधश्चांशान्तरे गिराम् ।
इत्येवं प्रत्यवस्थाने वक्तव्यं किञ्चिदुत्तरम् ॥

एवं हि केचिदाचक्षीरन्—सर्वथा तावदीश्वरे शब्दप्रामाण्यं न प्रतिष्ठां लभते । "ईश्वरस्वरूपमात्रे तावत्कार्यत्वानुमानमेव समर्थम् । तस्य परिजनस्थानादीनि धर्मिग्राहकमानबाधितानि ; अनाधेयातिशयत्वात् अतिशयाधायकपरिजनाद्यन्वयायोगात् । आधेयातिशयत्वे ईश्वरत्वायोगः । जगदुपादानत्वस्य च मूर्तत्वाचेतनत्वानेकत्वप्रेर्यत्वादिव्याप्तस्य विभौ चेतने एकस्मिन्नित्यस्वतन्त्रेऽनुपपत्तिः । सशरीरस्य च संसारित्वप्रसङ्गादनित्यत्वम् । अशरीरस्य च तद्द्वारेणाप्युपादानत्वानवकाशः" इत्याद्यनुमानजालेन बाधितास्सर्व एव वेदान्ताः कथमीश्वरे प्रमाणं भवेयुः ? न चैषामागमबाधो वाच्यः ; आगमस्यैवानुमानोपजीवने(विनो) बाध्यत्वात् । ननु व्युत्पत्तिकालेऽनुमानसापेक्षस्यापि वाक्यार्थप्रतिपादनकालेऽनपेक्षस्य शास्त्रस्यैव बलीयस्त्वम् । अत एव ज्योतिष्टोमादेरस्वर्ग

साधनत्वाद्यनुमानमागमेनैव बाध्यत इति चेन्न ; स्वर्गतत्साधनयोरेव शास्त्राधीनसिद्धित्वात् तदुपजीविनोऽनुमानस्य शास्त्रेण बाधात् । इह पुनरीश्वरे यद्यनुमानं निरङ्कुशप्रसरं भवेत् , तदेव कार्यदर्शनमात्रप्रभवमविलम्बितप्रवृत्तिकमिति तेनैव जघन्यस्य शास्त्रस्य बाध्यता व्यवतिष्ठेत । [1] 'यतो वा इमानि' इत्यादिवाक्यस्य चानुवादिता दृश्यते । अतः प्रमाणान्तरप्रसिद्धिपूर्वकत्वमेव युक्तमाश्रयितुम् , यदि लभ्यते । [2] नित्यानां हि भिन्नप्रकरणाम्नातानाञ्च वाक्यानां परस्परापेक्षानिबन्धनस्वारसिकपौर्वापर्यायोगात् । न च स्वगोचरेऽपि शब्दस्यात्यन्ताय नैराकाङ्क्ष्यं वक्तुं शक्यम् ; योगा(योग्यता)पेक्षत्वात् । तस्यां चानुमानाधीनत्वादित्यादयो हि कस्यचित् समुल्लापास्सम्भवन्ति ।

न च वाच्यमानुमानिकेश्वरपक्षे तद्वचसामागमानामनुमानाधीनमेव प्रामाण्यं स्यादिति स्वतः प्रामाण्यभङ्गप्रसङ्गः इति ; आनुमानिकेऽपि तस्मिन् वेदनित्यताया अविरोधात् ; जगदादिपक्षेऽपि तदविरोधस्य ' समाननामरूपत्वात् ' इत्यादिसूत्रेणैव[3] प्रतिपादितत्वात् । न चानुमानसिद्धत्वे कश्चिद्विशेषोऽस्ति । अतः पूर्वोक्त एव प्रसङ्गः ।

तत्र च प्रतिवचने कर्तव्ये द्वयी गतिः—सर्वनिषेधेन विरोधिनिषेधेन वेति । तत्र सर्वाप्रामाण्ये विरोधिनिषेधो न युक्तः; विशेषनिषेधस्य विशेषानुज्ञानविषयत्वात् , उद्भटदूषणोपेक्षायोगाच्च । यत्र सामान्यतोऽनुमानमप्रमाणं तत्र तदेव वक्तव्यम् । न हि सन्निहितमतिक्रमितुं कारणमस्ति । न हि तदा विशेषदोषावकाशः । स च विवक्षितोऽपि[4] किञ्चिद्दुःखेन व्युत्पाद्येत । सामान्यदोषेणैव तन्निरासे किं विशेषदोषव्युत्पादनत्वेनांशेन ? (नार्थेनांशेन) (न क्लेशेन) । एतदुक्तं भवति–अप्रतिषिद्धमनुमानं न प्रमाणान्तरवदुदास्ते, अपि तु प्रतिकूलमाचरेत् । अतस्तन्निरासस्सामान्यद्वारक इति । न केवलमसामर्थ्यमेव निरासं प्रयुङ्क्ते, अपि तु विरुद्धस्यासामर्थ्यमिति । एतेनाभिप्रायेणानुमाननिषेधपरतया

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1. एतावता 'एवं हि केचिदाचक्षीरन् ' इति प्रक्रान्तं केषाञ्चिदाख्यानप्रकारमुपवर्ण्य तत्रोपष्टम्भकमप्याह—यत इति ।

2. ननु श्रुत्यन्तरप्रसिद्धिपूर्वकत्वमेवास्तु, न प्रमाणान्तरप्रसिद्धिपूर्वकत्वमित्यत्राह—नित्यानामिति.

3. ब्र. सू. 1. 3. 29.

4. विपक्षिणोऽपीति. पा.

भाष्यकारमिश्रैस्सूत्रं व्याख्यातमिति । न चानुवादत्वेऽपि प्रामाण्यसिद्धिः । इति प्रयोजनवदेवे(देवमी)श्वरानुमानदूषणम् ।

अत्राहुः—क्षित्यादिकं सकर्तृकं कार्यत्वादिति । नात्रासिद्धो हेतुः, प्रत्यक्षेण सावयवत्वादिना वा यथायथं कार्यत्वसिद्धेः । न च व्याप्यत्वासिद्धिः; निरूपाधिकसम्बन्धवत्वात् । शरीरजन्यत्वमुपाधिरिति चेन्न ; व्यर्थविशेषणत्वात् । न च पक्षव्यवच्छेदो विशेषणफलमिति युक्तम्; सर्वत्र हेतूनां सोपाधिकत्वप्रसङ्गात् । [1]यद्यपि साध्याव्यापकेषु केषुचित्साधनेषु पक्षव्यवच्छेदकविशेषणविशिष्टस्य साध्यं प्रति अव्यापकतया केवलसाधनं[2] प्रति सो(नो)पाधित्वम् ; तथापि साध्यव्यापकहेतुप्रयोगे पक्षव्यवच्छेदकं विशेषणमुद्भाव्य तद्विशिष्टस्य तस्यैव केवलं प्रत्युपाधित्वेनोद्भावनं प्रसज्येत । अतः साध्यव्यापकः कृतकत्वादिरहेतुरेव स्यात् । न च शक्यक्रियत्वमुपाधिः; शक्तेः कार्यकल्प्यत्वेन त्वयैवं वक्तुमशक्यत्वात् । न च कृतजातीयत्वलक्षणं शक्यक्रियत्वमुपाधिः ; [3]सत्तयातिव्यापकत्वात् । अन्यस्य च क्रियमाणसमस्तव्यक्तिगोचरैकोपाधेर्जातेर्वानुपलम्भात् दृष्टक्रियावान्तरजातीयत्वस्यासर्वज्ञैराकलयितुमशक्यत्वात् । अस्मदादयो हि कतिपयादर्शिनः कथमिदमेव क्रियते नेतरदिति विवेक्तुमुत्सहामहे । यच्च शरीरिणा क्रियते, तत्रापि हि न कर्तुः प्रत्यक्षोपलम्भः, अनुमाने तु समानोऽयं दोष इति सोऽपि न सिद्ध्येत् ।

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1. हेतुमति पक्षेऽपि प्रकारान्तरेण साध्यनिश्चये सति हेतौ साध्यव्याप्यत्वनिश्चये साध्याधिकदेशवृत्तित्वग्रहणासम्भवात्साध्याव्यापकत्वम् । तत्र पक्षेऽपि साध्यसत्त्वात्पक्षव्यवच्छेदकविशेषणविशिष्ट उपाधिस्साध्याव्यापक एव भवतीति नोपाधिः । यत्र तु पक्षे न साध्यनिश्चयः, तत्र हेतोस्तत्र ज्ञानेन साध्यव्यापको हेतुरिति तत्र पक्षव्यवच्छेदकविशेषणविशिष्टस्य साध्यव्यापकत्वं साधनाव्यापकत्वञ्च भवतीति तत्र तादृशस्योद्भावनं स्यादिति विशिष्टार्थ इति भाति ।

2. साधनस्यापि पक्षव्यवच्छेदकविशेषणविशिष्टत्वे स्वरूपासिद्धिरेव स्यात्, साधनाव्यापकत्वासम्भवेन उपाधित्वाप्रसक्तिश्चेति सूचयितुं केवलेति ।

3. कृतघटादिगतसत्ताजातिमत्त्वस्य पक्षेऽपि सत्त्वात्साधनव्यापकत्वादित्यर्थः ।

न च जीवानामेवादृष्टद्वारेण कर्तृत्वोपपत्तेस्सिद्धसाध्यता, उपदानादि साक्षाद्विश्वतो य...[स्य तस्यै] व कर्तृत्वात् ; जीवानां तथात्वाभावस्य प्रत्यक्षादिसिद्धत्वात् ।

न चासौ विरुद्धो हेतुः; विपक्षवृत्त्यभावात् । विशेषविरुद्धइति चेत्, कथम् ? कार्यत्वस्य शरीर(रि)कर्तृकत्वव्याप्तेरिति चेत्, तत्किमस्त्यङ्कुरेऽपि शरीर(री) कर्ता ? नन्वसौ योग्यानुपलब्धिबाधित इति किं न जानासि ? अतोऽयमव्यापको(क)धर्मोत्कर्षः उत्कर्षसमा जातिरेव ।

अथ साध्यकर्तृव्यापकं शरीरमित्युत्कर्षः, सोऽप्युक्तनीत्या निरस्तः ; शरीरस्य प्रत्यक्षबाधात्, कर्तुरनुमानेन सिद्धेः । शरीराव्याप्तस्य कर्तुरनुमानात्सिद्धिः, सिद्धस्य चाव्याप्तत्वमित्यन्योन्याश्रयतेति चेन्न ; कर्तुश्शरीरसम्बन्धस्य कर्मनिबन्धनत्वेनैवाव्याप्तिसिद्धेः ।

ननु कर्मापि व्यापकं स्वकार्येण ज्ञानेन शरीरेण च सहेति कथमुपाधिः ? अपि च कर्ता नाम ज्ञानचिकीर्षाप्रयत्नाधारः, ज्ञानादेश्च शरीरेन्द्रियादीनि कारणानीति कथं तेषामव्यापकत्वमिति चेत् ; इत्थम् । कार्यस्यैव ज्ञानादेः कारणापेक्षेति तस्यैव तद्व्याप्तिरिति । ज्ञानमकार्यं नाम न दृश्यत इति चेत्, तत एवानुमीयते । संशये चानुमानं; अत्र तु विपर्यय इति चेत्, स कथम् ? न तावद्विवक्षितज्ञानविशेषसिद्धौ तस्यानित्यत्वानुमानात् । धर्मिग्राहकं हि मानं बाधकम् । न चासिद्धावपि; आश्रयासिद्धेरेव । क्रोडीकृतानित्य(त्व)मेव[1] सिद्धिमर्हतीति चेन्न ; ज्ञानत्वस्य विषयप्रावण्यविशेषनिरूप्यस्य नित्यत्वानित्यत्वानपेक्षणात् । अतः सकर्तृकत्वानुमाने सति शरीरादेरनुपलम्भान्निवृत्तौ सत्यां तदनुपजीवि नित्यमेव ज्ञानं कर्तृभू(ग)तं सिद्ध्यति । विरोधश्च विरोधिनोरुभयोस्सिद्धयोर्वक्तव्यः । अन्यतरस्यासिद्धौ कस्य केन विरोधः ? सिद्धे च नैकस्य वा (व्या)वृत्तये प्रभवतीति किं विशेषविरोधः करिष्यति ? ।

विशेषविरोधः यदि हेतुव्यापकस्योत्कर्षः, किमायातं प्रकृतसाध्यस्य ? व्यापकान्तरे साध्यमानेऽपि प्रकृतस्य सिद्ध्यविरोधात् । व्यापकान्तरमनिच्छन्तं प्रति तत्साधनेऽपि

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1. ज्ञानमिति शेषः.

प्रकृतस्य तादवस्थ्यमेव । अव्यापकसाधने तूत्कर्षसमेत्युक्तम् । अथ साध्यव्यापकोत्कर्षः ; तथाप्यनुमितानुमान इव प्रथमसाध्यस्य स्थैर्यमेव । व्यापकधर्मोत्कर्षः तत्राप्युत्कर्षसम एव । अथ साध्यव्यापकस्य पक्षे व्यावृत्तिदर्शनेऽव्यापादनं विशेषविरोध इति मतम्, तत्राप्युक्तरीत्या आपादनांशस्याकिञ्चित्करत्वात् । व्यापकव्यावृत्ति[1]लक्षणप्रत्यनुमान(ने) बाधो विरोधो वा दूषणं तर्कबाधो वेति को विशेषविरोधावकाशः ।

अस्तु तर्हि ईश्वरः न कर्ता अशरीरत्वात्, अतीन्द्रियत्वादित्यादिप्रतिप्रयोग इति चेन्न ; आश्रयासिद्धत्वात् । सिद्धौ वा कालात्ययापदेशात् । तर्हि क्षित्यादिकमकर्तृकं शरीराजन्यत्वादित्यादिप्रयोगोऽस्तु ; सोऽपि न युक्तः। विशेषणवैयर्थ्य...[स्य पूर्व]मेवोक्तत्वात् । अनित्यस्य सर्वस्य पक्षसपक्षकोटयन्तर्भावात् । नित्येषु चानित्यत्वव्याप्यस्य कार्यत्व...[स्यासत्त्वा]दनैकान्तिकत्वमपि नाशङ्कनीयमेव । एवं सर्वहेत्वाभासोद्धारसिद्धौ वा (चा)नुमानिक एवेश्वरस्सिद्ध्यति ।

तथापि कथमीश्वरसिद्धिः ? विप्रतिपन्नकतिपयकार्यकर्तृमात्रसिद्धेरिति चेन्न ; परमाण्वदृष्टादिगोचरसाक्षात्कारवति द्व्यणुकादिकर्तरि सिद्धे तावत्सार्वज्ञ्यसिद्धिः ; परमाण्वादिगोचर(स्य) कारणाभावादकारणाधीनस्य स्वाभाविकस्य विषयविषयिभावस्य सर्वगोचरत्वात् । सङ्कोचे कारणाभावात् । ज्ञानसमानगोचरयोरिच्छाप्रयत्नयोरपि तत एव सर्वगोचरत्वात्सर्वज्ञस्सर्वाधिष्ठानसमर्थस्सर्वकर्ता सिद्ध्यति । स एव चेश्वररूपो ख्यायत इति ।

अत्रोच्यते—

> चेतनस्यास्ति हेतुत्वं सर्वकार्येषु(ष्व)संशयम् ।
> तच्चावश्यं क्रियाहेतुगुणद्वारेण वर्ण्यते ॥

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1. निवृत्तीति पाठान्तरम्.

स च यत्नः क्वचिद् दृष्टः क्वचिद्धर्मादिलक्षणः ।
तौ चेन्मिथश्च साकाङ्क्षौ भवेतामव्यवस्थितिः ॥

अत्रैवं प्रत्युत्तरारम्भः---कर्तृशब्देन किमात्ममात्रं विवक्षितम् , उत यत्नवानात्मा, किं वा ज्ञानादिपरिकरसहितयत्नवानसावेवेति । तत्र न प्रथमः कल्पः ; यत्नादिव्यापारनिरपेक्षकेवलात्मनः (कर्तृ)पदवाच्यकर्तृत्वायोगात् । कारणत्वमात्रमेव तस्य वक्तुं युक्तम् । किं पुनः कर्तृत्वम् ? सर्वस्यापि कारणस्य ह्यन्ततस्स्वव्यापारः कश्चिदस्ति । सत् (तु) कार्यसम्बन्धतदुपकारकत्वादिलक्षणः । स हि कार्यं कुर्वतोऽवान्तरव्यापारस्तु (र इति चेदस्तु) तत्रायं नियमः । अतः व्यापारनिरपेक्षात्मकारणत्वे साध्ये प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः, हेतोः कालात्ययापदेशः, दृष्टान्तस्य साध्यविकलता, पक्षश्चाप्रसिद्धविशेषणः विवक्षितेश्वरासिद्धिश्च । अतो यत्नपूर्वकमिति साध्यमित्यास्थेयम् ।

तत्रापि विकल्पनीयम्---किं यत्नस्य क्रियाहेतुगुणत्वेनावान्तरव्यापारता, उत स्वरूपमात्रेणेति ? न तावच्चेष्टादिकार्येषु [1]स्वरूपमात्रेण यत्नस्यावान्तरव्यापारता निर्वहति; यत्ने सत्यपि क्रियोपजननाभावे कार्याभावदर्शनेन तस्य दृष्टान्ते तथात्वप्रसिद्धिवैकल्यात् । यदपि यत्किञ्चित्कार्यं तदानीमुपजायते, तदपि न तत्प्रयत्नसाध्यमिति कस्यचिदिष्टम् । न च ज्ञानेच्छागोचरस्य जायमानस्य यत्नेन साध्यत्वमिति वाच्यम्; फलस्यापि ज्ञानेच्छागोचरस्य तदुपायगोचरयत्ननिष्पाद्यत्वप्रसङ्गात् । उपायज्ञानेच्छाव्यवधानान्न साक्षात्तद्गोचरत्वमिति चेन्न ; अन्योन्याश्रयणात् , व्यवधानादतज्जन्यत्वं, अतज्जन्यत्वाद्व्यवधानमिति । अनुवर्तते ह्युपायगोचरो यत्नः फलदशायामपि क्वचिद्दण्डादिना चक्रभ्रमणादौ । अतः पूर्ववद्बाधो विरोधोऽप्रसिद्धविशेषणत्वञ्चेति दोषाः ।

यद्यपि चैतादृशं साध्यं पक्षे सिद्ध्यति ; तथापि नास्मदादिविलक्षणः, सर्वस्यापि तस्य कार्यस्य यत्किञ्चिद्यत्नपूर्वकत्वमात्रे लैङ्गिकबुद्धिपर्यवसानात् । तदा च किञ्चित्कुर्वा-

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1. चेष्टादिद्वारा साध्येष्वित्यर्थः.

णस्सर्वं तत्कालीनं करोतीत्यपि स्यात् । न विशेषहेतुरस्ति, येन एकमेकः कुरुते, नेतरदिति विवेकस्स्यात् ; यत्नाधिष्ठेयक्रियापेक्षाविरहात् । यत्नवदविच्छेदस्तु कार्यप्रमाणाविच्छेदे सिद्धयेत् । किमेतावता ; ईश्वरासिद्धेस्तादवस्थ्यात् ।

अथ यत्नवतः पुरुषस्य यत्नाधिष्ठेयवस्तुक्रियाद्वारेण कर्तृत्वमिति मतम्, तदेव हि युक्तमाश्रयितुम् । अवयवकर्मद्वारेणैव तत्संयोगावयवितद्गुणादीनां निष्पत्तेस्सम्भवात् । सर्वोद्देशेनापि च तदधिष्ठानोपपत्तिरिति सर्वस्यापि सकर्तृकत्वमपि स्यात् इति ।

अत्रापि वदामः—एवमपि सर्वस्य यत्नपूर्वकत्वादग्न्याद्यूर्ध्वगमनादेरदृष्टकारणकत्वकल्पनमन्याय्यं प्रसज्येत । एवं हि कल्पयन्ति, [1]"अग्नेरूर्ध्वज्वलनं वायोस्तिर्यग्गमनमणुमनसोश्चाद्यं कर्मेत्यदृष्टकारितानि" इति । न हि तत्रादृष्टमन्तरेण क्रियाया अनिष्पत्तिः, यत्नमात्रेण सर्वोत्पत्तेरुपपत्तेः । न च तत्रादृष्टस्य कारणान्तरघटकतामात्रं विवक्षितम् । सर्वकार्यसाधारणस्य तत्र विशेषतोऽवाच्यत्वात् । क्रियाहेतुगुणत्वमभिप्रेत्यैवादृष्टस्योपदेशः। अथादृष्टाधिष्ठाने यत्नस्योपयोगः, तन्न ; तस्य निष्क्रियत्वात् । न च साक्षादग्न्यादेरधिष्ठाने सम्भवति, अदृष्टद्वाराश्रयणं युक्तिमत् । न च प्रागेवादृष्टे कल्पिते पश्चादीश्वरानुमानमिति वाच्यम् ; पश्चादपि बाधेन भ्रान्तित्वनिर्वाहात् । तथापि चेददृष्टं कल्प्यते, सर्वत्रैव किं न कल्प्यते ।

अथ अदृष्टस्य भोगार्थमेव कल्पनम् ; न हि जगद्वैचित्र्यं एकरूपेश्वरयत्नमात्रेण सिद्धयति ; तथात्वे तस्य वैषम्यनैर्घृण्यादिप्रसङ्गाश्च (च) । न च विश्ववृत्ति[2]निष्फला भवितुमर्हति । तयोरुभयोः कार्यकारणभावश्चान्तरालिकप्रत्यात्मसमवेतभोगव्यवस्थापकातीन्द्रियगुणविशेषमन्तरेण न घटत इत्येवादृष्टं कल्प्यते, न क्रियामात्रहेतुतया इति चेत् ; अस्तु चैवम् । तथाप्यग्न्यादिकर्मण्युक्तो दोषस्तदवस्थ एव । अपि च विधिनिषेधशास्त्रगोचरक्रियानिष्पत्तिसमनन्तरं तद्गोचरेश्वरज्ञानानुवृत्तौ विपाकाभिधानफलसिसृक्षा

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1. वैशेषिकदर्शने 5-2-13
2. प्रवृत्तिरित्यर्थः "विफला विश्ववृत्तिर्नो" इति कुसुमाञ्जलिप्रथमस्तबके P. 34

सञ्जायेत। तदवच्छिन्नयत्ननिष्पाद्यं तत्फलमित्येव कल्प्यताम्, किमपरेणादृष्टेन?। न च नित्यत्वादिच्छाप्रयत्नयोर्नित्येन फलेन भवितव्यम्; कार्यान्तरवदुपपत्तेः। न च सर्वत्रादृष्टविशेषसदसद्भावकारित एव विपाकसिसृक्षादिभेद इति वाच्यम्; कालावच्छेदकपरमाणुक्रियासन्तानमात्रेण सर्वोपाधिविभागोपपत्तेः। यस्य च प्रेषणात्मको विधिः, तस्य विशेषत एवमेव कल्पनं युक्तम्। शब्दव्यापारापूर्वादिविधिपक्षे कल्प्येतापि काममदृष्टान्तरम्। अतस्सर्वगोचरज्ञानेच्छायत्नाधिकरणेश्वराभ्युपगममात्रेण सर्वादृष्टकार्योपपत्तेः कृतमदृष्टान्तरकल्पनया। अथवा दृष्टमेवाश्रित्येश्वरः प्रतिक्षिप्यताम्। यथा ह्येकेनैव यत्नेन कारकक्रियानिष्पत्तौ न यत्नान्तरमाश्रयणीयम्, तथैकेनैव जीवात्मगुणेन क्रियानिष्पत्तौ विश्वसर्गोपपत्तेर्न विलक्षणात्मान्तरसमवेतगुणान्तरपरिकल्पनं युक्तमिति। अत्रायं प्रयोगः—विप्रतिपन्नं कार्यं न क्रियाहेतुगुणान्तरानुमापकं, एकेन क्रियाहेतुगुणेन निराकाङ्क्षत्वात्, सम्प्रतिपन्नैककर्तृकवत्। लोके च पवनपरिस्पन्दादेर्न यत्नापेक्षा वास्यादिकर्मणः परम्परया तदपेक्षा स्यन्दनपतनयोः द्रवत्वगुरुत्वापेक्षेति सुप्रसिद्धमेव। इत्थं नैराकाङ्क्ष्येऽपि यदि दर्शनमात्रादपरत्रापि यत्नानुमानं भवेत्, गुरुत्वद्रवत्वाद्यनुमानमपि किन्न स्यादिति। क्रियाजातिभेदात्तदसाधारण्यं यत्नेन समानम्। तत्तत्क्रियासामग्र्याः परापेक्षायां विलम्बश्च स्यात्; तदभावाच्च नैराकाङ्क्ष्यं (इति) सर्वत्र समानम्। अपि च किमिति तर्हि कुलालकर्तृकमेव विश्वं न साध्येत? न चात्र बाधः प्रगल्भते। तत्तत्कालेषु न क्वापि (क्वापि) वर्तमानशरीरेण यतमानेन कुलालेन संयोगस्सर्वकार्यकारणानामप्यस्तीति पूर्वमेवोक्तम्। सर्वश्च(श्च)(त्र) कालाहोरात्रभेदेनोपलभ्यते तत्तद्देशभेदेनेति न सङ्कटं किञ्चित्। तज्ज्ञानागोचरत्वादनिच्छाविषयत्वाच्च तेषां (न) तदधिष्ठानमिति चेन्न; [1]अवान्तरव्यापारप्रकाराव्य··[व्यावृत्ते]रस्यापि विश्वस्याशरीरस्याधिष्ठाने चेष्टापेक्षाप्रसङ्गात्; यत्नमात्रेणापि तदधिष्ठाने शरीराङ्ग-

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1. अयं भावः—कुलालज्ञानागोचरत्वादिना कुलालाधिष्ठानं नास्तीति चेत्, चेष्टारूपद्वाराभावादशरीरेश्वराधिष्ठानमपि न स्यात्। चेष्टानपेक्षणे च कुलालोऽपि शरीरं विना मृदादिकमधितिष्ठेदिति।

(रांश)वैयर्थ्यात् । न च जगदादिरनुमानमात्रात्सिद्ध्यति, ततो विपरीतस्यैव सिद्धेः । अतस्सकर्तृकत्वे साध्ये सिद्धसाध्यता ।

पारम्पर्याददधिष्ठाने न साक्षात्तदपीष्यते ।
चेष्टमानतनुप्रेर्यवासीसन्दंशकादिवत् ॥

किं वा साक्षादधिष्ठाने पारम्पर्यानपेक्षणम् ।
तत्काङ्क्षा विनिहन्त्येव साक्षाद्यत्नार्थ(र्थि)तामपि ॥

तावतैव नैराकाङ्क्ष्यात् । तथाप्यपेक्षायां शरीरादावपि प्रसङ्गात् । तथाचाधिष्ठानमात्रसाधने सिद्धसाध्यता । साक्षादधिष्ठानसाधने व्याप्त्यभाव इति । एतत्सर्वमभिप्रेत्योक्तं मीमांसाचार्यपादैः—"कर्मभिस्सर्वजीवानां तत्सिद्धेस्सिद्धसाध्यता" [1]इति ।

किञ्च सर्वस्य साक्षादधिष्ठेयत्वे सर्वक्रियापि चेष्टा स्यात्; प्रयत्नवदात्मसंयोगासमवायिकारणिकायाः क्रियायाश्चेष्टात्वप्रसिद्धेः । असमवायिकारणत्वस्य च समवायिकारणप्रत्यासत्तिलक्षणीयत्वात् । ततश्चेष्टाश्रयाणामन्त्यावयविनां तावच्छरीरत्वप्रसङ्गः । तथा सति तच्छरीरकजीवकर्तृकमेव विश्वं प्रसज्येत । एवमपि परमाण्वाद्यधिष्ठानमशरीरस्यैवेति चेन्न; तत्रापि पूर्वमारब्धान्त्यावयविकतया शरीरावयवत्वेन चेष्टाश्रयत्वोपपत्तेः । दृश्यते हि जातिभेदेन केषाञ्चिच्छरीरावयवानां विभक्तानामेव चिरतरादिभावेन चेष्टाश्रयत्वम् ।

अथवा कथञ्चिदस्तु विश्वोपादानक्रियाहेतुप्रयत्नवान् कश्चित्; न तस्य सार्वज्ञ्ये प्रमाणं पश्यामः । ज्ञानं विना कथं यत्नस्य विषयव्यवस्था भविष्यतीति चेत्, यथा सुषुप्ताविति ब्रूमः । तथाह्यदृष्टविशेषादुपपद्यते । अतश्चेतनस्यैव यत्नो दृष्ट इति तस्य चैतन्यमात्रकल्पनैव हि लघीयसी । कथञ्चिद्य(ञ्च य)त्नस्य विषयनियमे ज्ञानमुपयुज्यत इति चिन्त्यम् । न तावज्ज्ञानस्य विषयप्रावण्ये सति तत्सामानाधिकरण्यमात्रेण स्वतो निर्विषयस्यापि यत्नस्य विषयव्यपदेश इति वाच्यम्; अतिप्रसङ्गात् । समकालत्वेन नियम इति चेन्न; अस्मासु जन्यजनकभावेन तदसिद्धेः । जन्यजनकभावेन विशेषे नातिप्रसङ्ग इति चेत्, कथ-

1. श्लो. वा. सम्बन्धाक्षेपपरिहारे श्लो. 75.

मयमीश्वरे सङ्गच्छेत ? । अपि च यथा ज्ञानस्य नित्यत्वान्न सामग्रीकृता विषयव्यवस्था, यथा च त्वया नित्ये ज्ञाने कारणगुणाभावेऽपि याथार्थ्यं प्रमात्वं चाश्रित्य "ते हि सर्वज्ञानानां न ज्ञानत्वप्रयुक्ते" इति महता प्रयासेन भवद्भिरेवोपपाद्यते ; एवं नित्यस्य प्रयत्नस्यापि न ज्ञानापेक्षिणी विषयव्यवस्थेति किं न कल्पनीयम् ? । स्वतो विषयप्रावण्ये प्रयत्नोऽपि ज्ञानमेव स्यादिति चेन्न ; कार्यभेदादेव तद्भेदोपपत्तेः । निश्वासप्रयत्नस्यापि तथाभावप्रसङ्गाच्च । अदृष्टाधीनत्वात्तत्रापि न स्वत इति चेन्न ; अदृष्टे ज्ञानत्वप्रसङ्गात् । न च भवत्पक्षे निश्वासहेतुप्रयत्नकल्पने प्रमाणमस्ति, ईश्वरयत्नमात्रेणापि तत्कार्यनिश्वासोपपत्तेः ।

एतदुक्तं भवति—सर्वाण्यवयविद्रव्याणि, यथायथं गुणाः, सर्वाणि कर्माणि चेति बहुप्रकारोऽशेषकार्यवर्गः स्वोचितकारणपरिस्पन्दमपेक्षमाणस्तदर्थं चेतनगुणमपेक्षते, स चादृष्टं यत्नो वा, न ज्ञानादिकमपि ; तावतैव क्रियासिद्धेः तत्रैव कार्यार्थापत्तिपरिक्षयादिति । न हि करणाकरणकालयोः कारणानां किञ्चित्सहकारिसम्बन्धासम्बन्धलक्षणं विशेषमुपलभमानास्तदतिरिक्तमनुपलब्धमपरमपि कारणं कल्पयितुमुत्सहामहे । कल्पने वा बौद्धोक्तसामर्थ्यासामर्थ्ययोरुपालम्भः कथं कर्तव्यः ? तदपि हि स्वभावान्तरमन्यथानुपपत्तिपरिक्षयादेव नाद्रियामहे । तत्रापि—

विचित्रकर्मकर्तृणां विचित्रा भोगसिद्धयः ।
अदृष्टमन्तरङ्गत्वादात्मस्थं गमयन्ति हि ॥

कर्मफलसम्बन्धे च शास्त्रमेव प्रमाणमिति सिद्धम् ॥ यच्चाचेतनानां चेतनाधिष्ठितानामेव करणत्वमिति, तदप्यनेनैव प्रत्युक्तम् ; अधिष्ठानस्यादृष्टेन यत्नेन वेति स्थापनात् । न हि तत्रापि साक्षादधिष्ठानानुमानमित्युक्तम् ।

एतेन ज्ञानादिपरिकरसहितयत्नवान् कर्ता साध्यत इति च प्रत्युक्तम् । ज्ञानादेर्यत्नं प्रत्यनुपकारकत्वात् । साहित्यमात्रेण साधनेऽतिप्रसङ्गस्योक्तत्वात् । अपि च—

यदि यत्नेन साहित्यात् ज्ञानादिरपि साध्यते।
देहादिरपि किं न स्यात् साहित्यस्याविशेषतः ॥

यत्तु कर्तुर्देहसम्बन्धे कर्मोपाधिकत्वमुक्तम्, तदयुक्तम्; साधनव्यापकत्वात्। देहकर्मणोस्समव्याप्तयोः कर्तृव्यापकत्वात्। ईश्वरासिद्धौ कथं व्यापकत्वमिति चेत्, असिद्धौ कथमव्यापकत्वमित्यत्रापि दीयतां दृष्टिः। तथापि शङ्कितोपाधिग्रस्तत्वान्न कर्तृव्यापकं शरीरमदृष्टं वेति चेत्, तत एवाव्यापकत्वनिष्कर्षोऽपि न शक्य इति विशेषविरोधस्य बाधस्योपाधेर्वा शङ्कायां प्रकृतानुमानस्तम्भसिद्धौ प्रतिवादिन एव विजयः।

अजसंयोगः प्रामाणिकोऽपि येन प्रतिक्षिप्यते, कथं तेन नित्यः प्रयत्नः प्रतिपादयितुं शक्येत। अप्राप्तयोः प्राप्तिः संयोग इति तल्लक्षणम्। इतरथा समवायत्वप्रसङ्गात्। अतो वर्जनीयं नित्यत्वमिति चेत्—न; एतेन सङ्केतमात्रेण नित्यविभूनां सम्बन्धस्य निराकर्तुमशक्यत्वात्। तेषाञ्चानाधाराधेयत्वात् संयोगसिद्धौ नाजसंयोगनिराससिद्धिः। न हि निरन्तरदेशानां द्रव्याणां तेनासम्बन्धो युक्तः। अत्रायं प्रयोगः—कालो विभुना संयुक्तः, तन्निरन्तरदेशत्वे सति द्रव्यत्वात् घटवदिति। इदन्तु प्रयत्नसाधकप्रमाणादन्यथासिद्धाद्बलीयः। एवं प्रामाणिकमपि सम्बन्धमनिच्छता कथं(थम) प्रामाणिकः प्रयत्नोऽभ्युपेयते। किञ्च—

यत्नश्च यतमानस्य कर्तुर्व्यापार इष्यते।
व्यापारस्सर्व एव स्यान्न नित्यः कारकाश्रयः ॥

यत्तु विशेषविरोधो नाम दूषणमस्तीति; तदयुक्तम्। साध्यमात्रविपरीतसाधकवद्विशिष्टसाध्यविपरीतसाधकस्यापि विरुद्धत्वात्। यद्यप्यसौ हेतुस्तत्र तद्विपरीतेऽपि न समर्थः, तथापि तस्य साध्यस्य वादिविवक्षितविपरीतरूपव्याप्तत्वात्तत्साधकस्य सर्वस्य विवक्षितविपरीतसाधकत्वेनैव नियमः। उभयत्र (त्रा)साधकस्यापि हेतोर्विवक्षितविपरीते पक्षपातमात्रमस्तीति विरुद्धता वक्तव्या। अशरीरो हि कर्ता न साहित्यमात्रेणापि दृष्टः, सशरीरस्तु सहदृष्ट इति विशेषात्। अतोऽयं विशेषविरोधस्साधयति चेत्, विपरीतमेव साधयेदित्येवो-

द्भाव्यम्। ननु यं तद्धि (नन्वयत्नत्व) (नन्वयं तत्त्व)चिन्तायां साध्या (साध्य) व्यापकाभावात्मेति प्रतिहेतुरुपाधिर्वा दूषणं स्यात्। न विशेषविरोधावकाश इति चेन्न; समव्याप्त्यपेक्षत्वादुपाधेः पक्षवृत्त्यपेक्षत्वात्प्रतिहेतोः। अस्य तु व्याप्तिमात्रनिरूप्यत्वेन शीघ्रभावित्वात्। इतरथा ह्युपाधेरेव दूषणत्वाद्विरुद्धानैकान्तिककालात्ययापदेशप्रकरणसमादेरदूषणत्वप्रसङ्गात्। निरुपाधिकसम्बन्धे सति तेषामभावात्।

यदि च भवदभिमतमेव दूषणं कार्यत्वहेतौ वक्तव्यमिति निर्बन्धः, तर्ह्यस्तूपाधिरेव शरीरजन्यत्वं प्रत्यनुमानं वा। न च व्यतिरेके विशेषवैयर्थ्यम्; कर्तृजन्यत्वे साध्ये शरीरजन्यत्वमुपाधिरित्यत्रैव विशेषस्यैव हेतुत्वात्। जन्यत्वांशस्यानुवादमात्रत्वात्। न हि सकर्तृकमित्यस्यायमर्थः, कर्तृसम्बन्धमात्रवदिति; सिद्धसाध्यताप्रसङ्गात्; किन्तु कर्तृजन्यमिति। अतो जीवकर्तृकत्वशरीरिकर्तृकत्वयोरिव कर्तृपूर्वकत्वशरीरपूर्वकत्वयोर्व्याप्तिरिति न दोषः। न चात्र जन्यवा(त्वा)ननुवादेन तयोः क्षित्यादिधर्मता वर्णयितुं शक्यते। शक्यते चेत्, किं त्वयापि न क्रियते? त्वयापि हि कर्तृजन्यमित्येव प्रतिज्ञायते। न हि तज्जन्यत्वस्यापि साध्यत्वं विवक्षितम्, तस्यैव हेतुत्वेनाङ्गीकारात्। तथाचासिद्धत्वप्रसङ्गात्। यथा च तव हेतुरेव किञ्चिद्विशिष्टो व्यापकोऽभिमतः, एवमस्माभिरपि सकर्तृकत्वं शरीरविशिष्टं तत्र व्यापकमिष्यते। तत्र शरीरबाधात्प्रथमव्याप्तिभङ्गो द्वितीयव्याप्तिभङ्गो वा। न्यायचिन्तायां प्रथमव्याप्तेरेव भङ्गो युक्तः। कार्यस्य कारणमात्रेणापि चरितार्थत्वात्। कर्तुस्तु देहादिपरिकरसापेक्षस्य दृष्टस्य तदभावेऽनुपपत्तेः। नित्यज्ञानादिकं ह्यत्यन्तादृष्टचरं सो(नो)त्प्रेक्षामप्यर्हतीति कस्तत्कल्पनयोत्तरव्याप्तिभङ्गायोत्तिष्ठेत्। तथा च सति चक्रकाश्रयत्वमुत्तरव्याप्तिभङ्गे पूर्वव्याप्तिजीव···[नं तज्जीवने नित्यज्ञानादिसिद्धिः तत्सिद्धौ उत्तरव्याप्तिभङ्गः इति। नचै] वंविधोपाधिवचने सर्वानुमानोच्छेदप्रसङ्गः। पक्षसपक्षत्वव्यवस्थापकधर्मोपजीवनेनोपाध्युद्भावने हि तथा स्यात्। न च शरीरादिना पक्षत्वादिसिद्धिः।

ननु क्षित्यादिकमित्यादिशब्दस्य शरीराजन्यत्वोपाधि(रा)(कार्या)(धार्या)कारो विषयः, न हि तदन्तरेण सङ्ग्राहको दृश्यत इति चेन्न; पक्षदर्शनात्प्रागेवोपाधिस्वरूपस्य तद्व्याप्तेश्च सिद्धेः एवंविधेष्वतिप्रसङ्गाभावात्। पक्षसंस्पर्शमात्रेणानुपाधित्वे चाग्नीषोमी-

यादिहिंसानामधर्मत्वसाधने निषिद्धत्वमुपाधिर्न स्यात् । तत्रापि ह्यनिषिद्धानामेवादि-शब्दार्थत्वम् ।

अपि च (वा) पक्षव्यवच्छेदायैव विशेषणमस्तु; यथा धूमवत्त्वसाधनस्याग्निमत्त्वस्यार्द्रेन्धनसम्बद्धाग्निमत्त्वोपाधिकत्वे, यथा वा ध्वंसानित्यत्वसाधने कृतकत्वस्य भावत्वे सति कृतकत्वोपाधित्वे च । अत्रापि हि व्यर्थविशेषणत्वं प्रत्युक्तम् । ननु तत्र पक्षे बाधकप्रमाणं व्युत्पाद्य साध्यव्यावृत्तिसिद्धौ पश्चाद्विशेषणं सप्रयोजनमिति विशिष्टस्योपाधित्वमुच्यते । अत्र तु तदलाभात् व्यर्थविशेषणत्वमिति चेन्न ; बाधानन्तरमुपाधेर्निष्प्रयोजनत्वात्, बाधेनैव दूषणसिद्धेः । उपाधिरिति स्वतन्त्रदूषणं विवक्षितम् ।

अपि च माभूदुपाधिनिश्चयः । स हि साध्याभावग्राहिप्रमाणोदयानन्तरभावी । तथापि तदुदयात्पूर्वं उपाधिशङ्का दुर्निवारा; सपक्षे निरुपाधिकानुगमदर्शनबलेन तस्यास्सुदृढनिरूढत्वात् । तथा च नातिप्रसङ्ग इत्युक्तम् । यदि च नैवं, तस्यैवोपाधेः किञ्चित्प्रत्यनुपाधित्वमितरं प्रत्युपाधित्वमित्यव्यवस्थितमेव तद्रूपं स्यात् । न च बाधप्रतिरोधयोरिव एवमस्त्विति वाच्यम् ; प्रतिपत्तव्यरूपविशेषाभावे तदनुपपत्तेः । अत्र तु तन्नास्त्येव । पक्षे बाधकप्रमाणेन विशेषेण सत्यु(षणेऽसत्यु)(षणसाफल्ये सत्यु)पाधेर्निर्णयः, बाधकालाभे विशेषणसाफल्यसंशये सत्युपाधिसंशय इत्येव स्थितेः । न चानेनैव प्रकृतहेतुना पक्षे साध्यनिर्णयाद्विशेषणवैफल्यनिर्णय इति वाच्यम् ; दर्शनबलेन परिप्लवमानस्योपाधेर्निरासमन्तरेण साध्यनिर्णयायोगात् ; यत्र तु पक्षप्रतीक्षाना[तिज्ञाता ?]र्थपूर्वं न किञ्चित्सपक्षानुगतं व्यापकान्तरं दृश्यते, तत्र हेतोः पक्षधर्मत्वसिद्धिसमनन्तरमुत्प्रेक्षणीयादुपाधेः प्रागेव प्रकृतहेतुना साध्यसिद्धेरुपाधिशङ्कानवसर इति विवेकः ।

अपि च विशेषस्यैव विशेषं प्रति प्रयोजकत्वं युक्तम् । सामान्यञ्च कार्यत्वम् । अतस्तत्कारणमात्रमेव प्रयोक्तुमुत्सहते । तद्विशेषस्तु कर्ता । नासौ कार्यमात्रेण प्रयोज्यो भवितुमर्हति । इतरथा कार्यत्वाच्छरीरजन्यत्वमित्यादेरपि दुर्निवारत्वप्रसङ्गात् । अवश्यञ्च कार्येऽपि कश्चिद्विशेषोऽनुसरणीयः, येन क्वचिच्छरीरस्य हेतुत्वं नेतरत्रेति व्यवस्था सिद्ध्येत् ।

ननु च शरीरसमवेतगुणादीनामपि शरीरजन्यत्वमस्ति, न तेषां सकर्तृकत्वं दृश्यते ; तदुपादानादिसाक्षात्कारवतस्सम्प्रतिपन्नस्यादृष्टेः। अतः कथं शरीरस्य कर्तुश्च समानजातीयहेतुत्वं मिथस्समव्याप्तिर्वा वक्तुं शक्यत इति चेन्न ; शरीरसमवेतगुणानां शरीराजन्यत्वात्। न हि शरीरं शरीरात्मना तां जनयति, अपि तु द्रव्यात्मना। शरीरत्वञ्च सिद्ध्यति प्रथममन्तरेण भोगाश्रयत्वादिना। तस्य फलं प्रथमं चेष्टा च (दिश्च) साक्षात्प्रयत्नाधिष्ठेयत्वेन। अतश्चेष्टैव साक्षाच्छरीरजन्य(न्या) तत्कार्याणि तामवान्तरव्यापारीकृत्य यथायथं शरीरेण जायन्ते, नेतराणि। तत्रोभयत्रापि सकर्तृकत्वमपि तथाविधमेव।

ननु च चेष्टाया अपि शरीरलक्षणान्तर्भावाद्भोगादिवच्छरीरजन्यत्वासिद्धिरिति चेन्न ; आत्मगुणायत्तत्वमात्रेण शरीरत्वसिद्धेस्तदुत्तीर्णस्य तज्जन्यत्वोपपत्तेः। अतः कर्तृशरीरयोस्समव्याप्त्यादिसिद्धिः। एतेन शरीराधिष्ठाने व्यभिचारः प्रत्युक्तः। अधिष्ठानं हि यदि संयोगः नासौ सकर्तृकः। यत्नहेतोस्तस्य यत्नादिपूर्वकत्वासिद्धेः। अथ यत्नवदात्मसंयोगः, नायमपि सकर्तृकः, यत्नसमानकालस्य संयोगस्य तत्साध्यत्वानुपपत्तेः। अतश्चेष्टैव प्रथमं सकर्तृका, तत्कार्यं त्वनन्तरमिति व्यवस्थेति।

किञ्च सकर्तृकत्वे साध्ये कार्यत्वं हेतुं वदता सकर्तृकत्वव्यावृत्तिः कार्यत्वव्यावृत्तिव्याप्ता वक्तव्या। साध्याभावस्य साधनाभावव्याप्तिमन्तरेण हेतोर्विपक्षव्यावृत्त्यसिद्धेः। तत्र च यदकर्तृकं तदकार्यमित्यत्र व्याप्तावकारणत्वमुपाधिः। न चात्र साधनव्यापकत्वम्, सामान्यस्य विशेषव्याप्त्ययोगेन विशेषाभावस्यापि सामान्याभावेन व्याप्त्यसिद्धेः। विशेषान्तरेणापि सामान्यस्थितेरविरोधात्।

ननु कोऽयं [1]विशेषः? यदि कारणानामन्यतममात्रम्, तदयुक्तम् ; दिक्कालयोर्व्यभिचारात्। तयोस्सर्वकार्यहेतुत्वेन तदभावस्य कारणमात्राभावव्याप्त्यभ्युपगमात्। अथ

1. कारणविशेषाभावः कारणसामान्याभावव्याप्यो न भवतीत्यत्र कारणविशेषः कः? न तावदन्यतममात्रम्, दिक्कालयोरप्यन्यतमत्वात्। तयोश्च सर्वकार्यकारणत्वेन तदभावस्य कारण-

सर्वकार्याननुगतत्वम् , तदसिद्धम् । अनुमानेनैव विश्वकर्तुस्साधनादिति चेन्न ; अन्यतममात्रस्य सर्वहेतुत्वासिद्धेः । अतः विशेषस्य हि सर्वहेतुत्वम् । कर्तुश्च सर्वहेतुत्वं नाद्यापि सिद्ध्यति । तावन्मात्रेणोपाधेः स्थितत्वात् । सर्वकार्यहेतु(त्व)निर्णयोत्तरकालं हि साधनव्यापकत्वम् । इतरथा पूर्ववत्कार्यमात्रत्वाच्छरीरजन्यत्वप्रसङ्गात् । न च शरीरस्य योग्यानुपलम्भान्निरासः । अयोग्यानामपि शरीराणां सम्भवात् । न च निबिडावयवशिलामध्यवर्तिभेकोत्पादके शरीरप्रवेशानुपपत्तिः, तत्रत्यानामेवा आप्यादिशरीराणां संभवात् । तेषाञ्च शिलारम्भकाल एवारम्भोपपत्तिः । दृश्यमानशरीरस्वभावत्वानतिक्रमाय तत्कारणत्वव्यावृत्तौ दृश्यमानकर्तृस्वभावानतिक्रमाय तत्कारणत्वव्यावृत्तिरप्यवश्याभ्युपेतव्या ।

एतेन विपक्षे बाधकाभावश्चानुसन्धेयः । यद्यकर्तृकं अकार्यमेव स्यादिति तु व्याप्त्यन्तराभावादेवासिद्धेः[2] । यः (यदि) अकारणमेव स्यादिति , [3]उक्तनीत्या व्याप्त्यसिद्धेः । सहदर्शनमात्रेण तूक्तौ पूर्वोक्तोऽतिप्रसङ्गः । ननु च कारकचक्रस्य स्वतन्त्रकारकविशेषानधिष्ठाने तत्त्वमेव दुर्निरूपम् । नच स्वतन्त्रानधिष्ठा(ष्ठाने कारणा)(ष्ठिता)नां [4]कदाचिदेव सहकारिसम्बन्धः कार्यत्वे उपपद्यत इति चेत् , सत्यम् । तत्तु न साक्षादिति दृष्टम् । परम्परया तु चेतनोऽदृष्टादिद्वाराधितिष्ठतीति पूर्वमेवोक्तम् ।

प्रतितर्काश्च भवन्ति—यदि क्षित्यादि सकर्तृकं, शरीरकर्तृकमेव स्यात् , अनित्यज्ञानकर्तृकमस्मदादिकर्तृकमसर्वज्ञकर्तृकञ्च स्यादित्यादयः । व्याप्तिश्च तर्काणां प्रागेव निरूपिता । एतत्सर्वमभिप्रेत्योक्तं भगवता मैत्रेयेणापि—

सामान्याभावव्याप्यत्वात् । नापि सर्वकार्यसाधारणातिरिक्तकारणमेव विशेषः । कर्तुस्सर्वकार्यकारणत्वस्येदानीं साधनेन तस्य तादृशविशेषत्वासिद्धेरिति शङ्कार्थः ।

2. बाधकासिद्धेरित्यर्थः

3. अकार्यत्वेऽकारणकत्वमेव प्रयोजकं न त्वकर्तृकत्वमित्युक्तनीत्येत्यर्थः

4. कदाचिदपीत्यर्थः

" निर्गुणस्याप्रमेयस्य शुद्धस्याप्यमलात्मनः ।
कथं सर्गादिकर्तृत्वं ब्रह्मणोऽभ्युपगम्यते ॥ "[1] इति

अत्र प्रतिविहितं भगवता पराशरेणापि—

" शक्तयस्सर्वभावानामचिन्त्यज्ञानगोचराः ।
यतोऽतो ब्रह्मणस्तास्तु सर्गाद्या भावशक्तयः ॥
भवन्ति तपतां श्रेष्ठ पावकस्य यथोष्णता "[2] । इति ।

अयमर्थः—एते प्रतितर्कादयो दोषा व्याप्तिपूर्वकेऽनुमान एव बाधकाः, न तु तन्निरपेक्षे शास्त्रे ; तत्र धर्मिग्राहकप्रमाणबाधितत्वादिति । यद्यपि शास्त्रस्यापि योग्यत्वापेक्षस्य कथञ्चित्तन्मूलत्वमस्ति, तथापि तत्सम्भावनामात्रेण, सा च नाविनाभावापेक्षिणीति नानुमानवद् दृष्टजातीयविषयत्वम् । सर्वथा चाप्रामाण्ये निरस्ते विषयविशेषपर्यवसानमात्रचिन्तायां यत्र विश्वैवजात्यादिना सर्वप्रमाणाविरोधसिद्धिस्तत्र मुख्य एवार्थे प्रामाण्यम् । यत्र तथापि न सम्भवति, तत्र वृत्त्यन्तराश्रयणम् ; यथा—'आदित्यो यूपः' इत्यादिषु । निखिलेतरविजातीयतया तु विश्वकर्तारं शास्त्रमुपदिशतीति कथं तस्य दृष्टसजातीयतागोचरेणानुमानेन समानयोगक्षेमता । " अथ परा यया तदक्षरमधिगम्यते " इत्यादौ हि सकलेतरवैजात्योपपादनपूर्वकं भूतयोन्यक्षरमभिधीयत इति न सङ्कटं किञ्चिदिति ।

ननु कथं न सङ्कटं ? यदा योग्यतापेक्षोऽन्वयस्तदनन्तरञ्च वैजात्यं, वाक्यार्थगोचरत्वात्तस्य । अतो वैजात्याद्योग्यत्वमयोग्यत्वाभावं वा वदतामन्योन्याश्रयत्वम् । तथा हि—

ज्ञानं सर्वान्वयायोग्यं सर्वं ज्ञानान्वये तथा[3] ।
वैजात्यादुपपत्तिश्चेन्न तत्सिद्धिरनन्वये ॥

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1. वि. पु. 1. 2. 1
2. वि. पु. 1. 2. 2—3
3. अयोग्यमित्यर्थः ।

उच्यते—

उक्तमेतत्प्रमाणत्वमस्ति सर्वात्मना श्रुतेः ।
अतः पदार्थसन्न्यासाद्व्याप्तिनाशो हि युज्यते ॥

प्रत्यक्षश्रुतिशक्तिप्रतिपन्नपदार्थवर्गस्य क्रियाकारकादि(देः) सामान्यतोदृष्टयोग्यतया निस्संशयत्वे, स्वरूपसंसर्गविरोधप्रतिपादकप्रमाणे च सर्वथानुपप(त्प)न्ने, यदि परं पदार्थसहचारिधर्मान्तरव्याप्तिमङ्गीकृत्य तत्तत्पदार्थव्यापकाभिमतवस्त्वन्तरविरोधापादनेनान्वयायोग्यत्वात्केचित्पदार्था उद्धार्यन्ते, लाक्षणिकान्तरपरिग्रहेण च वाक्यार्थनिर्वाहः, ततः पदार्थधर्मव्याप्त्यनुसारेण पदार्थत्याग इति स्यात् । तच्चायुक्तम्[1] । [2] 'अङ्गगुणविरोधे च तादर्थ्यात्' इति न्यायात् । अथ एकपदार्थधर्मव्याप्त्यनुसारेण पदार्थान्तरत्यागः, तत्रापि श्रुतिलिङ्गाधिकरणन्यायविरोधापत्तिः । अतो यत्र पदार्थस्वरूपगतो विरोधो दृश्यते, तत्र तत्त्यागेनान्वयाविरुद्धार्थान्तरलक्षणा, यथा यूपादित्ययोः । यत्र तु स्वरूपेण विरोधो नास्ति, व्याप्त्य(प्त्या) विरोधापादनं, तत्र विरोधापादकपदार्थगुणभूतव्याप्तित्यागेन पदार्थरक्षणमिति विवेकादर्थात्पदार्थस्यापि वैजात्यसिद्धिः । तत्रापि न व्युत्पत्तिभङ्गः; महासामान्यस्यैकत्वात् । तच्च रू(?)........दयनेनैव क्वचिदुपवर्णितं ज्ञातिषु ॥

इति भगवद्रामानुजमुनिवरमतधुरन्धरस्यात्रिगोत्रप्रदीपश्रीपद्मनाभार्यनन्दनस्य
वादिहंसाम्बुदार्यस्य श्रीमद्रामानुजार्यस्य कृतिषु न्यायकुलिशे
ईश्वरानुमानवादभङ्गः पञ्चमः ॥

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1. तच्च युक्तम् इति क्वचित् पाठः ।
2 पू. मी. (12-2-9)

॥ श्रीगुरुभ्यो नमः ॥

॥ लक्षणाविमर्शः प्रथमो भागः ॥

पूर्वतोऽनुवृत्तः

॥ वे. सुब्रह्मण्य शास्त्री ॥

॥ अण्णामलैविश्वविद्यालयः ॥

अथवा अपभ्रंशाद्गवादिरूपार्थबोधेऽपि गावीशब्दाद्बोधो भवतु बोधविषयो गौर्भवत्वित्याकारक एवेश्वरसंकेतः तावतैव तस्य सर्वविषयकत्वनिर्वाहात्। तथा च गवांशे गावीशब्दजन्यबोधविषयत्वस्य बोधविषयतात्वेन प्रकारत्वेऽपि मानाभावेन गावीशब्दजन्यबोधविषयतात्वेनाप्रकारत्वात् ईश्वरसंकेतीयगावीशब्दजन्यबोधविषयतात्वावच्छिन्नप्रकारतानिरूपितविशेष्यत्वस्य गवि अभावेन तत्र तदवगाहिज्ञानस्य भ्रमत्वम्। एवञ्च गङ्गापदस्य तीरशक्तत्वे गङ्गापदजन्यबोधविषयस्तीरं भवत्वित्याकारिका भगवदिच्छा वाच्येति गङ्गापदजन्यबोधविषयतात्वे ईश्वरसंकेतीयतीरादिनानापदार्थनिष्ठविशेष्यतानिरूपितप्रकारतावच्छेदकत्वं, तत्प्रयोज्यतीराद्युपस्थितेः शाब्दबोधानुकूलत्वञ्च कल्पनीयम्। गङ्गापदस्य तीरलक्षकत्वे तु गङ्गापदाद्बोधो भवतु बोधविषयस्तीरं भवतु इत्याकारिकैव ईश्वरेच्छा कल्प्यते। तावतापि तस्याः सर्वविषयकत्वोपपत्तेः। एवञ्च गङ्गापदजन्यबोधविषयतात्वे न नानापदार्थनिष्ठविशेष्यतानिरूपितप्रकारतावच्छेदकत्वं कल्प्यते। अपि तु क्लृप्तशक्यसंबन्धप्रयोज्यतीराद्युपस्थितेः शाब्दबोधानुकूलत्वमात्रं कल्प्यते इति लाघवम्। तस्माल्लक्षणा स्वीकरणीया। इत्थञ्च लक्षणासिद्धौ तन्निबन्धनकार्यकारणभावाधिक्यं न दोषाय फलमुखत्वात्॥

शक्तिज्ञानस्य पदनिष्ठप्रकारतानिरूपितशक्तित्वावच्छिन्नसांसर्गिकविषयतानिरूपितार्थनिष्ठविशेष्यताशालिज्ञानत्वेन लक्षणाज्ञानसाधारणरूपेण शाब्दबोधे कारणत्वम्। कारण-

तावच्छेदककोटौ शक्तित्वपर्याप्तावच्छेदकताकसांसर्गिकविषयता न निवेश्यते। शक्यसंबन्धसंसर्गकपदप्रकारकार्थविशेष्यकज्ञानेऽपि शक्तेः संसर्गतया भानात् निरुक्तकारणतावच्छेदकं लक्षणाज्ञानसाधारणमिति दीक्षितश्रीकण्ठभट्टाचार्याः ॥

(३) केचित्प्राचीननैयायिकाः, लक्ष्यार्थबोधे लक्षणाज्ञानं कारणमिति सर्वसंप्रतिपन्नम्। गङ्गायां घोषः इत्यादौ तीरविषयकशाब्दबोधे शक्यप्रवाहसंबन्धितीरतात्पर्यज्ञानं कारणत्वेन क्लृप्तम्। अतः लक्ष्यार्थबोधकारणज्ञानविषयस्य तात्पर्यस्य लक्षणात्वकल्पनमुचितमिति शक्यसंबन्धिप्रतीतीच्छयोच्चरितत्वपर्यवसितं शक्यसंबन्धिनि तात्पर्यं लक्षणेति वदन्ति ॥

इदं पुनरत्र चिन्तनीयम्। तात्पर्यानुपपत्तिर्लक्षणाबीजमिति तान्त्रिकसिद्धान्तः। तात्पर्यस्य लक्षणात्वे तात्पर्यानुपपत्तिः तात्पर्यबीजमिति स्यात्। तच्च नोपपद्यते स्वानुपपत्तेः स्वबीजत्वासंभवात्। अपि च शाब्दबोधानुकूलपदार्थस्मृत्यौपयिकः संबन्धो वृत्तिः। अतश्च लक्ष्यार्थस्मृतेः प्राक् लक्षणाया वृत्तेर्ज्ञानमपेक्षितम्। वृत्त्या पदार्थोपस्थित्यनन्तरमेव तथोपस्थापितपदार्थे प्रकरणादिना वक्तृतात्पर्यज्ञानं जायते। तात्पर्यस्य लक्षणात्वे तस्या ज्ञानं पदार्थस्मृतेः पूर्वं न संभवतीति सा वृत्तिर्न स्यात्। किञ्च लक्ष्यार्थस्मृतये लक्षणा। स च शक्यसंबन्धज्ञानादेव संभवतीति शक्यसंबन्धस्यैव लक्षणात्वसंभवात् तदतिरिक्तः संबन्धिप्रतीतीच्छयोच्चरितत्वभागो व्यर्थः। अपि च प्रवाहे तात्पर्यस्यापि गङ्गापदशक्तित्वापत्तिः। न चेष्टापत्तिः शक्त्यतिरिक्तलक्षणाया एवासिद्धिप्रसङ्गात्। यदि च वृत्त्योपस्थापितार्थे तात्पर्यग्रहोदयात् तात्पर्यनिर्वाहकत्वेन शक्तिः तात्पर्यातिरिक्तास्वीकरणीया स्वस्य स्वनिर्वाहकत्वानुपपत्तेरित्युच्यते। तदा लक्ष्यार्थतात्पर्यनिर्वाहकतया तात्पर्यातिरिक्ता लक्षणा वृत्तिः स्वीकरणीयैवेति ॥

(४) अन्ये तु अशक्ये तात्पर्यं लक्षणा। शक्यार्थे तात्पर्यस्य लक्षणात्वाभावादशक्ये इत्युक्तमिति वदन्ति। अत्र कल्पे लक्षणाशरीरे शक्यसंबन्धस्याप्रवेशात् तदतिरिक्तांशवैयर्थ्यं न संभवति। परन्तु तदतिरिक्ता दोषाः संभवन्त्येव। किञ्च घटमानयेति वाक्यजन्यशाब्दबोधे घटकर्मत्वयोः संसर्गः (आधेयत्वं) भासते। तत्रापि वक्तुस्तात्पर्यमस्ति। एवञ्च अशक्ये संसर्गे (वाक्यार्थे) लक्षणा स्यात्। न च शक्यसंबन्धो

लक्षणेति मतेऽपि आधेयत्वरूपसंसर्गे घटपदशक्यघटस्य प्रतियोगित्वादिः संबन्धोऽस्तीति संसर्गस्य लक्ष्यत्वं दुर्वारमिति वाच्यम् । गङ्गायां मीनः इत्यत्रापि गङ्गापदशक्यप्रवाह-संबन्धः तीरे वर्तते । परन्तु तदुपस्थितिः तज्जन्यतीरोपस्थितिर्वा न शाब्दबोधोपयोगिनीति तत्र लक्षणा मूकेत्युच्यते । तदुक्तं मणौ 'लक्षणायां तात्पर्याभावेन लक्षणाया मूकत्वात्' इति । एवं संसर्गांशे शक्यसंबन्धरूपलक्षणायाः सत्त्वेऽपि सा मूकैव तस्याः शाब्दबोधौ-पयिकत्वाभावात् । तात्पर्यस्य लक्षणात्वे संसर्गांशे तात्पर्यस्य शाब्दबोधप्रयोजकत्वेन मूकत्वासंभवात् संसर्गांशे शाब्दबोधानुकूललक्षणा दुर्वारैव ॥

(5) अपरे तु स्वार्थसंबन्धेन गङ्गापदं तीरं बोधयिष्यतीति प्रयोक्तुरभिप्रायो लक्षणा । प्रयोक्तुरभिप्रायविशेषाज्ञाने लक्ष्यतीराज्ञानादिति वदन्ति ॥

इदमत्रावधेयम् । गङ्गायां मीन इत्यत्र गङ्गापदं शक्त्या प्रवाहं बोधयिष्यतीति वक्तुरभिप्रायोऽस्ति । स च तथाविधप्रयोगे निमित्तं न तु स एव शक्तिः । तथैव स्वार्थ-संबन्धेन गङ्गापदं तीरं बोधयिष्यतीति वक्तुरभिप्रायः गङ्गायां घोष इति प्रयोगे निमित्तम् । न तु स एव लक्षणा । किञ्च लक्ष्यस्मृतये लक्षणा अपेक्ष्यते । गङ्गापदस्य तीरबोध-कत्वे प्रयोजकः संबन्धः शक्यसंबन्ध इति सिद्धं भवन्मतेऽपि । अन्यथा निरुक्ताभि-प्रायवतो वक्तुर्भ्रान्तत्वापत्तेः । एवञ्च तीरस्मारकत्वेन क्लृप्तः शक्यसंबन्ध एव लक्षणेति युक्तम् । वक्त्रभिप्रायज्ञानं च शाब्दबोध एवोपयुज्यते न पदजन्यपदार्थोपस्थितौ । वृत्तेश्च पदजन्यपदार्थोपस्थितावेवोपयोगः । एवञ्च वक्त्रभिप्रायाज्ञानेऽपि गङ्गापदात् शक्य-संबन्धेन तीरस्मृतिरुपपद्यते इति ॥

(6) अन्ये जरन्नैयायिकाः शक्यादशक्योपस्थितिर्लक्षणा । गङ्गायां घोषः इति वाक्यश्रवणे गङ्गापदात् शक्यप्रवाहस्य स्मृतिर्जायते । ततः तत्र घोषाधारत्वान्वयानुपपत्ति-प्रतिसन्धानम् । ततः स्मृतगङ्गापदात् पुनः शक्यप्रवाहस्मृतिः । तया च प्रवाहसंब-न्धिनस्तीरस्य स्मृतिः । ततः तीरान्वयबोधः । तीरोपस्थापकः गङ्गापदशक्यः प्रवाहः । न च वारद्वयं शक्यप्रवाहोपस्थितिकल्पनायां गौरवात् शक्यसंबन्धाख्यसंबन्धेन गङ्गापदमेव तीरस्मारकं स्वीक्रियतामिति वाच्यम् । संबन्धिज्ञानं तत्तत्संबन्धिज्ञानत्वेन अपर-

संबन्धिस्मारकम्। गङ्गापदस्य शक्तिसंबन्धेन प्रवाहस्मृतिप्रयोजकत्वं, प्रवाहस्य स्वसंबन्धितीरस्मृतिप्रयोजकत्वञ्च क्लृप्तम्। एवञ्च स्मारकत्वेन क्लृप्ताभ्यां गङ्गापदप्रवाहाभ्यामेव शाब्दबोधोपयोगिन्याः तीरोपस्थितेः संभव इति शक्यसंबन्धेन गङ्गापदस्य तीरस्मारकत्वं न कल्प्यते गौरवात्। इत्थञ्च गङ्गापदस्मृतशक्यार्थप्रवाहस्यैव तीरस्मारकत्वे लाक्षणिकं पदं नानुभावकमिति प्रवादोऽपि संगच्छते। पदं वृत्त्या स्वजन्योपस्थितिद्वारा शाब्दबोधे कारणम्। गङ्गापदञ्च न शाब्दबोधविषयसंसर्गप्रतियोगितीरस्मारकमिति न तीरानुभावकम्। न च गङ्गापदस्याननुभावकत्वे तीरान्वितशाब्दबोधो न स्यादिति वाच्यम्। तत्समभिव्याहृतघोषपदादेव तीरान्वितविषयकशाब्दबोधोपपत्तेरित्याहुः।

अत्रेदमालोचनीयम्। घटपदजन्या घटाद्युपस्तितिरेव घटपदस्य शक्तिः किन्न स्यात्। यदि च शाब्दबोधानुकूलोपस्थित्यौपयिकः पदपदार्थसंबन्ध एव वृत्तिः। तदुक्तमभियुक्तैः 'उपस्थितिहेतुर्हि वृत्तिः न तु सैव' इति। अतः शक्यार्थोपस्थितिर्न शक्तिरित्युच्यते। तदा लक्षणापि अशक्यतीराद्युपस्थितिरूपा इति न युज्यते।

अपि च प्रत्ययानां स्वप्रकृत्यर्थान्वितस्वार्थबोधकत्वमिति व्युत्पत्तिः। तत्र च प्रकृत्यर्थत्वं वृत्त्या प्रकृतिजन्योपस्थितिविषयत्वम्। गङ्गापदात्तीरस्यानुपस्थितत्वे तीरं न सप्तमीप्रकृतिगङ्गापदार्थ इति तीरान्वितसप्तम्यर्थाधारत्वावगाही शाब्दबोधो न स्यात्। न च प्रत्ययानां प्रकृत्यर्थोपस्थापितार्थान्वितस्वार्थबोधकत्वव्युत्पत्तिरपि स्वीक्रियते इति गङ्गा-

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(6) "शब्दव्यापारतो यस्य प्रतीतिस्तस्य मुख्यता।
अर्थावसेयस्य पुनर्लक्ष्यमाणत्वमुच्यते॥

यस्य तु शब्दव्यापारगम्यार्थपर्यालोचनया अवगतिः तस्य लाक्षणिकत्वम्" इति निरूपयन्तो मुकुळभट्टाः अमुमेव पक्षमनुसरन्ति॥

"मुख्यार्थबाधे तद्योगे रूढितोऽथ प्रयोजनात्।

अन्योऽर्थो लक्ष्यते यत्सा लक्षणारोपिता क्रिया॥ इति काव्यप्रकाशव्याख्याने शक्यसंबन्धेनाशक्यप्रतिपत्तिर्लक्षणेति प्राचीनमतेनेदं लक्षणमिति प्रदीपकारा निरूपयन्ति॥

पदार्थप्रवाहोपस्थापिततीरेण सप्तम्यर्थाधारत्वान्वयबोधः संभवतीति वाच्यम् । तादृश-व्युत्पत्त्यन्तरकल्पने गौरवात् । अपि च शब्दं जानातीति वाक्यात् आकाशविषय-कत्वावगाही शाब्दबोधः स्यात् । आकाशस्य द्वितीयाप्रकृत्यर्थशब्देन समवायसंबन्धेन उपस्थापितत्वात् । यदि समवायेन प्रकृत्यर्थोपस्थापिते न प्रत्ययार्थान्वयः । तदा यत्र लक्ष्यार्थे शक्यस्य संबन्धः समवायः तत्र घटादितात्पर्येण प्रयुक्ते नीलमानयेत्यादौ नीलरू-पविशिष्टघटाद्यन्वितविभक्त्यर्थविषयकः शाब्दबोधो न स्यात् । नीलपदशक्यार्थनीलरूपेण समवायेनैव तद्विशिष्टघटस्योपस्थापितत्वात् । न च प्रत्ययानां प्रकृतितात्पर्यविषयान्वि-तस्वार्थबोधकत्वमिति व्युत्पत्तिः स्वीक्रियते । तीरं गङ्गापदतात्पर्यविषय इति तेन विभक्त्य-र्थान्वयः । शब्दं जानातीत्यत्र आकाशः न शब्दपदतात्पर्यविषय इति न तेन विभक्त्यर्था-न्वयः । व्युत्पत्त्यन्तराकल्पनाच्च न तन्निबन्धनं गौरवमिति वाच्यम् । स्वोपस्थापक-प्रकृतिकत्वरूपप्रकृत्यर्थत्वापेक्षया स्वप्रतिपादनेच्छयोच्चरितप्रकृतिकत्वरूपस्य प्रकृतितात्पर्य-विषयत्वस्य गुरुत्वेन प्रत्ययजन्योपस्थितिकार्यतावच्छेदकस्यातिगुरुत्वात् । न च प्रकृत्यर्थ-त्वं न प्रकृतिजन्योपस्थितिविषयत्वमात्रम् । घटादिपदात्समवायेनोपस्थापितस्य आका-शस्य घटादिपदरूपप्रकृत्यर्थत्वापत्तेः । अपि तु वृत्त्या प्रकृतिजन्योपस्थितिविषयत्वम् । वृत्तित्वञ्च शाब्दबोधानुकूलपदार्थोपस्थितिप्रयोजकपदपदार्थसंबन्धत्वम् । एवञ्च निरुक्त-वृत्तिज्ञानसहकृतप्रकृतिज्ञानजन्योपस्थितिविषयत्वं प्रकृत्यर्थत्वमिति पर्यवसितम् । तदपेक्ष-या च न प्रकृतितात्पर्यविषयत्वं गुर्विति वाच्यम् । वह्नितात्पर्येण धूमोऽस्तीति प्रयुज्यते । तत्र धूमपदस्य न वह्नौ लक्षणा । धूमपदाद्धूमोपस्थितौ तेन वह्नेरनुमातुं शक्यत्वेन अन्यल-भ्यत्वात् अनन्यलभ्यःशब्दार्थः इति न्यायात् । तत्र धूमपदतात्पर्यविषयवह्निना प्रत्ययार्था-न्वयबोधः स्यात् । तस्मात् प्रत्ययानां प्रकृत्यर्थान्वितस्वार्थबोधकत्वमिति व्युत्पत्तिरेव स्वीकर-णीया । तथा सति गङ्गायां घोषः इत्यत्र प्रवाहोपस्थिततीरेण सप्तम्यर्थाधारत्वान्वय-बोधो न स्यादित्युक्तमिति ॥

(7) केचन मीमांसकाः शक्यनिष्ठः अशक्यसंबन्धो लक्षणा । सा च पदार्थवृत्तिः । गङ्गापदाच्छक्त्या प्रवाहे स्मृते तेन स्वसंबन्धिनस्तीरस्य स्मृतिर्जायते । तथाच लक्ष्यार्थ-स्मारकः शक्यार्थः । अत एव शक्यादशक्योपस्थितिर्लक्षणेति वृद्धतार्किकाः । तत्र

शक्यादिति ल्यब्लोपे पञ्चमी । शक्यमाश्रित्येत्यर्थः । अशक्यस्य उपस्थितिः येन इति बहुव्रीहिणा अशक्योपस्थितिपदात् अशक्योपस्थितिप्रयोजकः लभ्यते । तथाच शक्याश्रितः अशक्योपस्थितिप्रयोजकः संबन्धः लक्षणेति फलितम् । अन्यथा यथाश्रुते वृत्तिज्ञानप्रयोज्यपदार्थज्ञानस्य शाब्दबोधहेतुत्वं नतु शाब्दबोधहेतुपदार्थज्ञानस्यैव वृत्तित्वमित्यसंगत्यापत्तेः । एवञ्च गङ्गापदार्थप्रवाहनिष्ठः तीरसंयोगो लक्षणेति वदन्ति ।

अस्मिन्नपि पक्षे लक्ष्यस्य न प्रकृत्यर्थत्वमिति तेन प्रत्ययार्थान्वयो न स्यात् । अपि च लक्षणा पदवृत्तिः वृत्तित्वाच्छक्तिवदिति अनुमानाल्लक्षणायाः पदवृत्तित्वमेव युक्तम् ॥

(8) वृत्तिवार्तिककृतस्तु मुख्यार्थसंबन्धेन शब्दस्य प्रतिपादकत्वं लक्षणेत्याहुः । अत्र प्रतिपादकत्वमात्रोक्तौ अभिधायामतिव्याप्तिः । शक्त्या प्रतिपादकत्वमभिधा इति तैरभिधालक्षणोक्तेः ।

इदं पुनरत्रालोचनीयम् । मुख्यार्थसंबन्धेनेति तृतीयान्तार्थः मुख्यार्थसंबन्धप्रयोज्यत्वं प्रतिपादकत्वान्वयि । शब्दस्येति षष्ट्यन्तार्थः शब्दनिष्ठत्वमपि तत्रैवान्वेति । प्रतिपादकत्वञ्च प्रतीतिजनकत्वम् । एवञ्च मुख्यार्थसंबन्धाधीनं शब्दनिष्ठं प्रतीतिजनकत्वं लक्षणेति फलितम् । गङ्गापदस्य तीररूपलक्ष्यार्थप्रतीतिजनकतायां मुख्यार्थसंबन्धः कथं प्रयोजकः । गङ्गापदस्य तीरेण मुख्यार्थसंबन्धः (प्रवाहसामीप्यम्) संबन्धः । गङ्गापदस्य संबन्धिनः तीरस्मृतिजनकतायां संबन्धविधया शक्यसंबन्धः प्रयोजक इति यद्युच्यते । तदा शाब्दबोधानुकूलपदार्थोपस्थित्यौपयिकसंबन्धत्वरूपं वृत्तित्वं मुख्यार्थ-

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(7) अस्मिन्मते पदेन बोध्यं शक्यं पदार्थेन बोध्यं लक्ष्यमिति व्यवह्रियते। अभिहितान्वयवादे पदार्थसंसर्गो वाक्यार्थः लक्ष्यः। परन्तु गङ्गायां घोषः इत्यत्र गङ्गापदार्थेन लक्ष्यस्य तीरस्य स्मृतिर्जायते । स्मृतये च प्रवाहतीरयोः संबन्धज्ञानमावश्यकम् । वाक्यार्थस्तु अपूर्व इति शाब्दबोधात्पूर्वं तस्य स्मृतिर्नास्ति । अतश्च वाक्यार्थे संबन्धज्ञानमपि नापेक्षितम् । इत्थञ्च तीरस्य लक्ष्यत्वं गङ्गापदाभिहितप्रवाहस्मार्यत्वम्। वाक्यार्थस्य तु पदार्थानुभाव्यत्वं तत् । पदार्थबोध्यत्वाद्वाक्यार्थे लक्ष्यत्वव्यवहार इति बोध्यम् ।

संबन्धस्य क्लृप्तमिति तस्यैव लक्षणात्वमुचितम्। न तु तत्प्रयोज्यप्रतिपादकतायाः मानाभावाद्गौरवाच्च । न च मुख्यार्थसंबन्धेनेत्यत्र तृतीयार्थः अवच्छिन्नत्वं प्रतिपादकत्वेऽन्वेतीति वाच्यम्। लक्ष्यनिष्ठस्य मुख्यार्थसंबन्धस्य शब्दनिष्ठायां प्रतीतिजनकतायामवच्छेदकत्वासंभवात् । स्वप्रतियोगिवाचकत्वसंबन्धेन तस्य पदनिष्ठत्वेऽपि जनकतावच्छेदकस्य मुख्यार्थसंबन्धस्य वृत्तित्वसंभवे निरुक्तपरंपरया मुख्यार्थसंबन्धावच्छिन्नप्रतीतिजनकतायाः लक्षणात्वे गौरवात् । नच तृतीयान्तार्थः शक्यसंबन्धप्रयोज्यत्वं प्रतिपत्तावन्वेति। प्रतिपादकत्वञ्च प्रतिपत्त्यनुकूलो व्यापारः । एवञ्च शक्यसंबन्धप्रयोज्यप्रतीत्यनुकूलव्यापारो लक्षणेति वाच्यम् । तादृशव्यापारविशेषस्य शक्यसंबन्धरूपत्वे मुख्यार्थसंबन्धो लक्षणेति वक्तुमुचितम् । तदतिरिक्तत्वे, क्लृप्तसंबन्धभावस्य शक्यसंबन्धस्य लक्ष्योपस्थितिप्रयोजकत्वेन क्लृप्तत्वात्तस्यैव लक्षणात्वसंभवे व्यापारान्तरकल्पनायां मानाभावः। यदि शक्यसंबन्धेनेत्यत्र तृतीयार्थः अभेदः व्यापारान्वयी । शक्यसंबन्धाभिन्नः प्रतिपत्त्यनुकूलव्यापारो लक्षणेत्युच्यते । तदा लक्षणायां संबन्धनिमित्तकत्वप्रतिपादकेन "तस्मात्सादृश्यगर्भतदन्यसंबन्धनिमित्ततया गौणी शुद्धा चेति लक्षणाया एव द्वैविध्यम्" इत्यग्रिमग्रन्थेन विरोधः इति ॥

(७) मीमांसकास्तु गभीरायां नद्यां घोषः इत्यादौ वाक्यलक्षणायाः स्वीकरणीयतया तदनुरोधेन बोध्यसंबन्धो लक्षणेति वदन्ति । तेषामयमाशयः। निरुक्तस्थले गभीरनदीतीरवृत्तिर्घोषः इति शाब्दबोधोऽनुभवसिद्धः । स च पदलक्षणया न निर्वहति। तथाहि न तावन्नदीपदस्य नदीतीरे लक्षणेति युक्तम्। गभीराभेदस्य तीरे बाधेनानन्वयापत्तेः। यदि नदीपदलक्ष्यार्थैकदेशनद्यां गभीरपदार्थस्याभेदान्वयः तदा पदार्थः पदार्थेनान्वेति न तदेकदेशेनेति व्युत्पत्तिविरोधः । नापि गभीरपदस्य तीरे लक्षणा। नदीपदार्थस्यानन्वयापत्तेः । नच विशेष्यवाचकनदीपदस्य गभीरनदीतीरे लक्षणा। तत्पदस्य तादृशार्थे लाक्षणिकत्वतात्पर्यग्राहकञ्च गभीरपदमिति वाच्यम् । विनिगमनाविरहेण गभीरपदमेव गभीरनदीतीरलक्षकं नदीपदं तात्पर्यग्राहकमित्यस्यापि सुवचत्वात्। तथाच विनिगमनाविरहेण सिद्धं चेदुभयमपि सिद्धमेवेति न्यायेन उभयोः पदयोः लक्षणाद्वयं

स्यात् । अतः गभीरायां नद्यामिति पदसमुदायरूपवाक्यस्यैव गभीरनदीतीरे एका लक्षणा युक्ता । तादृशपदसमुदायेन च गभीराभिन्ना नदी बोध्यते । तत्संबन्धश्च तत्तीरे वर्तते । न च नदीपदशक्यार्थस्य तीरे साक्षात्संबन्धो वर्तते । गुणवाचकगभीर-पदार्थगाम्भीर्यस्य तु तीरे नदीद्वारकः परम्परासंबन्धः । एवञ्च साक्षात्संबन्धेन नदीपदान्न-दीतीररूपलक्ष्यार्थोपस्थितेः शीघ्रं संभवेन नदीपदस्यैव लक्षणेति वाच्यम् । निम्नं गभीरं गम्भीरमिति कोशात् गभीरशब्दस्य गाम्भीर्यविशिष्टवाचकत्वेन गभीरपदार्थतीरयोः साक्षा-त्संबन्धस्यैव सत्त्वेन विनिगमनानवकाशात् । नच लाघवात् नीलादिपदानामिव गभीरप-दस्यापि गाम्भीर्ये धर्मे शक्तिरिति वाच्यम् । नीलो वर्णः इत्यादिः गुणे स्वारसिकः प्रयो-गोऽस्ति । गाम्भीर्ये च गभीरपदस्य स्वारसिकः प्रयोगो नास्ति । अत एव गभीरपदस्य न गाम्भीर्यवाचिता । अन्यथा घटादिपदानामपि लाघवात् नैयायिकमते घटत्वमात्रवाच-कत्वापत्तेः । न च प्रत्ययानां प्रकृत्यर्थान्वितस्वार्थबोधकत्वमिति व्युत्पत्तिः । विशेष-णवाचकपदोत्तरविभक्तिः प्रयोगसाधुत्वमात्रार्था । एवञ्च नदीपदोत्तरसप्तमी आधेयत्ववा-चिका । विशेषणवाचकगभीरपदोत्तरसप्तमी निरर्थिका । नदीपदोत्तरसप्तम्याश्च न गभीरपदं प्रकृतिरिति गभीरपदार्थगभीरनदीतीरान्वितआधेयत्वावगाही शाब्दबोधो न स्यात् । अतः आधेयत्वार्थकसप्तमीप्रकृतौ नदीपद एव लक्षणोचितेति वाच्यम् । गभीरपदस्य तादृशनदीतीरलक्षकत्वे तस्य विशेषणपदत्वाभावेन तदुत्तरसप्तम्या आधेयत्वार्थकतासंभवात् । प्राथम्याद्गभीरपदस्य लक्षणाङ्गीकारे अन्यत्र विशेषणपदोत्तरविभक्तेः साधुत्वसंपादकत्वेऽपि अत्र विशेष्यवाचकपदोत्तरविभक्तेः साधुत्वसंपादकत्वकल्पनसंभवात् विशेषणविभक्तित्वेन सामान्यतः साधुत्वार्थकत्वकल्पनायां मानाभावाच्च ।

ननु कीदृशवाक्ये लक्षणा । न तावद्गभीरायां नद्यामिति वाक्ये । तदुत्तरं सप्तम्या अभावेन लक्ष्यगभीरनदीतीरान्विताधेयत्वबोधासंभवात् । न च तादृशवाक्यलक्ष्य-स्य गभीरनदीतीरस्य आधेयतासंबन्धेनैव घोषपदार्थे अन्वयः संभवतीति वाच्यम् । तादृ-शसमुदायस्य अर्थवत्त्वेन नामत्वात् तदर्थस्य आधेयतासंबन्धेन घोषनामार्थे अन्वयस्य नामार्थयोरिति व्युत्पत्तिविरुद्धत्वात् । गभीरायां नदीति भागस्य च न गभीरनदीतीरे लक्षणा । अभेदान्वयबोधे समानविभक्तिकत्वस्य तन्त्रत्वात् गभीरायां नदीति भागेन

गभीराभिन्ननदीबोधासंभवेन तादृशसमुदायबोध्याप्रसिद्ध्या तत्संबन्धरूपलक्षणाया अप्रसिद्धेः। यदि च स्तोकं पचतीत्यत्र स्तोकपदासमानविभक्तिकपचधातूपस्थापिते पाके द्वितीयान्तस्तोकपदार्थाभेदान्वयात् समानविभक्तिकत्वं नाभेदान्वये तन्त्रम् । अपि तु विरुद्धविभक्तिराहित्यमेव । गभीरपदोत्तरविभक्तिविरुद्धविभक्तिराहित्यञ्च नदीपदे वर्तते इति तद्भागबोध्यः प्रसिद्ध्यतीति मन्यते । तदापि गभीरनदीतीरान्विताधेयत्वबोधो न स्यात् प्रत्ययानां स्वप्रकृत्यर्थान्वितस्वार्थबोधकत्वव्युत्पत्तेः । गभीरायां नदीति भागस्य सप्तमीप्रकृतित्वाभावादिति चेन्न ।

गभीरायां नदीति भागस्य लक्षकत्वे तस्यार्थवत्त्वेन नामत्वात् तदुत्तरविभक्तेः तदर्थान्वितस्वार्थबोधकत्वे विरोधाभावः । एवं गभीरायां नद्यामिति भागस्य गभीरनदीतीरवृत्तौ लक्षणा । स च नामार्थः अभेदसंबन्धेन घोषनामार्थेऽन्वेति । नामार्थयोर्भेदेनान्वयस्यैव व्युत्पत्तिविरुद्धत्वात् ।

ननु गाव्यादीनामपभ्रंशानामपि लाक्षणिकत्वापत्तिः । गावीशब्दबोध्यगोसंबन्धस्य प्रसिद्धेः । तथा च वृत्तिमत्त्वस्यैव साधुत्वात् तेषामपि साधुतापत्तिरिति चेन्न । एतदनुरोधेन प्रमाधीनस्वजन्यबोधविषयसंबन्धो लक्षणा । अपभ्रंशादौ शक्तिभ्रमादेव शाब्दबोध इति अपभ्रंशजन्यबोधः न प्रमाधीनः । एवञ्च निरुक्तस्य अपभ्रंशबोध्यस्याप्रसिद्ध्या तत्संबन्धरूपा लक्षणा न संभवतीति न अपभ्रंशानां साधुतापत्तिः । तस्माद्वाक्यलक्षणानुरोधेन बोध्यसंबन्धो लक्षणेति ॥

तत्रेदं बोध्यम् । पदविशेषघटितानुपूर्व्याः लक्षकतावच्छेदकत्वकल्पने गौरवात् पदलक्षणाया उभयवादिसिद्धत्वाच्च पदलक्षणैवोचिता । एवंच गभीरायां नद्यां घोषः इत्यत्र गभीराभिन्ना नदीति बोधानन्तरं नदीपदं गभीरपदं वा गभीरनदीतीरं लक्षयति न वाक्यम् । विनिगमनाविरहात् पदद्वये लक्षणायाः स्वीकारेऽपि नान्यतरपदवैयर्थ्यम् । नदीपदेन गभीरनदीतीरबोधे जननीये गभीरपदसमभिव्यवहारो नियामकः । गभीरपदेन तादृशबोधे जननीये नदीपदसमभिव्याहारो नियामकः इति परस्परतात्पर्यग्राहकत्वात् ।

वस्तुतस्तु नदीपदस्यैव गभीरनदीतीरे लक्षणा। गभीरपदं तात्पर्यग्राहकम्। न च विनिगमनाविरहः शङ्क्यः। नीलायां यमुनायां घोषः शुक्लायां गङ्गायां घोषः इत्यादौ विशेष्यवाचकपद एव लक्षणा। नीलशुक्लादिपदशक्यार्थः रूपमेव। तेन च लक्ष्यस्य तीरस्य परम्परासंबन्धः। नदीपदार्थेन च साक्षात्संबन्धः इति विनिगमकसद्भावात्। एवञ्च विशेष्यवाचकपदे लक्षणायाः क्लृप्तत्वात् गभीरायां नद्यां घोषः इत्यत्रापि विशेष्यवाचक-नदीपद एव लक्षणा। तस्मात्पदलक्षणयैवोपपत्तौ वाक्ये लक्षणा अनावश्यकी।

अपि च गभीरायां नदीति भागस्य लक्षकत्वे तस्य नामत्वात्तदन्तर्गतगभीरपदोत्तर-सप्तमी लुप्येत। सुपो धातुप्रातिपदिकयोरित्यनुशासनात्। न च पदसमुदायरूपस्या-स्य कृत्तद्धितसमासाश्चेति नियमबलेन प्रातिपदिकसंज्ञा न संभवतीति वाच्यम्। तथा सति गभीरायां नदीति भागोत्तरं सप्तम्युत्पत्त्यसंभवात् तद्भागस्य सप्तमीप्रकृतित्वाभावात् तदर्थतीरान्वितसप्तम्यर्थाधेयत्वबोधो न स्यात्। अपि च गभीरायां नदीं व्रजेदिति वाक्यादपि गभीरनदीतीरकर्मकत्वावगाही शाब्दबोधः जायेत। गभीरायां नद्यामिति भागस्य गभीरनदीतीरवृत्तिलक्षकत्वे तस्य घोषे अभेदेनान्वयो न संभवति। अभेदान्वये समानविभक्तिकत्वस्य तन्त्रत्वात् तस्य चात्राभावात्। तस्माद्वाक्ये लक्षणा न संभवति।

किञ्च स्वबोध्यसंबन्ध इत्यत्र स्वबोध्यत्वं स्वजन्योपस्थितिविषयत्वं, स्वजन्यशाब्द-बोधविषयत्वं वा। आद्ये समवायेन घटपदजन्यस्मृतिविषयाकाशसंबन्धस्य पटे सत्त्वात् पटादेः घटादिपदलक्ष्यत्वव्यवहारापत्तेर्दुर्वारत्वात्। द्वितीये गङ्गायां घोषः इत्यत्र गङ्गा-पदस्य लाक्षणिकत्वानुपपत्तिः। तत्रत्यगङ्गापदात् प्रवाहस्य स्मृतिरेव न प्रवाहान्वित-विषयकः शाब्दबोधः। बाधज्ञानपर्यवसितस्य अन्वयानुपपत्तिज्ञानस्य सत्त्वात्। एवञ्च प्रवाहः न गङ्गापदजन्यशाब्दबोधविषय इति तत्संबन्धो न गङ्गापदस्य लक्षणा स्यात्। अतः शक्त्या स्वजन्योपस्थितिविषयत्वमेव स्वबोध्यत्वम्। तत्र गङ्गापदेन प्रवाहशाब्द-बोधाजननेऽपि शक्त्या प्रवाहोपस्थितेर्जातत्वाद्गङ्गापदबोध्यत्वं प्रवाहस्य संभवति। एवञ्च शक्तिप्रयोज्यस्वजन्योपस्थितिविषयसंबन्धापेक्षया शक्यसंबन्धस्य लघुत्वात्तस्यैव लक्षणात्व-मुचितम्। वाक्ये च शक्तिः मीमांसकैरपि न स्वीकृतेति लक्षणा संभवति इति।

(10) आलंकारिकास्तु शक्यसंबन्धो लक्षणा। गङ्गापदशक्यप्रवाहसामीप्यं गङ्गापदस्य तीरे लक्षणा। तया च गङ्गापदात् तीरत्वविशिष्टस्य स्मृतिर्जायते। यद्रूपविशिष्टतया गृहीते संबन्धग्रहः जातः एकसंबन्धिज्ञाने सति तेनैव रूपेण अपरसंबन्धिनः स्मरणस्यानुभवसिद्धत्वात्। परन्तु पदजन्यतीरत्वविशिष्टोपस्थित्या गङ्गात्वेन तीरविषयकः गङ्गावृत्तिर्घोषः इति शाब्दबोधो जायते। तीरे घोषः इति प्रयोक्तव्ये गङ्गापदशक्यार्थप्रवाहगतशैत्यपावनत्वादिप्रतिपत्तये गङ्गायां घोषः इति प्रयुज्यते। गङ्गात्वेन तीरशाब्दबोधे सति गङ्गावृत्तिधर्मविशेषप्रतिपत्तिस्तीरे जायते। तदुक्तं काव्यप्रकाशे "तटादीनां गङ्गादिशब्दैः प्रतिपादने तत्त्वप्रतिपत्तौ हि प्रतिपिपादयिषितप्रयोजनसंप्रत्ययः" इति। तथाच व्यञ्जनया प्रवाहगतशैत्यपावनत्वादिप्रतिपत्तये गङ्गात्वेन तीरशाब्दबोधः स्वीकरणीयः। इत्थञ्च अनुभवानुरोधात् शक्यतावच्छेदकप्रकारकलक्ष्यार्थविशेष्यकशाब्दबोधे लक्षणाज्ञानस्य कारणत्वं कल्प्यते। नच पदार्थोपस्थितिशाब्दबोधयोः समानप्रकारकयोरेव कार्यकारणभावात् तीरत्वप्रकारकतीरस्मृतेः गङ्गात्वप्रकारकतीरशाब्दबोधो न संभवतीति वाच्यम्। लाक्षणिकबोधातिरिक्तशाब्दबोध एव समानप्रकारकपदार्थस्मृतेः हेतुत्वं कल्प्यते उक्तानुभवानुरोधात्। न च गङ्गात्वेन रूपेण घोषाधारत्वानन्वयनिश्चयस्य सत्त्वात् गङ्गात्वेन घोषाधारत्वावगाही शाब्दबोधो न संभवतीति वाच्यम्। समानप्रकारकं समानविशेष्यकञ्चायोग्यताज्ञानं प्रतिबन्धकम्। न विभिन्नविशेष्यकमपि समानप्रकारकज्ञानम्। तथा च गङ्गात्वेन प्रवाहे घोषाधारत्वानन्वयनिश्चयसद्भावेऽपि गङ्गात्वेन तीरे घोषाधारत्वावगाही शाब्दबोधो नानुपपन्नः। तस्माल्लक्षणया गङ्गापदात्तीरत्वेनोपस्थितस्यापि तीरस्य गङ्गात्वेनैव शाब्दबोधः इति वदन्ति।

(11) नव्यनैयायिकास्तु सर्वेषां शब्दानां सर्वार्थवाचकत्वे मानाभावात् गङ्गापदस्य तीरे शक्तिर्नास्ति। गङ्गापदोपस्थापिततीरस्य शाब्दबोधे भानात् शाब्दबोधौपयिकतीरस्मृतिप्रयो-

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नागेश मते शक्यतावच्छेदकप्रकारकलक्ष्यार्थबोधः शक्ति प्रयोज्यः।

अस्मिन्मते तादृशो बोधः शक्यसंबन्धरूपलक्षणाप्रयोज्यः इति विशेषः॥

जकः गङ्गापदतीरयोः कश्चन संबन्धो वाच्यः। पदज्ञानस्य एकसंबन्धिज्ञानविधयैव पदार्थोपस्थितिजनकत्वनियमात् । यत्र च शक्यसंबन्धज्ञानादेव तीरमुपस्थितं तत्र तीरान्वितशाब्दबोधस्य सर्वानुभवसिद्धत्वात् शाब्दबोधौपयिकपदार्थस्मृत्यौपयिकत्वेन संप्रतिपन्नः स्वतस्सिद्धसंबन्धभावः शक्यसंबन्धः तादृशसंबन्ध इति युक्तम् । सैव लक्षणा । गङ्गायां घोषः इत्यत्र गङ्गापदशक्यप्रवाहसामीप्यं लक्षणा । यथा संयुक्तविशेष्यकज्ञानप्रकारीभूतं धूमत्वं चक्षुरिन्द्रियव्यवहितधूमयोः संबन्धः । विशेष्यस्य धूमानुयोगिकत्वात् संसर्गविशेषणसंयोगस्य चक्षुरिन्द्रियप्रतियोगिकत्वाच्च । तथा शक्यसंबन्धस्य लक्ष्यतीराद्यनुयोगिकत्वात् शक्तेः पदप्रतियोगिकत्वाच्च शक्यसंबन्धः (प्रवाहसामीप्यम्) गङ्गापदतीरयोः संबन्धः । यद्यपि शक्यसंबन्धः लक्ष्यार्थनिष्ठः । तथापि स्वप्रतियोगिवाचकत्वरूपपरंपरासंबन्धेन शब्दनिष्ठत्वाच्छब्दनिष्ठव्यापार इति व्यवह्रियते । तत्र एकसंबन्धिनः गङ्गापदस्य ज्ञाने अपरसंबन्धिनः तीरस्य स्मृतिर्जायते । एवं गङ्गापदस्य यद्यदर्थैः संबन्धग्रहो जातः तेषां सर्वेषामपि स्मृतिर्जायते । ततः गङ्गापदशक्यार्थप्रवाहघोषयोरन्वयानुपपत्तिप्रतिसन्धानम् । ततः प्रकरणादिना वृत्त्युपस्थापिततीरे तात्पर्यज्ञानम् । ततः तीरान्वितविषयकः शाब्दबोधो जायते । न च प्रवाहवृत्तिर्घोषः इति शाब्दबोधाजनने कथं तत्रानुपपत्तिप्रतिसंधानं संभवतीति वाच्यम् । वाक्यार्थस्यापूर्वत्वेऽपि शाब्दबोधजननात्पूर्वं तच्छाब्दबोधेच्छयोच्चरितत्वरूपतात्पर्यज्ञानस्येव अनुपपत्तिप्रतिसन्धानस्यापि तत्तत्पदार्थस्मरणे सति संभवाविरोधात् । किञ्च प्रवाहवृत्तिर्घोष इति शाब्दबोधे जाते अनुपपत्तिप्रतिसन्धानं न संभवति । प्रवाहस्य घोषाधारत्वमनुपपन्नमिति ज्ञानं घोषः प्रवाहावृत्तिरिति ज्ञाने पर्यवस्यति । तत्र च प्रवाहवृत्तिर्घोषः इति शाब्दबोधस्य बाधज्ञानविधया प्रतिबन्धकत्वात् । न चेदं रजतमिति भ्रमानन्तरं नेदं रजतमिति बाधज्ञानवदिदमपि ज्ञानं जायतामिति वाच्यम् । लौकिकसन्निकर्षाजन्यदोषविशेषाजन्यतद्वत्ताबुद्धावेव तदभाववत्तानिश्चयः प्रतिबन्धकः । अतः इदं रजतमिति प्रतिबन्धकज्ञानसत्त्वेऽपि लौकिकसन्निकर्षजन्यं नेदं रजतमिति प्रत्यक्षं संभवति । अत्र तु गङ्गायां घोषः इति वाक्यश्रवणकाले गङ्गाघोषयोरिन्द्रियासन्निकृष्टत्वादनुपपत्तिज्ञानं लौकिकसन्निकर्षजन्यं न संभवति । दोषविशेषजन्यज्ञानञ्च

न प्रकृतोपयोगि । अतः शक्यार्थान्वितशाब्दबोधानन्तरं अनुपपत्तिप्रतिसन्धानं न युज्यते । तस्मात्तत्पदार्थस्मरणानन्तरं अनुपपत्तिप्रतिसन्धानं जायते ।

यद्रूपवत्त्वेन गृहीते संबन्धज्ञानं एकसंबन्धिज्ञानेन तेनैव रूपेण अपरसंबन्धिनः स्मृतिरनुभवसिद्धा । तीरत्वविशिष्टे संबन्धज्ञानं जातमिति गङ्गापदात्तीरत्वेनैव तीरस्य स्मृतिः । समानप्रकारकयोरेव शाब्दबोधपदार्थोपस्थित्योः कार्यकारणभावात् तीरत्वेनैव तीरशाब्दबोधः । इत्थञ्च शक्यतावच्छेदकप्रकारकलक्ष्यार्थबोधे लक्षणाज्ञानस्य कारणत्वं न कल्प्यते । न वा समानप्रकारकयोः पदार्थोपस्थितिशाब्दबोधयोः कार्यकारणभावः लाक्षणिकबोधातिरिक्तविषयकः कल्प्यते । न च गङ्गात्वेन तीरस्याभाने गङ्गागतशैत्यपावनत्वादीनां न तीरे प्रतीतिरिति प्रयोजनालाभ इति वाच्यम् । तीरस्य गङ्गापदप्रतिपाद्यत्वज्ञानान्मानसात् गङ्गागतशैत्यपावनत्वादीनां तीरे प्रतीतिः संभवति । स्पष्टश्चायमर्थः काव्यदर्पणे । एवञ्च लाक्षणिकवाक्यजन्यशाब्दबोधो न भ्रमः तीरत्वेनैव तीरविषयकत्वात् । न च देवदत्ते अजधनत्वस्य यज्ञदत्ते अविधनत्वस्य चान्वयतात्पर्येण अजाविधनौ देवदत्तयज्ञदत्तौ इति प्रयोगवारणाय समस्यमानपदार्थयोरेकधर्मावच्छिन्नान्वय एव द्वन्द्वसमाससाधुता स्वीकरणीया । गङ्गापदलक्ष्यतीरस्य तीरत्वेन बोधे गङ्गायां मीनघोषौ स्त इत्यत्र मीनघोषयोरेकधर्मावच्छिन्नान्वयाभावात् द्वन्द्वो न साधुःस्यादित्युक्तमिति वाच्यम् । समस्यमानपदार्थयोरेकपदोपस्थाप्यान्वयित्वे द्वन्द्वसमाससाधुता इति स्वीकारेऽपि निरुक्तप्रयोगवारणं संभवति । तत्र एकपदोपस्थाप्यान्वयाभावात् । गङ्गायां मीनघोषौ स्त इत्यत्र तीरत्वेन भासमानस्यापि , तीरस्य प्रवाहोपस्थापकगङ्गापदेनैवोपस्थापितत्वात् तदन्वयेऽपि न द्वन्द्वासाधुता । न चैवं नियमस्वीकारे अजाग्रामौ नयतीति साधुःस्यात् नीधातुनोपस्थापितसंयोगे ग्रामस्य तेनैवोपस्थापितायां संयोगावच्छिन्नक्रियायां अजायाश्च अन्वयविवक्षायां एकपदोपस्थाप्यान्वयित्वस्याक्षतत्वादिति वाच्यम् । तुल्यतया एकपदोपस्थाप्यान्वयिताया एव द्वन्द्वसाधुताप्रयोजकत्वोपगमात् । नीधातोः संयोगावच्छिन्नक्रियानुकूलव्यापारे शक्तत्वात्तेन संयोगस्य व्यापारविशेषणतावच्छेदकतया क्रियायाः व्यापारविशेषणतया चोपस्थितत्वात् तयोस्तुल्यतया एकपदोपस्थाप्यत्वाभावात् निरुक्ता-

न्वयविवक्षायां द्वन्द्वासाधुता । गङ्गायां मीनघोषौ स्त इत्यत्र लक्ष्यतीरस्यापि शक्यप्रवाहस्येव विशेष्यतयोपस्थापितत्वात् तुल्यतया एकपदोपस्थाप्यान्वयित्वमक्षतमिति द्वन्द्वसाधुता निर्वहति ।

अथवा गङ्गायां मीनघोषौ इत्यत्र गङ्गापदस्य गङ्गातीरोभयत्वावच्छिन्ने लक्षणा । मीनघोषोभयत्वावच्छिन्नं गङ्गातीरोभयत्वावच्छिन्नवृत्ति इति शाब्दबोधः । मीने प्रवाहवृत्तित्वस्य घोषे तीरवृत्तित्वस्य च बोधो मानसः । एवञ्च एकधर्मावच्छिन्नान्वयित्वनियमाङ्गीकारेऽपि न दोषः । गङ्गापदलक्ष्यतावच्छेदकोभयत्वरूपैकधर्मावच्छिन्नान्वयित्वस्याक्षतत्वात् । तथा च शक्यतावच्छेदकरूपेण लक्ष्यार्थभानं नावश्यकम् ।

इत्थञ्च आयुर्घृतमिति वेदवाक्यजन्यशाब्दबोधः प्रमैवेति वेदकर्तुः शाब्दबोधसमानाकारज्ञानवतः न भ्रमवत्त्वापत्तिः । अन्यथा आयुष्ट्वेन घृतशाब्दबोधस्य भ्रमत्वात् तत्समानाकारप्रयोगहेतुज्ञानवतः वेदकर्तुरीश्वरस्य भ्रमवत्त्वमापद्येत ।

कमलानि कमलानीत्यत्र लाक्षणिककमलपदात् सौरभविशिष्टकमलत्वेनैव बोधः । एवञ्च दण्डवान्रक्तदण्डवानिति वाक्यादिव निरुक्तवाक्याच्छाब्दबोध उपपद्यते । वृक्षो महीरुह इति व्याख्यानवाक्ये महीरुहपदस्य महीरुहपदप्रतिपाद्ये लक्षणा । ज्ञानसामान्ये शब्दभानानङ्गीकारेण तत्तच्छब्दभेदेन शाब्दबोधस्योपपादयितुमशक्यत्वात् । तथा च उद्देश्यतावच्छेदकविधेयतावच्छेदकयोः वृक्षत्वमहीरुहपदप्रतिपाद्यत्वयोर्भेदादभेदान्वयबोधः सम्यगुपपद्यते ।

अतद्भावेऽपि तदुपचारः इति न्यायसूत्रावयवं अतच्छब्दस्य तेन शब्देनाभिधानमिति विवृण्वन्ति न्यायभाष्यकाराः । 'सहचरणात् यष्टिकां भोजयेति यष्टिकासहचरितब्राह्मणोऽभिधीयते' इत्यादिना तेन शब्देनाभिधाने निमित्ततया सहचरणादिकमेव निरूपयन्ति नत्वारोपम् । इत्थञ्च केषांचित्प्राचीननैयायिकानां शक्यतावच्छेदकारोपस्वीकारोऽपि नादरणीयः । उपपद्यते च 'शक्यादन्येन रूपेण ज्ञाते भवति लक्षणा' इत्यभियुक्तोक्तिः ।

स च शक्यसंबन्धः साक्षात्परंपरासाधारणः। गङ्गायां घोषः इत्यत्र तीरे शक्यार्थस्य साक्षात्सम्बन्धः संयोगविशेषः। इन्द्रा स्थूणा इत्यत्र तत्कर्मकपूजाप्रयोजनकत्वं परंपरासंबन्धः। न हि प्रयोजनं लक्ष्यं संबन्धाभावादिति काव्यप्रकाशपर्यालोचनया गौण्यतिरिक्तस्थले परंपरासंबन्धस्य लक्षणात्वास्वीकारो नोपादेयः। उक्तताद्दर्थ्यादीनां अखण्डसंबन्धत्वकल्पनागौरवात्। लक्षणयापि शैत्यपावनत्वादीनां प्रतीतिः संभवतीति वादिनां नैयायिकानां प्रयोजनं न लक्ष्यमिति काव्यप्रकाशसंगमनस्यानावश्यकत्वात्।

शक्यविनाभूतार्थस्य शाब्दबोधवारणाय शक्याविनाभाव एव लक्षणा। मञ्चाः क्रोशन्तीत्यादावपि पुरुषे मञ्चपदलक्ष्यार्थे शक्यार्थाविनाभावः क्रोशनकाले वर्तते इति न लक्षणानुपपत्तिरिति केचित्। तन्न। घटमुच्चारयेत्यत्र घटशब्दः स्वस्मिन्लाक्षणिक इति नैयायिकसिद्धान्तः। तच्च नोपपद्येत घटपदशक्यार्थेन घटपदस्य देशतः कालतो वा अविनाभावस्याभावात्। अपि च यत्रान्वययोग्यौ शक्याविनाभूतौ द्वावर्थौ संभवतः तत्र एक एव शक्याविनाभूतोऽर्थः शाब्दबोधे भासते इत्येतत्तात्पर्येणैव निर्वाह्यम्। एवञ्च शक्यसंबन्धमात्रस्य लक्षणात्वेऽपि तात्पर्यविरहेणैव शक्यविनाभूतार्थस्य शाब्दबोधवारणसंभवाच्छक्याविनाभावस्य लक्षणात्वस्वीकारो व्यर्थः। सादृश्यरूपः शक्यसंबन्धः गौणीत्युच्यते। गौर्वाहीकः इत्यत्र गोपदस्य गोसदृशे लक्षणा। सादृश्यञ्चात्र गोवृत्तिजाड्यादिमत्त्वम्। एवञ्च जडो बाहीक इति शाब्दबोधः। जाड्यादिगुणस्य गोपदलक्ष्यतावच्छेदकत्वात् सम्यगुपपद्यते 'लक्ष्यमाणगुणैर्योगाद्वृत्तेरिष्टा तु गौणता' इत्यभियुक्तोक्तिः।

तस्माच्छक्यसंबन्धो लक्षणा। सा च पदमात्रवृत्तिः। प्रत्येकपदशक्त्यैव बोधोपपत्तौ पदसमुदायरूपवाक्ये शक्तेरभावेन शक्यसंबन्धरूपलक्षणाया असंभवात् इति निरूपयन्ति।

॥ इति लक्षणाविमर्शे प्रथमो भागः ॥

University Notes

CONVOCATION.

The sixth Annual Convocation of the University was held on Friday the 20th November 1936, presided over by His Excellency Lord Erskine, G.C.I.E., the Chancellor of the University. The Address to the graduates was delivered by the Hon'ble Sir Phiroze Sethna Kt., of Bombay.

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OUR VICE-CHANCELLOR.

The Rt. Hon'ble V. S. Srinivasa Sastriar, P.C., C.H., LL.D., was delegated by the Government of India to enquire into the conditions of Indian Labour in Malaya. He left Annamalainagar on the 20th November 1936 and after completing his labours on the Government of India delegation he returned to this country on the 20th January 1937. The report of the delegation is awaited and we are sure it will be a valuable contribution towards solving the difficulties of our nationals in that part of the world.

During the period he was away M.R.Ry. T. R. Venkatarama Sastriar Avl., B.A., B.L., C.I.E., Advocate, acted as our Vice-Chancellor.

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CONGRESSES AND CONFERENCES.

The following members of the Staff attended as delegates of the University the Conferences noted below:—

Prof. M. S. Sundaram	.. The 12th All-India Educational Conference at Gwalior.
Rao Saheb C. S. Srinivasachariar	.. The Vijayanagara Foundation Sexcentenary Celebrations at Hampi.
Prof. R. Ramanujachariar	.. The Philosophical Conference at Delhi.
Dr. B. V. Narayanaswami Naidu	.. The 20th All-India Economic Conference at Agra.
Mr. M. K. Muniswami	.. Do. Do.

Dr. S. Ramachandra Rao	..	The Indian Science Congress at Hyderabad.
Dr. K. Aswath Narain Rao	..	Do. Do.
Mr. L. K. Govindarajulu	..	Inter-University Zone Committee of the Board of Cricket Control at Hyderabad.

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CENTRAL ADVISORY BOARD OF EDUCATION.

The Government of India nominated the Rt. Hon'ble V. S. Srinivasa Sastriar, P.C., C.H., LL.D., Vice-Chancellor as a member of the Central Advisory Board of Education to the Government of India.

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UNVEILING THE PORTRAIT OF THE EX-VICE-CHANCELLOR.

The Founder-Pro-Chancellor presented to the University a life-size oil painting of M.R.Ry. Dewan Bahadur S. E. Ranganathan Avl., M.A., I.E.S., Ex-Vice-Chancellor of the University, which was unveiled by His Excellency the Chancellor on the 20th November 1936.

The Founder-Pro-Chancellor in requesting the Chancellor to unveil the portrait said :

" I am most grateful to Your Excellency for your kind consent to unveil the portrait of M.R.Ry. Dewan Bahadur S. E. Ranganathan, Avl., M.A., I.E.S., (retired), our Vice-Chancellor for a continuous tenure of six years in all. In 1929, when the Right Hon'ble V. S. Srinivasa Sastriar, our first Vice-Chancellor, was called away to East Africa on an Imperial mission Government kindly lent the services of the Dewan Bahadur temporarily for a year. Having made a name as a popular educationist during his long association with the Presidency College as Professor of English from 1907 to 1929 with very little interruption, he had just then been appointed Principal of the Government College at Kumbakonam. He was then no stranger to the Sri Minakshi College, the nucleus of this University, for early in its history he was one of the two great educationists who came on Commission to inspect the College with a view to its status being raised from second grade to first grade in 1922. In 1928 Mr. Ranganathan had just returned, having concluded his labours as the Chairman of a University Commission visiting all the Colleges of the Non-Andhra area. His Excellency Lord Goschen, the then Chancellor, was pleased to extend the period of his loan to the University for the rest of the normal period of a Vice-Chancellor ; and later, for another period of three years. During all these six years he had

arduous work both in the academic and administrative spheres. The courses modelled on those of the Madras University were altered in the light of his great experience at the Madras University as member of the Syndicate, Chairman of the Boards of Studies and Examiner in English and as the Chairman of the Inspection Commission. On the administrative side, he had to see to the building up of this University Colony and providing more quarters for Staff, more lecture halls, the erection of a Sports Pavilion, the equipment of a play-ground and the institution of an electric supply scheme and the starting of a Ladies' Club. Thus he gave of his best to the University. For his labours in the direction of promoting social contact between the teachers and the taught, we are indebted to him. In the working of the Women's Club and promoting the social life of the colony he was ably assisted by the sympathetic and genial personality of his wife.

By his signal service in the cause of collegiate education from 1907 to 1934 he has earned the gratitude of several generations of his students and the warmest regard of the public. Even in retirement he does not stint himself for work in the cause of education. It is only a few days ago he returned from serving the cause of the classical and vernacular languages of the country. At gatherings of teachers and in discussions for the betterment of education his counsels have been of great value.

It is true he lives here in spirit by his work at the University, To the present students of this University who have seen him, his memory will be quite fresh; but to remind those that might come hereafter, it is necessary to furnish the aid of a resemblance. His portrait should adorn the Senate Hall in the Library and Administrative Buildings and will be taken there when the erection of the New Buildings is complete."

His Excellency the Chancellor in unveiling the portrait said:

"Raja Saheb, Ladies and Gentlemen—It is a very pleasant duty which you have asked me to perform and I am indeed glad to have this opportunity of paying my tribute to one to whom this University is so deeply indebted. Of the holder of the office of Vice-Chancellor much is required—great intellectual attainments, a real administrative ability and, more than these, a large-hearted understanding of human nature, capable of drawing forth all that is best in the character of those committed to his charge and at the same time of stamping the impress of his personality upon them. All these qualities and more we find in Mr. Ranganathan, and in honouring him, we do honour ourselves. After a successful career at college, Mr. Ranganathan chose to go abroad to complete his studies, and wisely did he choose, for he went to Scotland. I am happy to think that what he learned there stood him in good stead in later years. Thereafter followed a long period of devoted service to the

cause of education in South India and our Presidency College will not soon forget so kindly a professor and warden.

But it is with the birth of this University that his name will ever be most closely associated and there could be no finer testimony to his achievement than the flourishing position to which in seven short years it has attained. For Mr. Ranganathan laid his foundations wisely and well. His University was to be no exotic growth divorced from the realities of his country's life and educational system. He believed that it should provide an all-round training, should cater for the many-sided needs of growing youth, and through corporate activities, should make itself first and foremost a mould of character and a mother of fine men and women. Let that objective be achieved and on that sound basis would assuredly grow the brilliance of literary and scientific attainment which is more taking to the outward eye. I think few will question how right Mr. Ranganathan was and how badly India needs more men of his stamp. His retirement is a great loss to our educational service, but it is good to know that he is not lost to Madras, but is still here and ready to help and advise, I hope, for many long years to come. I am sure that nothing could please him more than to see this admirable portrait hanging here, a constant reminder to future generations of students of what their University owes to his wise guidance."

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INFORMATION BUREAU.

In accordance with the resolution passed by the Senate in October, 1935, recommending the institution of a Bureau of Information of careers for graduates to provide facilities for their employment, arrangements have been made to supply information about vacancies and competitive and other examinations.

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COLONISATION SCHEME

The Syndicate has appointed a special committee to explore the possibilities of utilising the agricultural lands in the possession of the University for purposes of colonisation by such students of the University as are in need of employment and are prepared to take to private farming on the lines of the Punjab Colonisation Scheme. The following were appointed to constitute the Committee:

M.R.Ry. Rao Bahadur M. R. Ramaswami Sivan Avl. (Convener).
Nawabzada Sadaat Ulla Khan, B.A. (Oxon), I.A.S., Deputy Director of Agriculture, IV Circle, Madras.
The Assistant Director of Agriculture, Cuddalore.
Dr. B. V. Narayanaswami Naidu, M.A., Ph.D., B.Com., Bar-at-Law.
Mr. K. S. Venkataramani, M.A., B.L. and
The Registrar.

RESEARCH.

The following is the statement of research work done by the various departments and published in other journals.

PHILOSOPHY

Mr. P. S. Naidu. in collaboration with Dr. B. V. Narayanaswami Naidu.	Tandava Lakshana.	Book published.
	Heisenberg's Principle of Uncertainty.	Philosophical Quarterly, 1936 .
	An Extension of Prof. MacDougall's Theory.	Indian Philosophical Congress.
Prof. R. Ramanujachariar.	The Philosophical Implications of the theory of Evolution.	do. 1936.

HISTORY

Rao Saheb C. S. Srinivasachariar.	Edited and Contributed papers to.	Dr. S. K. Aiyengar Commemoration volume.
	Contributed a paper to.	Jayanti Ramayya Pantulu's Commemoration volume.
	do.	Silver Jubilee volume of the Tanjore Karanthai Tamil Sangam.
	do.	Pandit C. R. Namasivaya Mudaliar Commemoration volume.
	do.	Jaina Commemoration volume of Lahore.
Mr. R. Sathianatha Iyer.	The Kadavaraya Problem.	Dr. S. K. Aiyengar Commemoration volume.
	Historical Notes on the Mudrarakshasa.	Mm. Prof. S. Kuppuswami Sastriar Commemoration volume.

ECONOMICS

Dr. B. V. Narayanaswami Naidu.	Ten Year Plan for Agriculture.	Bulletin No. 2, The S. I. E. & L. O. Economic Council.
	The Economics of Public Health.	A. M. Vol. VII.
	The Great Depression.	Financia Expertus.
	Economic Intelligence in India.	Indian Review.

Mr. V. G. Ramakrishna Iyer.	India's Agricultural Incomes.	Eco. Jl. (Lond.),
	The Financing of Provincial Autonomy.	Financia Expertus (Udipi).
	Small Scale Production in India.	The New Review (Calcutta).
	The Administration of Income-tax in India.	Indian Economic Conference (Agra).
Mr. M. K. Muniswami.	Some suggestions for increasing Railway Revenue in India.	Indian Economic Conference (Agra).

MATHEMATICS

Prof. A. Narasinga Rao.	On Quadratic Equations.	The Mathematics Student Vol. IV.
	The Contract of Varieties in n-space.	,, ,,
	Observations on Father Racine's Paper.	,, ,,
	On certain cremon transformations in circle-space connected with the Miquel-Clifford Configuration.	Camb. Phil. Society, Proceedings.
Dr. S. S. Pillai.	On Warings Problem. II.	Journal of the Indian Math. Soc. Vol. II.
	On Sets of Square Free Numbers.	,, ,,
	On $A^x - B^y = C$.	,, ,,
Dr. S. S. Pillai and Dr. Chowla.	The number of representation of a number as the sum of n non-negative n^{th} powers.	Quarterly Journal, Vol. VII.
,, ,,	Hypothesis K of Hardy and Littlewood.	Math. Zeitschrift, Vol. 41.
Dr. B. Ramamurti.	On the line of striction of a quadric.	The Mathematics Student, Vol. IV.
Mr. S. Subramaniam.	The section of a cone by a plane through its vertex.	Mathematical Gazette, 1935.
	The Madras Land Revenue System—Some Aspects.	Indian Journal of Economics, 1936.
	The Role of Weights in International Trade Statistics.	Indian Journal of Economics, 1936.

PHYSICS

Dr. S. R. Rao.	Magnetic properties of colloidal powders of metallic elements.	Current Science Vol. IV. pp. 572-576.
	Magnetism and cold-working in metals—Part I. Poly Crystals.	Proceedings of the Indian Academy of Sciences, Vol. IV. pp. 37-53.
	Do. Part II. Single Crystals of bismuth, zinc and tin.	do. pp. 186-203.
	Soft X-rays and photo-electrons from nickel at different temperatures.	Current Science Vol. 5 pp. 73-74.
Dr. S. R. Rao and Mr. K. C. Subramaniam.	Magnetic susceptibility of single crystals of lead, thalium, and tin.	Philosophical Magazine, Vol. 21, pp. 609-624.
Mr. K. C. Subramaniam.	Magnetic susceptibilities of some organic compounds in different physical states.	Proceedings of the Indian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 3, pp-420-427.
	The diamagnetism of some metallic hallides.	„ Vol. 4, pp. 404-413.
Mr. P. S. Varadachari and Mr. K. C. Subramaniam.	Magnetic Studies of sulphur and some sulphur compounds.	„ Vol. 3, pp. 428-434.

ZOOLOGY

Mr. A. Ramakrishna Reddy.	"Crab-fishing" in the Ceded districts.	Current Science Vol. 5, No. 3.

TAMIL

Prof. S. S. Bharatiar.	A Poem of 225 verses known as Marivayil.	Book published by the Professor himself.
Mahavidvan R. Raghava Aiyengar.	Dissertations (1) Pattinapalai (2) Perumpanarruppadai.	
	The Tamilian Law of Inheritance.	
	The origin of the Velirs.	
	World Mother Worship.	Professor S. Kuppuswami Sastriar Commemoration volume.
Mr. E. S. Varadaraja Aiyer.	"Ancient Tamilian Warfare."	do.
	"Ancient Tamilian Architecture."	
Mr. K. Vellaivarnan.	Thevaram and Periapuranam.	

SAMSKRIT

Mahamahopadhyaya Professor S. Kuppuswami Sastri.	A substantial paper on Mandana and Suresvara in the history of Advaita.	The Annals of the Bhandarkar Institute, Poona.
	Dhvanyaloka with Locana and the Upalocana. (Second Fasciculus).	Madras Law Journal Press, Mylapore.
Mr. V. A. Ramaswami Sastri.	Tattvabindhu.	Published by the Annamalai University.
	The Rasa-aspect of the Malati Madhava.	Professor S. Kuppuswami Sastriar Commemoration volume.
Mr. B. N. Krishnamurti Sarma.	A paper on the Agamaprakarana of the Mandukya karikas.	Poona Orientalist.
	Vijayindra - tirtha and Ramacarya-two Dwaita Philosophers.	Professor S. Kuppuswami Sastriar Commemoration volume.
Mr. K. A. Sivaramakrishna Sastri.	Nagananda and the Santarasa.	Professor S. Kuppuswami Sastriar Commemoration volume.
Mr. V. Subramania Sastri.	Harmony of the Puranic Texts.	Professor S. Kuppuswami Sastriar Commemoration volume

Reviews

The Mysore University English-Kannada Dictionary—Part I (A to Billow). 96 pages. Printed by the Superintendent, the Government Press, Bangalore. Price not stated.

This publication is the first part of an authoritative English-Kannada Dictionary which the Government of Mysore have arranged to get prepared by a special committee of Kannada scholars and publish in twelve parts. As the Chairman of the Editorial Committee writes in the preface, "A sufficiently comprehensive and authoritative English-Kannada Dictionary which would help to convey into the vernacular modern ideas in English has long been needed" and it is difficult to understand why no attempt to remedy this defect was made all these years, considering that Kannada is the state language of Mysore and is spoken in parts of Madras and Bombay Presidencies and H. E. H. the Nizam's Dominions.

As at present constituted, the committee of publication consists of Mysore scholars only, but probably it would have been better if two or three Kannada scholars from outside the state had been included so that there might have been a better likelihood of the Dictionary being accepted as a standard work in the whole of Kannadadesa.

The Committee deserves the congratulations of all Kannadigas for the very thorough way in which the work, which evidently must have been arduous, has been accomplished. Such an important work must not be allowed to take too long to finish, but the staff seems to be totally inadequate to enable the Committee to complete the work within a reasonable period.

Without any intention of disparaging the excellent work done by the Committee, I may be permitted to make one or two suggestions. The important work of scrutinizing the pronunciation of English words and transcribing them into Kannada script should be done by a special sub-committee consisting of experts in both the languages. The Dictionary is meant for the use of all Kannada-speaking people, be they scholars or mere literates and the use of simplest possible Kannada words in the Dictionary might, with advantage, be considered by the Committee.

The price of the Dictionary is not stated. It would help to popularise it, if a reduction in price could be offered to advance subscribers, although I am sure the Committee would have already considered the matter.

K. A. N. R.

Acoustics. By Mr. R. K. Viswanathan Avl., B.A. (Hons.), Lecturer in Physics, (Annamalai University. Price Rs. 1-8-0).

I congratulate the authorities of the Annamalai University for having given the author the opportunity to write this book and I welcome with pleasure the text-book on Acoustics written in Tamil by Mr. R. K. Viswanathan, B.A. (Hons.), for the use of students preparing for the Sangeetha Bhushana title.

In eleven well chosen and well arranged chapters the author has given a clear and good account (without entering into mathematical details) of the main principles of Sound and Music, such as the production and properties of sound waves, vibrations of strings and air columns, mechanism of audition, Musical scale and Temperament.

One interesting feature is the excellent way in which the author has discussed the nature of the musical instruments used in South India. A general account is also given of phonograph, gramaphone and the radio music. The chapter on Temperament is ably written. But the author as a man of science could well have discussed his views on 22 or 24 srutis. A comparative study of melody and harmony in music could also have been very advantageously added.

The book is very well written and well serves the purpose for which it is written. The printing and get up compare very favourably with the best publications. The author's free use of transliteration throughout the book may not stand in the way of easy grasp of the subject. But I wish that this transliteration could be reduced to a minimum by the use of corresponding terms in Tamil wherever they exist.

I heartily congratulate Mr. R. K. Viswanathan and the University for the excellent treatise giving in a compact volume all fundamental ideas of sound and music. The book though intended for Sangeetha Bhushana course should certainly prove to be of immense help to an intelligent reader who desires to have definite ideas of the fundamentals in Acoustics.

P. E. S.

A Study of Economic Depression in Rural Kistna.—By Ch. Sitharama Sastry and C. Sriramanarasimham. Published by The Madras Provincial Co-operative Union. pp. 58.

In this brochure the authors place before the general public the results of a personal enquiry they conducted into the economic conditions of Rural Kistna during the depression years. How hard the agri-

culturist has been hit by the depression, and what adjustments he has made to the new situation are the main themes of the work, and to elucidate these, different aspects of rural economic life are examined. Crop distribution, price dispersion, cost of agricultural wages—these are some of the topics dealt with. The enquiry was intensive and was confined to select villages in the district, but the villages were wisely chosen so as to cover both the delta and the uplands. Within the limits set by circumstances the enquiry was thorough, and the authors have to be congratulated on the mass of information they have been able to gather together and interpret. They have been singularly fortunate in disarming suspicion and inducing the ryot to part with information usually not made available to the Rural Investigator.

Their chapter on costs of cultivation and the net income of the agriculturist will be found to be interesting reading, and amazing to a degree, and it will not be strange if this amazement should at times verge on disbelief. So appalling are the conditions depicted therein. On the topic of rural debt liquidation the authors have valuable suggestions to make, but one misses direct data bearing on the debt position. Agricultural wages are examined in detail, and a few pages are devoted to the treatment of village artisans and their miserable plight. A more balanced selection of crops, and a change over from money payments to payments in kind are discoursed as two essential parts of the process of adjustment which the agriculturists have been able to make to the new situation. But of even more significance than these, in the opinion of the authors, have been the sale of 'distress gold,' and the lowering of the standard of life. In conclusion there is a plea for a planning of rural economy, a diversification of occupations and the conversion of potential to effective demand. The work contains also useful graphs and informing appendices. Unfortunately some graphs and some appendices to which reference is made in the text are not found in the book.

This is a book which will well repay reading.

C. W. B. Z.